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THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN 






BY 

HERMAN G. 1 A. BRAUER, M.A. 



A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, 1902 



(Reprinted from the Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, 

Philology and Literature Series, 

Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 205-379) 



MADISON, WISCONSIN 
October, 1903 



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FROM WHOM I HAVE ALL THAT IS BEST IN MY LIFE 

I DEDICATE THIS LITTLE BOOK 

A TRIBUTE OF LOVE 

AND ESTEEM 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 



CHAPTEE I. 



INTKODUCTORY. 



"Ren an peut etre defmi d'un seul mot, qui, heureusement, 
n'est pas une fornmle: ce fut Phomme le plus intelligent du 
XIXe siecle," fimile Faguet, in the Histoire de la Langue et 
de la Litterature frangaise, Paris, 1899, tome YIH, pp. 397. 
Of. Monod : Renan, etc., 40, 48 * 

"Personne n'a parle de nos jours un franc, ais plus savant a 
la f ois et plus simple, plus limpide, plus sincere, a, travers lequel 
s'apergoive niieux la pensee." Gaston Bbissier, L'Academie 
Frangaise, Recueil des Discours, Rapports et Pieces diverses, 
tome I, p. 808. 

On the two qualities emphasized in these judgments! the fame 
of Renan chiefly rests: the clearness, simplicity and sincerity 
of his matchless prose, and the extraordinary fertility and com- 
prehensive culture of his many-sided mind. In this paper it is 
from the side of his thought, and not of his style, that he is 
approached. 

A study of Renan as a philosophic thinker would seem to re- 
veal a third quality in respect of which he stands unexcelled, 
if not unequalled, in the century just closed. If it is true that 
he was the most intelligent man of the nineteenth century, it 
certainly is true no less that he Was the most inconsistent. 
Even more remarkable than his wonderful fertility in ideas is 
the amazing incongruity of these ideas among themselves. 
Lest this should seem an exaggeration, I hasten to adduce his 



•"For this and all other abbreviations see Appendix C, page 37S. 



210 BULLETIN Or THE UNIVEESITY OF WISCONSIN. 

own testimony in support of these statements. That Ren an 
was abundantly aware of the many contradictions in his writ- 
ings, the following passage alone would sufficiently prove. 

"Bon gre, mal gre, et nonobstant tons mes efforts conscien- 
tieux en sens contraire, j'etais predestine a etre ce que je suis, 
un romantique protestant contre le romantisme, un utopiste 
ixrechant en politique le terre-a-terre, un idealiste se donnant 
inutilement beaucoup de mal pour paraitre bourgeois, un tissu 
de contradictions, rappellant Vhircocerf de la scolastique, qui 
avait deux natures. TJne de mes moities devait etre occupee 
a demolir l'autre, conmie cet animal fabuleux de Ctesias qui 
se mangeait les pattes sans s'en douter." Souv.,* 73. Cf. 
Ibid., 62, 116-7. 

This confession is amply endorsed by a careful study of Re- 
nan's writings, except . perhaps the phrase: "nonobstant tous 
mes efforts conscientieux en sens contraire," which certainly 
does not accord very well with the following statement, written 
about the same time, and in which he seems rather to glory in 
his very inconsistencies: 

"In utrumque paratus! Etre pret a, tout, voila peut-etre la 
sagesse. S'abandonner, suivant les heures, a la. confiance, au 
scepticisme, a. l'optimismei, a. l'ironie, voila le moyen d'etre siir 
qu'au nioins par moments on a ete dans le vrai." !F. Det, 
396. Cf. A. S., 43. Similar utterances abound in his books, 
especially those of the later period. 

Such cavalierly indifference to logic might seem at first sight 
to be only an expression of certain moods in his later phase, 
when experience had shown that his "efforts conscientieux" at 
consistency remained stubbornly fruitless. But such an ex- 
planation is forbidden by the facts. For nowhere is the incon- 
sistency of his opposite ideals more frankly avowed, or the pol- 
icy of alternative contradictory assertion more deliberately em- 
braced, than in his earliest writings. 

As early as 1845, for example, in a personal letter, he says : 

"J'ai pris la-dessus franchement mon parti; je me suis de- 
barrasse du joug importun de la consequence, au moins provisoi- 
rement, Dieu me condamnera-t-il pour avoir admis simulta- 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 211 

nement ce quo reclament simultanement mes' diflerentes fae- 
ultes, quoique je no puisse concilier lours exigences contraires ?" 
Souv., 321. 

This casting aside of the importunate fetter's of logic, reluc- 
tantly accepted in this letter as a provisional compromise, was 
destined soon to become a settled policy. Three years later, 
in the Avenir de la\ Science, the impossibility of expressing the 
whole truth within the limits of logical consistency, is already 
proclaimed in a very different tone: 

"Le premier pas de celui qui veut penser est de s'enhardir 
aux contradictions, laissant a Favenir le soin de tout concilier. 
Un homme consequent dans son systeme de vie est certainement 
un esprit etroit. Oar je le dene, dans l'etat actuel de l'esprit 
humain, de faire concorder tous les elements de la nature hu- 
maine. S'il veut un systeme tout d'une piece, il sera done 
reduit a nier et exclure." A. S., 100. 

The unhesitating firmness of tone in this passage, when con- 
trasted with the apologetic timidity of his earlier statements, 
seemk to indicate a more settled conviction. Unwilling com- 
pulsion has already become deliberate choice. 

The same position is reaffirmed in his first published book, 
L'Averroes et VaveiTo'isme, 1852 : 

"L'inconsequence est un element essentiel de toutes les 
choses humaines. La logique mene aux abimes. Qui pent 
sender l'indiscernable mystere de sa propre conscience, et, dans 
le grand chaos de la vie humainei, quelle raison sait au juste ou 
s'arretent ses chances de bien voir et son droit d'affirmer?" 
Averr., 170. Of. ibid., X. 

Renan does not mean of course to advocate a systematic 
disregard of logical rules as such. He merely contends that 
the various "f acuities" and "capacities" of what we call human 
nature habitually and spontaneously, and perhaps inevitably, 
tend to affirm propositions and imply points of view which can- 
not be brought into logical accord with each other. A few tyj>- 
ical passages from his later books will help to make clear his 
meaning, and incidentally show how deliberately and persist- 



212 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

ently this indifference to self-contradiction prevailed in his own 
practice. 

In his Discours de reception before the Academie Franqaise, 
1878, he says : 

"J'estime qu'il est des sujets sur lesquels il est bon de se con- 
tredire; car aucune vue partielle n'en saurait epuiser les in- 
times replis. Les verites de la conscience sont des phares a 
feux changeants. A certaines heures, ces verites paraissent e- 
videntes; puis, on s'etonne qu'on ait pu y croire. . . Vingt 
fois l'humanite les a niees et afnrmees; vingt fois l'humanite 
les niera et les afhrmera encore." Disc., 41-2. 

And two years later, in his address before the Royal Society 
of London, speaking of Marcus Aurelius: 

"II vit bien que lorsqu'il s'agit de l'inflni aucune formule 
n'est absolue, et qu'en pareille matiere on n'a quelque chance 
d'avoir apergu la verite une fois en sa vie que si Ton s'est beau- 
coup contredit." C. d'Angl., 237-8. 

In his Introduction to the Booh of Job and his Essay on Ec- 
clesiastes, once more, he declares that consistency, in matters 
of metaphysical speculation, is a mark of pedantry and narrow- 
ness, and inconsistency rather a sign of truth: 

"La question que l'auteur se propose est precisement celle 
que tout penseur agite, sans pouvoir la resoudre; ses embarras, 
ses inquietudes, cette fagon de retourner dans tous les sens le 
noeud fatal sans en trouver Tissue, renferment bien plus de 
philosophic que la scolastique tranchante qui pretend imposer 
silence aux doutes de la raison par des reponses d'une appar- 
ente clarte. La contradiction, en de pareilles matieres, est le 
;signe de la verite." Job, LXVII. Cf. Dr. Ph., 176. 

"Malheur a qui ne se contredit pas au moins une fois par 
jour. On ne fut jamais plus eloigne du pedantisme que l'au- 
teur de l'Ecclesiaste. La vue claire d'une verite ne l'empeche 
pas de voir, tout de suite apres, la verite contraire, avec la 
meme clarte." Eccl., 24. 

I have purposely quoted at length from Kenan's own words, 
in order to* leave no doubt that he was quite aware of the many 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 213 

inconsistencies in his own writings, and that he was rather 
proud than otherwise of their presence. 

When a writer thus boldly admits logical contradictions 
among his first principles, it of course becomes a difficult task 
to exhibit his thoughts in coherent form. "Abandon logic all 
who enter here," might be written over the entrance of Kenan s 
temple of philosophic truth. 

In the present instance this difficulty of exposition is 
increased by the fact that many of his characteristic doctrines 
are most clearly developed in his Dialogues and his Drames 
Philosophiques j but he expressly declines to be held responsible 
for the opinions professed by his interlocutors: 

"Je me resigne d'avance a ce que l'on m'attribue directe- 
ment toutes les opinions professees par mjes interlocuteurs, 
meme quand elles sont contradictoires. Je n'ecris que pour des 
lecteurs intelligents et eclaires. Ceux-la admettront parfaite- 
ment que je n'aie nulle solidarite avec mes personnages et que 
je ne doive porter la responsabilite d'aucune des opinions qu'ils 
expriment." Dial., VII. Cf. Dr. Ph., 257; Souv., 377. 

From most writers such a disclaimer would be entirely rea- 
sonable, or rather unnecessary. But Eenan, surely, should be 
the last of all men to repudiate opinions professed in his 
dramas merely on the ground of their contradicting each other ; 
and to 1 absolve him from responsibility for those opinions, on 
that ground alone, would seeml to' be going counter to his own 
professed principles. 

But there is, in fact, a special reason, in his case, for insist- 
ing on this responsibility. It would not be hard to show that 
every doctrine of importance developed in iheDialogues and the 
Drames Philosophiques is put forward elsewhere in his writ- 
ings, explicitly or implicitly, by himself directly. Cf. Seailles, 
E. R, 280-1. 

The following example is typical. In his preface to the 
Preire de Nemi, he complains that certain critics have imputed 
to him the subversive doctrines of Ganeo, the least attractive 
character in the play, to whom he himself refers in the same 
connection as "le vil coquin." 



314: BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

"J'ai mis en scene Ganeo, 'le vil coquin,' trouvant un dis- 
ciple digne de lui dans Leporinus, et lui enseignant la derniere 
consequence de l'egoisme, la lachete. O'est la doctrine de 
Ganeo qu'on a presentee comme la niienne. J'aurais preche 
justement ce dont j'ai voulu inspirer le mepris! C'est comme 
si Ton soutenait que les Spartiates montraient des esclaves ivres 
a leurs enf ants, non pour les leur f aire prendre en horreur, 
mais pour les engager a les imiter." Dr. Ph., 259. 

Now what is this doctrine of Ganeo, so indignantly repudi- 
ated by Kenan? Briefly this: that courage in battle is 
frequently punished by death, and cowardice rewarded by es- 
cape from death ; the brave man dies on the field while cowards 
at home enjoy the fruits of his bravery. 

"La lachete est presque toujours recompensee; quant au 
courage, c'est une vertu qui est le plus souvent punie de la 
peine de mort." 

"JSPest-ce pas?" continues Ganeo, "Le vrai vainqueur, c'est 
celui qui se sauve. Vaincre, c'est ne pas se faire tuer. On a 
1'air de supposer que le vainqueur mort jouit de sa victoire. 
Mais il n'en sait rien. Les honneurs qu'on rend a, son cadavre, 
c'est comme si on les rendait a un tronc d'arbre." 

"Mais on dit gue les dieux aiment les braves," objects Lepo- 
rinus. 

"Tant mieux pour les dieux," retorts Ganeo, "s'il y en a. 
"J'aime mieux ma peau que 1' amour des dieux. Avec 1' amour 
des dieux, on pourrit bel et bien sous terre." 

"On a aussi l'estinue des homines." 

"Oui, l'estime de vos deux voisins de rang, a condition qu'ita 
n'aient pas ete tues comme vous." 

"Mais il y a la nation." 

"Ah ! si je te disais cme la nation aussi a interet a. etre vain- 
cue. Malheur a la nation victorieuse.' . . . Le vain- 
queur est le pire des maitres, le plus oppose aux reformes. 
O'est au lendemain d'une defaite qu'une nation fait des pro- 
gress. O'est au lendemain d'une defaite que l'on est libre, heu- 
reux. Dieu nous preserve de la victoire ! Eh bien, 



BKATJEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENA1ST. 215 

reflechis done, men cher. A moins de conserver l'imrnortalite 
de Fame pour les militaires, l'essentiel, dans une bataille, est 
de se sauver." ... La mort est la faute irreparable. 
. . ." Dr. Ph., 355-358. 

Embarrassing reflections, truly; reflections which, encour- 
aged by the authoritative pen of M. l'Administrateur du Col- 
lege de France, might well provoke objections from French, pa- 
triots. But in what respect does Ganeo's doctrine differ from 
the following declaration, published by our author himself four- 
teen years earlier? 

"L'interet personnel ne conseille jamais le courage militaire; 
car aucun des inconvenients qu'on enoourt par la lachete 
n'equivaut a, ce que Ton risque par le courage. II faut, pour 
exposer sa vie, la foi a quelque chose d'immateriel. Or, cette foi 
disparait de jour en jour." lief. Int., 116. Cf. Dr. Ph., 258. 

What effort did Penan ever make, one cannot help wonder- 
ing, to encourage men's faith in a future life % 

The further assertion of Ganeo, that individual welfare is 
not necessarily proportioned to national strength, is likewise 
endorsed by Penan directly: 

"Le gouvernement representative est etabli presque partout. 
Mais des signes evidents de la fatigue causee par les charges 
nationales se montrent a l'horizon. Le patriotism© devient lo- 
cal; l'entrainement national diminue. . . Dans cinquante 
ans le principe national sera en baisse. . . II est devenu 
trop clair, en effet, que le bonheur de l'individu n'est pas en 
proportion de la grandeur de la nation a laquelle il appartient. 
. . ." A. S., XV-XVI. 

The truth is, that Penan's disavowal of the teachings of his 
interlocutors whenever they contradict his own, must be re- 
garded as adding another contradiction to the number, for in 
point of fact they never do contradict him. The opposite 
points of view which these characters are usually made to es- 
pouse, in reality represent the opposite conceptions of the two 
lobes of his own brain. His very reason, indeed, for giving 
to his thoughts the form of a dialogue was because in this way, 



216 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

as he himself says, he could best give expression to his own 
two-sided, philosophic beliefs; 

"Prive de mes livres et separe de mes travaux," he writes 
in the preface to his Dialogues philosophiques, "j'employais 
ces loisirs forces a faire un retour sur moi-meme et a dresser 
line sorte d'etat sommaire de mes croyances philosophiques. 
La forme du dialogue me parut bonne pour cela, parce qu'elle 
n'a rien de dogmatique et qu'elle permet de presenter succes- 
sivement les diverses faces du probleme, sans que l'on soit 
oblige de conclure. Moins que jamais je me sens l'audace de 
parler doctrinalement en pareille matiere." Dial., V— VI. 

But on the next page in the same preface he writes : 

"Ghacun de ces personnages represente . . . les cotes 
successifs d'une pensee libre ; aucun d'eux n'est un pseudonyme 
que j'aurais choisi . . . pour exposer mon propre senti- 
ment." 

These statements, taken both together, can only mean that, 
while each of his interlocutors represents a certain phase of Re- 
nan's own doctrine, no one of them, represents that doctrine com- 
pletely. And this is true. Any one of his characters, taken 
alone, would certainly misrepresent Kenan's position. But the 
misrepresentation would be due not to a real contradiction, but 
rather to the .consistent advocacy of a single phase of the ques- 
tion at any one time. 

In view of our author's protest., however, the Dialogues and 
the Drames philosophiques are quoted in this paper only as con- 
firming positions taken by the author elsewhere, which they 
often express more briefly and more clearly. 

Few men have been more written about, by friends and by 
foes, than Reman. All the eminent literary critics, and many 
others, have had their say; and several biographers have told 
the story of his life. A list of these works will be found in 
Appendix B. 

The most elaborate attempt yet made to explain, from a psy- 
chological point of view, the complex personality of Renan, and 
the many contradictions in his writings resulting therefrom, is 



\ 



BRAI7ER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN". 217 

that of M. Gabriel Sleailles: Eimest Renan, Essai de Biogra- 
phie psychologique, 2 e edition, Paris, 1895. 

This writer tries to show tbat Kenan's inconsistencies are 
the logical outcome of his rejection of metaphysics, and his ex- 
clusive reliance upon the experimental method. 

"Renan attend tout de la science, il n'y a pas une verite qui 
ne vienne d'elle:, il lui demande non settlement les faits et les 
lois, mais, plus hardi qu'A. Comte, l'idee qui domine les faits 

et-coordonne les lois a la fin ideale de l'univers 

II etait bon que oette experience fut faite, et en un sens elle 
a ete faite pour tous. L'echec de Renan n'est pas un accident, 
il est le terme logique d'une philosophie qui se reduit a, l'his- 
toire, demande aux faits eux-memes 1' intelligence des faits, et 
devant leurs dementis ne pent que renoncer a, elleKmeme et 
desesperer. ... La vie intellectuelle de Renan est une 
experience faite pour tous, elle nous apprend ou. la logique 
conduit un esprit sincere qui, resolu a suivre la verite jusqu'au 
bout, l'attend du seul temoignage des faits." E. R., VIII, 341. 

My own opinion is that M. Seailles is trying too hard to 
refer to a single cause what in truth was due to the coopera- 
tion of a great many ; and that, moreover, he has approached 
his author too exclusively from the intellectual side. It was 
not so much Renan's rejection, of metaphysics, — indeed, he did 
not reject it in the sweeping manner assumed by M. Seailles^ — 
but rather his heterogeneous temperament; not his adherence 
to the experimental method, but rather his frequent and capri- 
cious departure from that method, that furnished the principal 
source of the puzzling contradictions in his philosophical writ- 
ings. But further discussion of this point must be reserved for 
a later chapter. 

An explanation seems called for in regard to the form of 
the exposition here attempted. After bringing together and 
comparing with one another all Renan's utterances on the va- 
rious topics discussed, his contradictions were found to be so 
bold and so unceasing, that it seemed impossible to avoid mis- 
representation, or to convey anything like a true idea of the 



218 BULLETIN OF TPIE UNIVEESITY OF WISCONSIN. 

nature of his mind, except by exhibiting his own statements 
side by side, and making discussion and criticism incidental. 

This mode of exposition will of course not lend itself well 
to continuous narrative, and is certain for that reason to prove 
less attractive to the reader; but it seemed the only way to 
avoid arbitrary exclusions. Moreover, this method has the 
advantage of presenting Kenan's views mainly in his own words, 
and thus provides at least, in convenient groupings, materials 
for a more detailed study of the subject at some future time. 
The topics are accordingly grouped under three heads : Nature, 
Man, Society. Under the first will be found Kenan's ideas on 
guch questions as evolution vs. special creation, law and miracle ; 
materialism and spiritualism; theism:, pantheism, agnosticism 
and positivism. In the other two divisions are presented his 
views on certain questions in ethics and politics respectively. 
The concluding chapter suggests the direction in which we must 
turn for a knowledge of the psychological factors involved in 
the production of his heterogeneous personality. 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 219 



CHAPTER II. 



NATURE. 



Of Kenan's nature-philosophy, in the sense just described, 
the most characteristic feature is its thorough-going evolution- 
ism). As early as 1845, fourteen years before the publication 
of the Origin of Species, he had quite abandoned the special- 
creation hypothesis, and adopted instead, at least within the 
limits of his own specialty, the principle of gradual evolution 
in accordance with natural law. Souv., 251. 

At least as early as 1848 also, he had developed a formula 
'for evolution in general, recalling that which has since become 
famous in the wording of Herbert Spencer. It may help the 
comparison to place the two side by side. Mr. Spencer's well- 
known formula runs thus : 

"Evolution is au integration of matter and concomitant dis- 
sipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an 
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent het- 
erogeneity ; and during which the retained motion undergoes a 
parallel transformation." Eirst Principles, §145. 

Renan's conception is not expressed in such definite terms; 
it is less abstract, but also less concise and less comprehensive, 
being restricted to living forms. He writes in 1848 : 

"Evolution d'un germle primitif et syncretique par 1' analyse 
de ses membres, et nouvelle unite resultant de cette analyse, 
telle est la loi de tout ce qui vit. Un germe est pose, renf er- 
mant en puissance, sans distinction, tout oe que l'etre sera un 
jour; le germle se developpe, les formes se constituent dans 
leurs proportions regulieres . . . Mais rien ne se cree, 
rien ne s'ajoute. Je me suis souvent servi avec succes de la 
comparaison suivante pour faire comprendre cette vue. Soit 



220 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

une masse cle chanvre homogene, que l'on tire en cordelles dis- 
tinctes ; la masse representera le syncretisme, ou. coexistent con- 
fusement tons les instincts; les cordelles representeront 1' ana- 
lyse. Si Ton suppose que les cordelles, tout en restant distinctes, 
soient ensuite entrelaeees pour former une corde, on aura la 
synthese, qui differe du syncretisme primitif, en ce que les 
individualites bien que nouees en unite y restent distinctes.'' 
A. S., 313. 

This conception is applied by Renan to the evolution of the 
human mind, as represented in languages, literatures and re- 
ligions; and, in a more hypothetical way, to cosmic evolution 
at large. See A. S., 301-318. Herder, Michelet, and Cousin 
are frequently mentioned by him in connection with these views. 
So extreme was Kenan's enthusiasm for evolutionary science 
in this early period of his life that, had he been free to de- 
vote himself to biology instead of theology, as he often declared 
in later days, he would probably have anticipated some of the 
demonstrations of Darwin. Souv., 262-3. He was forced 
into other fields, however; and so, instead of an Origines des 
Especes, it was Les Origines du, Christianisme which established 
his famle in the world. 

Writing nearly half a century later of his views in the 
forties : 

"J'avais un sentiment juste de ce que j'appellais les origines 
de la vie. Je voyais bien que tout se fait dans l'humanite et 
dans la nature, que la creation n'a pas de place dans la serie 
des effets et des causes. T'rop peu naturaliste pour suivre les 
voies de la vie dans lei labyrinthe que nous voyons sans le voir, 
j'etais evolutionniste decide en tout ce qui concerne les produits 
de l'humanite, langues, ecritures, litteratures, legislations, 
formes sociales. J'entrevoyais que le damier morphologique 
des especes vegetales et animales est bien l'indice d'une genese, 
que tout est ne selom un dessein dont nous voyons l'obscur cane- 
vas." A. S,, XII-XIII. Ctf. ibid., 170-2. 

But the truth is that Eenan and Darwin approached the prob- 
lem from entirely different points of view. Consistently with 
his clerical antecedents, Eenan approached the question of evo- 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST RENAN. 221 

lution from the side of its theological and religious significance. 
To his mind, at least in the earlier period, the assertion of evo- 
lution was primarily a denial of the biblical account of creation, 
and of all the theological dogmas thence derived. 

In a world governed by natural law, — this is the very key- 
stone of his nature-philosophy — supernatural agencies have no 
place. In the endless chain of cause and effect which formed 
bis conception of nature, each event is bound to its neighbor 
by a tie of internal necessity which is never broken through by 
interpositions of a supernatural or extra -natural power. Dial., 
162 ; Or. Lang., 241. 

"Une chose absolument hors de doute, c'est que, dans l'uni- 
vers accessible a notre experience, on n'observe et on n'a jamais 
observe aucun fait passager provenant d'une volonte ni de 
volontes superieures a celle de l'homme." F. Det., 402 ; also 
•406. 

This conviction dates back as far as 1846, and was apparently 
formed, under the influence of, or at least in co-operation with, 
nis friend M. Berthelot. In all his life Renan never again 
changed from this position. Souv., 337-8 ; also', 371-2. 

Neither is there any such thing as intentional action to be 
discovered in the operations of Nature. Whatever may be true 
of the government of the universe as a whole, in the details of 
this planet, if we except the actions of finite beings, there is 
no such thing as intelligently directed action ; nor ever has been, 
so far as man can ascertain. The unerring precision and ab- 
solute constancy of natural law, making it possible to' predict 
results from a given combination of known materials and forces, 
is alone sufficient ground, he affirms, for discarding the idea of 
intelligent or intentional action in the workings of Nature. 

"Le caractere de precsion absolue du monde que nous ap- 
pelons materiel suffirait a eloigner l'idee d'intention; l'inten- 
tionnel se trahissant presque toujour® par le manque de geo- 
metrie et l'a-peu-pres." F. Det., 404. Cf . Or. Lang., 241 . 

In the present state of the universe, intelligence is restricted 
to a middle region: both above and below finite minds, all is 
night. There is no evidence that our planet has ever been in- 



222 BULLETIN OF THE TJNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

fluenced by any rational being higher than man. A God, in 
the ordinary sense of the word, a living, acting God, a Provi- 
dence, is nowhere discernible. F. Det., 406-7. And this ab- 
sence of purposive action may be affirmed without hesitation, 
ihe declares, of the entire solar system, and even of the whole 
universe, so far as planetary motions are concerned. There is 
no reasonable doubt that the other celestial bodies likewise fol- 
low laws of development inherent in their own constitution. 
At any rate, the onus probandi rests upon those who deny this. 1 
F. Det,, 405. 

Ben an does not mean to assert that a conscious ruler of the 
world does not exist ; but merely that no such influence is dis- 
cernible in the details of the world's government over that por- 
tion of space and time which man can investigate. Dial., 20. 
In other worlds or other ages, interventions by outside powers 
may possibly occur. It may well be that, compared with the 
totality of things, the portion of the universe accessible to the 
observations of man is a mere point; and what is true of this 
point, need, not^ of course, be true of the whole. At all events, 
with respect to the totality of things, it would be as rash to 
deny as to affirm intervention by superior powers. Dial., 22 ; 
F. Det., 417. 

The same course of reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
infinite^ time. Between our phenomenal universe, which we 
know is not eternal, and the primordial universe, of which we 
know nothing at all, there may be infinitudes of intervals. But 
if we admit, as Benan thinks we must, that our phenomenal 
world is but a finite part, of an infinite whole, everything is 
possible, even God. F. Det., 416. The day may come, for 
aught we know or can do to the contrary, when some outside in- 
fluence will break through the causal nexus of our world and 
destroy its autonomy, without more regard for our theories than 
Ave show for the microbes in a clod that we crush. F. Det., 416. 
Imagine an atom, unconscious as a whole but inhabited by con- 
scious individuals asserting the complete autonomy of their 
little world. Suppose that chemistry should some day succeed 
in disintegrating these atoms. And is it quite impossible that 



BRATTER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 223 

our universe should have similar proof some day of the possi- 
bility of interventions from outside powers? F. Det., 414. 

But plainly, all this speculation about the constitution of a 
supposed primordial universe turns on mere possibilities, and 
between posse and esse the gulf is too wide to' be bridged by 
the fragile fabrics of mere fancy. So far as our positive knowl- 
edge of nature extends, Renan maintains, inviolate natural law, 
unbroken by any trace of supernatural intervention, reigns su- 
preme in the universe. Of. A. S., 170-1 ; 174. 

This intense constitutional aversion, as it must be called, 
for anything that savored of miracle, is best understood from 
a study, of his childhood environment. 

As Mr. Balfour among others has pointed out, one of the most 
important causes of belief, because the most irresistible, is the 
psychological climate, as he calls it, in which a person is born. 
And indeed, a little reflection will show that none of our earli- 
est beliefs, whether in religion, philosophy or science, can be 
properly called the product of our own reasoning at all. A 
man cannot choose the first beginnings of his intellectual life 
any more than he can choose his parents or his native land. 
His first beliefs are matters of ethnical geography, and are de- 
termined by what may be called the mloral zone or psychological 
climate of his early surroundings. In the words of Mr. 
Balfour : 

"Considered from the side of their origin, a man's early 
beliefs are mere products of natural conditions, psychological 
growllis, comparable to the flora and fauna of continents and 
oceans." Found. Bel., 196; Of. James, Will to Bel.; Bain's 
Men! and Mor. Sci., especially the Appendix, p. 80 ; also 
Philos. Rev., V, p. Iff. 

This truth is well exemplified in the life of Ernest Renan. 
His native town, Treguier, had grown out of an ancient mon- 
astery, and was shrouded in an atmosphere of mythology, as 
dense as Benares or Jagatnata. S'ouv., I. He calls it a nest 
of priests and nuns, cut off from all trade and industry. Secu- 
lar pursuits were looked upon as vanity and vexation of spirit, 
while all about the town, in the high places and the country holy- 



424 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

wells, Mab and Merlin, the fairies and the witches, had their 
devotees. Cf. Mme. Darmsteter, Life of Renan, pp. 4-5 ; 
Seailles, E, R., p. 4. 

A large place in the lives of the people was given to the wor- 
ship of saints, most of theirn unkown to the rest of Christendom, 
and whose solitary little chapels stood here and there among 
the moors or barren rocks. 

These local deities have left indelible marks on the mind of 
Renan. More than half a century later he writes : 

"La physionomie etrange, terrible, de ces saints, plus druides 
que chretiens., sauvages, vindicatifs, me poursuivait comme un 
cauchemar." Sou v., 82. 

Among other virtues, these saints were reputed to possess 
the power of working miracles. A good example of these is the 
miracle by which, as Renan was taught to believe, his father 
was cured of fever when a child. Before day-break, the child 
was taken to the chapel of the saint who exercised the healing 
power. A blacksmith arrived at the same time with his forge, 
nails and tongs. He lighted his fire, made his tongs red-hot, 
and held them before the face of the saint, threatening to shoe 
him like a horse unless he cured the child of his fever. The 
threat took immediate effect, and the child was cured. Souv., 
p. 86. 

A still better test of credulity was the miracle performed 
once a year by Saint Yves de la Verite, the patron-saint of Brit- 
tany, on the occasion of an annual festival held in his honor : 

"La veille de la fete, le peuple se reunissait le soir dans 
l'eglise et, a, minuit, le saint etendait le bras pour benir l'as- 
sistance prosteraee. Mais s'il y avait dans la foule un seul 
incredule qui levat les yeux pour voir si le miracle etait reel, 
le saint, justement blesse de ce soupcon, ne bougea.it pas, et, 
par la faute du mecreant, personne n'etait beni." Souv., 11. 

Renan was not slow to discover a common trait in all these 
miracles: the credulity of the witnesses. "Das Wunder ist 
Jes Glaubens liebstes Kind." 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST BEN AN. 225 

With this environment of his- childhood and the circum- 
stances of his early life in view, we are no longer surprised to 
find that his interest as a theological student in Paris should 
have centered in the subject of miracles, and that throughout 
his long life the question of naturalism vs. supernaturalism 
should have been in the fore-ground of all his philosophical 
speculations. It is impossible to read his later discussions of 
miracles without being reminded of the wonder-working saints 
of his early surroundings. 

"II y a des miracles quand on y croit ; ils disparaissent quand 
on n'y croit plus." Mor. Or., 194. ' Of. V. J., L-LII, 268 ; 
Dial., 14-22 ; Q. 0., 221. 

"Aucun miracle ne s'est produit dans des conditions vrai- 
ment scientifiqu.es., en presence de juges competents." Or. 
Lang., 241; Apost, 37-42; Fragm., 318-19. 

Renan insists that his rejection of miracles: is not. a violation 
of scientific method, nor an a priori procedure. Rather is it 
the inevitable result of an impartial study of nature and his- 
tory. There is no evidence at the present day of any violation 
or suspension of natural law, he maintains ; and as for the mir- 
acles alleged to have occurred in the distant past, they are in 
the sarnie class with sirens and centaurs. What reason have we 
for disbelieving either the one or the other except that they have 
never been seen ? Dial., 246. Hence the burden of proof, he 
insists, lies not with those who reject miracles, but with those 
who affirm them. Science is not called upon to disprove 
groundless assertions gratuitously made. Quod gratis asserir 
tur gratis negatur. I\ Det., 405. 

"Chercher a expliquer les recits surnaturels ou les reduire a 
des legendes, ce n'est pas mutiler les faits au nom! de la theo- 
rie; c'est partir de 1 'observation meme des faits. . . Une 
observation qui n'a pas ete une seule fois dementie nous ap- 
prend qu'il n' arrive de miracles que dans leg temps: et les pays 
ou Ton y croit, devant des personnes disposees a y croire. . 
Ce n'est done pas au nom de telle ou telle philosophic, c'est au 
nom d'une constante experience, que nous banissons le miracle 

2 



226 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

de l'histoire." V. J., L-LI; Apost., 37fT; Dial, 318-19. 

"C'est par les sciences historiques qu'on peut etablir (et, 
selon moi, d'une maniere peremptoire) . . . qu'il n'y a 
jamais eu de fait surnaturel. Ce n'est point par un raisonne- 
nient a priori que nous repoussons le miracle; c'est par un rai- 
sonnenient critique ou historique." Souv., 328. Cf. ibid., 
282. 

It is a noteworthy fact that Renan seldom approaches the 
question of miracles without citing either Malebranche or Lit- 
tre. The influence of the former on Eenan was probably 
greater in this matter than that of any other writer. 

The conception of miracle, according to Eenan, is a legacy 
from an unscientific age, and entirely without rational mean- 
ing today. At a time when everybody believed, as a matter of 
course, in spirits; and their intervention in human affairs, any- 
thing that baffled the understanding was considered sufficiently 
explained by calling it a miracle, that is to say the work of su- 
pernatural powers. A. S., 262. But to a modern mind such 
an explanation is without meaning. To call an event miracu- 
lous to-day is not to explain it, but rather to> class it as unex- 
plained. 

"La condition mem© de la science est de croire que tout est 
explicable naturellement, meme l'inexplique. Pour la science, 
une explication surnaturelle n'est ni vraie ni fausse; ce n'est 
pas une explication." Q. C, 223. 

In Renan's sense of the word miracle', indeed, it would be a 
contradiction in terms to speak of miracles in the remote past. 
The miraculous, as he conceives it, is not merely the inexpli- 
cable; it is a formal derogation from recognized laws in the 
name of a particular desire. A thing is not miraculous merely 
because it is unique, or not understood. Apost., 37-42 ; Or. 
Lang., 239. 

As thus defined, a miracle is a comparatively modern con- 
ception, a kind of by-product of natural science. Obviously, 
there must be a conception of natural law before we can think 
of an infraction or suspension of natural law ; or rather the two 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 227 

conceptions, law and miracle, undifferentiated in primitive 
minds, develop together, pari passu, as the idea of natural law 
becomes definite. 2 Miracle implies law, as supernaturalism 
implies naturalism. They are correlative terms, and only have 
a meaning with reference to each other. 

The opposition of law and miracle, of naturalism and super- 
naturalism, thus represent different stages in the evolution of 
man's ideas about nature. Time was when the word miracle 
explained things, in the sense of satisfying curiosity, just as 
phlogiston, chemism, heredity, electricity, microbe, even evolu- 
tion itself, have served in turn to explain almost anything to 
unscientific minds of a later day. In the mythological ages 
of primitive man, spirits were as real as bacteria are to-day, 
and their action as universal. The exact nature of their ac- 
tivity, its limits and conditions, nobody stopped to examine in 
detail. Of. A. S., 45-6 ; also V. J., 41. 

But in his polemics against the miraculous Kenan seems not 
to have realized sufficiently, at least in his earlier days, the ne- 
cessity of compromise in passing from the one regime to the 
other. 

"Tout ou rien," he exclaims, "supernaturalisme absolu ou 
rationalisme sans reserve." A. S., 49. 

But who could expect that the humjan race should pass from 
mythology to logic at a single bound? Should we not call it 
the greatest miracle of all if humanity had leaped suddenly 
from undoubting belief to unbelieving doubt? 

Nor has Benan, in his crusade against supernaturalism, al- 
ways kept to the straight and narrow path of sound logic. 
When, for example, miracles are declared impossible because 
natural law is absolute and universal (A. S., 48, 169), he is 
plainly assuming the very point at issue. Such a statement 
amounts to saying that miracles cannot happen because they do 
not ; a position which he has himself refuted elsewhere : 

"Dans le milieu que nous experimentons, il ne se passe pas 
de miracles; mais, au point de vue de Finfini, rien n'est im- 
possible." F. Det, 418. 

Occasionally also, in reply to a certain class of theologians, 



228 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

and presumably on tlie biblical principle of answering the fool 
according to his folly, he has repeated the well-worn argument 
that miracles are inconsistent with the idea of an all-knowing 
and all-powerful creator, as subsequent interventions would im- 
ply that the original plan of the world was defective and needed 
occasional correction. Or. Lang., 239. 

But in such quibbling he rarely indulges. Already in 
UAvenir de la science he takes the ground that belief in super- 
naturalism, like belief in fetichism, will never be dispelled by 
metaphysical argumentation. 

"Le seul moyen de guerir de cette etrange maladie qui, a la 
honte de la civilisation, n'a pas encore disparue de l'humanite, 
c'est la culture moderne. Mettez l'esprit au niveau de la sci- 
ence, nourissez-le dans la methode rationnelle, et, sans lutte, sans 
argumentation, tomberont ces superstitions surannees. . . . 
La science positive et experimentale, en donnant a l'homme le 
sentiment de la vie reelle, peut seule detruire le supernatural- 
isme." A. S., 48-9. 

It is interesting to note that Renan, while repudiating mir- 
acles in the past and the present, admits their possibility in the 
future. Supernatural interventions do not occur at the pres- 
ent time, because there is no supernatural being capable of in- 
tervening. Some day, however, such a being may exist. In 
the remote future, when evolution has run its course and the 
universe attained to complete self-consciousness, personal acts 
of divine will may take the place of natural law, even to the 
extent of becoming the normal modus operandi of nature. 

"Mais le miracle, c'est-a-dire l'intervention d'un etre su- 
perieur, qui miaintenant n'a pas lieu, pourra un jour, quand 
Dieu sera conscient, etre le regime normal de l'univers." F. 
Det., 441. Also in his article on Amiel, F. Det., 392-3. 

Is Reman, then, to be classed as a materialist, in view of his 
disbelief in the existence of a conscious ruler of the universe? 
That would be a great mistake. Cf. Dial., 143-4, 253, 141. 
The truth is that materialism' in every form, whether ra- 
tional or temperamental, was repulsive to him. As for onto- 
logical materialism, the doctrine that matter is the one eternal. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 229 

self-existent reality, the ultimate Weltstoff, so to speak, he ex- 
plicitly rejects it as a, palpable absurdity. A. S., 478. Mat- 
ter, he declares, has no real independent existence. It is 
merely the form in which the true substance of the universe, 
whatever that may be, becomes manif est to' our senses ;' a bridge 
of communication, as it were, between spirit and spirit in the 
finite world. 

"Je ne puis trop le repeter," he writes in 1862, "c'est l'ideal 
qui est, et la realite passagere qui parait etre." Frag., 250. 

"S'il est une induction qui resulte naturellement de l'aspeet 
general des f aits, c'est que la conscience de PindividtL nait et se 
forme, qu'elle est une resultante, mais une resultante plus re- 
elle que la. cause qui la produit et sans conumune mesure avec 
elle. . . . Le materialisme est done un non-sens plutot 
qu'une erreur. II est le fait d'esprits etroits qui se noient dans 
leurs propres mots et s'arretent au petit cote des choses," Mor. 
Cr., 05. 

"L'ame est la premiere 1 des realites et la seule pleine realite. 
O'est l'ame qui est, et le corps qui parait etre." Ibid., 63. Cf. 
Dial., 56, 141 ; A. S., 261 ; Or. Lang., 99 ; V. J., 29 ; Dr. Ph., 
22-3. 

Is spirit, then, the ultimate reality, the true substance of the 
world ? There are numerous passages in Kenan's books which 
would make it appear that he thought so, as for example, the 
statement last quoted. That is not his meaning, however. In 
reality he takes a, middle ground, declaring the one assertion as 
unwarranted as the other. Neither matter nor mind are abso- 
lute, independent, self-existent realities. Rather, our ideas of 
matter and spirit are both of them; negative conceptions. 
"What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind." 
All that we know about either is that it is not the other; matr 
ter is not-mind, mind is not-matter. "Tout ce qui n'est point 
prose est vers, et tout ce qui n'est point vers est prose." Re>- 
nan's only advance upon this tautology consists in the state- 
ment, little more than a guess, that matter and spirit are dis- 
tinct and irreducible modes of existence in which the real real- 
ity, whatever that may be, becomes manifest to our senses. 



230 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

This view, already distinctly expressed in the Avenir de la, sci- 
ence, he maintained to the end. 

"Les mots de corps et d'ame restent parfaitement distincts, 
en tant que representant des ordres de phenomenes irreduc- 
tibles; mais faire cette diversite* toute phenomenale synonyme 
d'une distinction ontologique, c'est tomiber dans nn pesant re- 
alisme, et imiter les anciennes hypotheses des sciences phy- 
siques, qui supposaient autant de causes que de faits. 
Le vrai est qu'il y a une substance unique, qui n'est ni corps 
ni esprit, mais qui se manifeste par deux ordres de phenomenes, 
qui sent le corps et 1' esprit, que ces deux mots n'ont de sens 
que par leur opposition, et que cette opposition n'est que dans 
les faits." A. S., 478. 

In his reply to the Discours de reception of M. Pasteur be- 
fore the Academie Frangaise, 1882, he says: 

"Le but du monde, c'est l'idee; mais je ne connais pas un 
cas ou l'idee se soit produite sans matiere; je ne connais pas 
d'esprit pur ni d'oeuvre d'esprit pur. . . . Je ne sais pas 
si je suis spiritualiste ou materialiste." Disc, 78. Cf. Dial., 
55-6 ; Frag., 253. 

It is only very occasionally, however, that Renan adverts to 
questions of this order. He was not much addicted to specula- 
tions about the essence of Being. Metaphysical speculations 
seemed to him 1 , in his normal moods, an unprofitable waste of 
time, an intellectual legerdemain unworthy of a serious mind, 
and completely barren of results so far as the advancement of 
positive knowledge is concerned. 3 

"Si la philosophic ne veut pas rester une toile de Penelope, 
sans cesse et toujours vainement recommencee, il faut qu'elle 
devienne savante." Mor. Grit., 81. 

"La tentative de construire la theorie des choses par le jeu 
des formules vides de resprit est une pretention aussi vaine que 
celle du tisserand que voudrait produire de la toile en faisant 
aller sa navette sans y mettre du fil." Mor. Crit., 82. Cf. 
Souv., 250; Averr. IV, 323; Lang. Eem., 505; Disc, 39. 

But although the ultimate nature of reality is thus unknown, 
and presumably unknowable, Renan is very positive in his 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 231 

numerous assertions regarding its aims. An essential feature 
of his nature-philosophy is its teleology. The universe is cer- 
tainly not an assemblage of undirected, blindly acting forces, 
it is a mechanism moving towards a predetermined goal. 

"L'univers a un but ideal et sert a une fin divine; il n'est 
pas seulement une vaine agitation, dont la balance finale est 
zero." Dial, XIV. 

This is inferred from the fact of evolution throughout na- 
ture, the universal tendency in virtue of which the possible de- 
velops into the actual, the actual into the conscious, and the con- 
scious into progressively higher forms of self-consciousness. 
As the germ of an animal or plant tends to evolve conformably 
to its ancestral pattern, so does the evolution of the world as a 
whole follow a predetermined course. Dial., 23-4 ; Frag., 177. 

This belief in the purposive character of world evolution is 
not by any means the expression merely of a passing mood, or 
the casual flight of an erratic fancy. It is repeated again and 
again, in a great variety of forms — essays, speeches, dialogues, 
histories, plays, — and in widely different associations. It is, 
in fact, one of the few constant items in his eminently incon- 
stant creed. Renan thoroughly believed, in his more serious 
moments at least, in some "far-off divine event, toward which 
the whole creation moves." As if to make sure of being taken 
in earnest, he declares his belief in teleology to be one of the 
only two propositions in philosophy of which he is certain be- 
yond a doubt, the other being his belief in the absoluteness and 
universality of natural law. 

"Autant je tiens pour indubitable qu'aucun caprice, aucune 
volonte particuliere n'intervient dans le tissu des faits de l'uni- 
vers, autant je regarde comme evident que le monde a un but 
et travaille a une oeuvre mysterieuse. II y a quelque chose 
qui se developpe par une necessite interieure, par un instinct 
inconscient, analogue au mouvement des plantes vers l'eau ou 
la lumiere. . . Le monde est en travail de quelque chose; 
omnis creatura ingemiscit et parturit." Dial., 22. Cf. Frag., 
177, 179. 



232 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

If we ask what can be this ulterior goal of world-develop- 
ment, his answer is ready: It is the production of Reason. 

"Le but du monde est de produire de la raison. Tout lui 
est bon pour cela. Chaque planete fabrique de la' pensee, du 
sentiment esthetique et mioral; la petitei recolte de vertu et de 
raison que produit chaque monde est la fin de ce monde, comme 
la secretion de la. gomnie est le dernier but du gommier." 
Dial., 58-9. 

Again in his letter to* M'. Berthelot, Frag., 177 : 
"Deux elements, le temps et la tendance au progres, ex- 
pliquent l'univers. Mens agiiat molem. . . Spiritus intus 
alii. . . . II y a une conscience obscure de l'univers qui 
tend a se fair©, un secret ressort qui pousse le possible a ex- 
ister." Frag., 177-8. Cf. Dial., 144; Dtr. Ph., 189. 

It is needless to observe; that the Reason which, according 
to Ren an, the universe is destined to evolve, is not human rea- 
son, but intelligence or mind in its widest sense, including all 
conscious! beings, of whatever sort, past, present and to come. 
Human reason, it is true, marks the highest point yet reached, 
so far as the process is represented on this planet. 

"Pour moi je pens© qu'il n'est pas dans l'univers d'intelli- 
gence superieure a celle de l'homme, en sorte que le plus vaste 
genie d© notre planete est vraiment le pretre du monde, 
puisqu'il en est la plus haute reflection." Frag., 283. Cf. 
Dial., 20-1 ; A. Si, note 14. 

Au moyen age, le plus haut result at du monde, au moins de 
la planete Terre, etait un choeur de religieux chantant des 
psaumes. La science de notre temps, repondant au desir qu'a 
le monde de se connaitre, atteint des ©ifets bien superieurs." 
Frag,, 430-1. 

But, of course, evolution does not stop with man. Human- 
ity is merely a transitional link, human reason only a, phase 
in the evolutionary movement whose ultimate goal is. the pro- 
duction of a universal reason or world-consciousness. A. S., 
XX ; Dial., 118-23 ; Frag., 182-3 ; A. S., note 14. In a single 
word, evolution is a deific process. The development of con- 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. . 233 

sciousness is the development of God, that is to say of a being 
who will one day permeate and govern the universe as the soul 
its body. F. Det., 430. Of. A. SL, 37 ; and especially, note 
42 ; also Dial., 143 ; Souv., XXI-II. God is immanent in na- 
ture, and in all its products; the laws of nature are the habits 
of God. Dial., 25-6 ; 125 ; Frag., 248. 

"De qui est done cette phrase. . . "Dieu est immanent 
dans l'ensemble de l'univers, et dans chacun. des etres qui le 
composent. Seulement il ne se connait pas egalement dans 
tous. II se connait plus- dans la plante que dans le rocher, dans 
l'animal que dans la plante, dans l'hommei que dans l'ani- 
mal, dans l'homme intelligent que dans l'homme borne, dans 
l'homme de genie que dans l'homme intelligent, dans Socrates 
que dans l'hommei de genie, dans Bouddha que dans Socrate, 
dans le Christ que dans B'ouddha." Voila la these fonda- 
meutale de toute notre theologie. Si e'est bien la, ce qu'a voulu 
dire Hegel, soyons hegeliens." Dial, 187 ; 310 ; Dr. Ph. 22-3 ; 
A. S., 188-9 ; 200-1 ; Or. Lang., 99. 

Ren an insists' that his teleology is not open to' the objections 
properly raised against the Aristotelian finalism of the schol- 
astics. His own conception,, he claimis, does not imply the ex- 
istence of a conseioTLS', deliberating, omnipotent power. The re- 
alization of nature's aim is not a, conscious execution of a pre- 
conceived plan. Evolution attains its purpose without special 
aimi, by a succession of lucky hits, so to> speak. 

"Les objections, des savants qui se mettent en garde centre 
ce qu'il tiennent pour une resurrection du finalisme portent a. 
fond centre le systeme d'un createur renechi et tout-puissant. 
Elles ne portent en rien centre notre hypothese d'un nisus pro- 
fond, s'exergant d'une miandere aveugie dans lesi abimes de 
l'etre, poussant tout a l'eixistence a chaque point de 1'espaee. 
Ce nisus n'est ni conscient, ni tout-puissant ; il tire le meilleur 
parti possible de la matiere dont il dispose." F. Det., 429-30. 
Cf. A. &., 258; Souv., 373. 

The evolutional impulse is an unconscious tendency or drift, 
ein blinder Drang, groping its way in the dark, and reaching 
its goal in the end. in spite of endless blundering and countless 



234 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

failures, because of its eternal persistence and indefatigable en- 
deavor. Imagine, says Renan, an insect fluttering about in a 
room from which, the only escape is through a hole in the ceil- 
ing just large enough for the creature to pass through if it- 
happens to strike the exact centre, of the opening. Allow this 
insect infinite time and infinite patience and perseverance, and 
it. will ultimately succeed. Such is the universe ; always young, 
always enterprising, never discouraged, and with a supply of 
material for experimentation so inexhaustible that waste is no 
loss. 4 

But how can these positive statements, so often repeated in 
Renan's books, be made to accord with his explicit rejection of 
metaphysics ? 

"H n'y a pas de verite," he has told us, "qui n'ait son point 
de depart dans l'experience scientifique, qui ne sorte directe- 
ment ou indirectement d'un laboratoire on d'une bibliotheque, 
etc." Frag., 283-4; ibid., 263, 265. 

"Comment," asks M. Seailles, "l'experience scientifique 
l'autoriseM>elle a con dure que Dieu se fait, qu'un jour il sera?" 
E. E., 212. 

Renan's own reply is that it does not. In spite of his fre- 
quent reiterations of the deific doctrine, he has really forestalled 
criticism by explicit declarations on the other side of the 
question. How, for example, can the following words be recon- 
ciled with his doctrine of deific evolution, when taken together 
with his rejection of metaphysics? 

"La theodicee n'a aucun fondement experimental. 
Demander la Divinite a. l'experience, c'est done s'abuser." 
Frag., 318-20. 

And again in his preface to the Drames Philosophiques, 
written in 1888: 

"La philosophie, a.u point de rafiuiement ou elle est arrivee, 
s'accomode a. merveille d'un mode d'exposition ou rien ne 
s'aifijme, ou tout s'induit, se fond, s'oppose, se nuance. On 
n'en est plus a perfectionner les regies du syllogisme, ni a 
fortifier les preuves de l'existence de Dieu ou de l'immortalite 
de Fame. L'homme voit bien, a l'heure qu'il est, qu'il ne saura 



BEATTEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST R.ENAN. 235 

jamais rien de la cause supreme de l'univers ni de sa propre 
destinee." Dr. Ph., III. 

Two years later, in another preface, — all his prefaces are 
written with special care — we have the two opposite views ex- 
pressed in almost the sarnie breath : 

"Rien ne nous indique quelle est la volonte de la nature, 
ni le but de l'univers. Pour nous autres, idealistes, une seule 
doctrine est vraie, la doctrine transcendante selon laquelle le 
but de l'humanite est la constitution d'une conscience superi- 
•eure, ou, comme on disait autrefois, la plus grande gloire de 
Dieu." A. S., XVI. 

Here we learn that our author distinguished between scien- 
tific truth and transcendental truth, the one for all men and the 
•other reserved for idealists; but how, again, is this "doctrine 
transcendante" to be reconciled with his rejection of metaphys- 
ics? Is not his theory one thing, and his practice quite 
another ? 

With regard to his theory, one is curious to know what stage 
this God-evolving process may have reached in our own day. 
May we say that God is, as well as that he will be? In a letter 
dated August, 1862, written in answer to this very question, 
Penan says: 

"En dehors de la nature et de l'homme, y a-t-il done quelque 
■chose ? me demandez-vous. 

"II y a tout, repondrai-je. La nature n'est qu'une appa- 
rence, rhomme n'est qu'un phenomene. II y a le fond eternel, 
il y a l'infini, la substance, l'absolu, l'ideal ; il y a, selon la belle 
expression miusulmane, celui qui dure; il y a., selon 1' expression 
juive, plus belle encore, celui qui est. Voila le pere du sein 
duquel tout sort, au sein duquel tout rentre." Dial., 252. 

This is not merely ironical jargon employed to put off im- 
pertinent questions. The statement is repeated in many dif- 
ferent connections. In the lecture Rome et le Christianisme, 
for example, we read: 

"La vie nous parait un court passage entre deux longues 
nuits. . . . line seule chose est certaine, e'est le sourire 
paternel, qui, a certaines heures, traverse la nature, attestant 



236 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

qu' un oeil nous regarde et qu'un coeur nous suit." C. d'Angl., 
200-1. Cf. Souv., 376. 

And again in his article: la Metaphysique et son avenir: 

"Dans la nature et I'histoire je vois bien mieux le divin que 
dans des formules abstraites d'une theodicee artificielle et d'une 

ontologie sans rapports avec les faits L'infini 

n'existe que quand il revete une forme finie. Dieu ne se voit 
que dans ses incarnations." Frag., 310 ; ibid., 250. 

These are explicit statements. Unfortunately, however, for 
logical consistency, he is equally explicit on the other side of 
the question. Contrast, for example, the passage last quoted 
with the following, taken from the same article: 

"La theodicee n'a aucun fondement experimental. Loin de 
reveler Dieu, la nature est immorale ; le bien et le mal lui sent 
indifTerents. . . . L'histoire de meme est un scandale 
permanent au point de vue de la morale." Frag., 319. Cf. 
Disc, pp. 75, 134. 

And again : 

"La conscience est peut-etre une forme secondaire de l'exist- 
ence. Un tel mot n'a, plus de sens quand on veut l'appliquer 
au tout, a l'univers, a Dieu. Conscience suppose une limitation, 
une opposition du moi et du non-moi, qui est la. negation nieme 
de l'infini. Ce qui est eternel, c'est l'idee." Dial., 140-1. 

In his article on Amiel he speaks of the "conscience generale 
obscure" as being "tout a fait insoucieuse des individus" 
(Y. Det,, 391) ; and repeatedly he declares that the process 
of deific evolution is still very far from, its goal, which per- 
haps it may never attain. Compared with the omnipotence and 
omniscience which the world-soul is probably destined some 
day to attain, its present condition is comparable to the semi- 
consciousness of an oyster. 

"La conscience du tout par ait jusqu-ici bien obscure. Elle 
ue semble pas depasser beaucoup celle de l'huitre et du polypier, 
mais elle existe ; le monde va vers ses fins avec un instinct sur." 
Dial., 23-4 ; cf. F. Det., 442-3. 

It would be interesting to know how Eenan would have us 
reconcile the "aovrire paternel . . . attestant qu'un oeil 



BKAUEK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 237 

nous regarde et qu'un coeur nous suit" with this oyster-con- 
sciousness of the over-soul in its present stage. 

A third statement of his, it is true, supplies a connecting 
link; but this statement appears under the heading Reves: 

"Croyez-mjoi, Dieu est une necessite absolue. Dieu sera, et 
Dieu est. En taut que realite, il sera ; en tant qu'ideal, il 
est. Deus est sinmL in esse et in fieri. Cela seul pent se deve>- 
lopper qui est deja. Comment d'ailleurs imaginer un deve- 
loppement ayant pour point de depart le neant." Dial., 145-6. 
Of. F. Del, XV— XVII. 

Without entering here on a discussion of the grounds upon 
which even the ideal existence of God is affirmed in this inter- 
miediate statement, it is clear that it does not remove the con- 
tradiction between the other two. Even here the existence of 
God as an actual and completed present reality is distinctly 
denied. 5 

A very provoking mannerism of Kenan, whenever he -touches 
these questions, is the substitution of vague, grandiloquent 
phrases for coherent ideas. What, precisely, does he mean by 
"le fond eternal, Vinfini, la* substance, Videal, I'abime de Vetre," 
and so forth? 

"Kenan abuse de la mythologie," suggests M. Seailles, "il fait 
des etres avee des mots." E. K, 282, note 2 : Of. ibid., 192-3. 

Much of Kenan's religious philosophy is in fact mere rheto- 
ric. His language reminds one of Napoleon's famous har- 
angue to his soldiers in Egypt : "Soldats, du haut de ces monu- 
ments quarante siecles vous contemplent !" The emptiest rhet- 
oric will serve when minds are made up in advance. It is so 
in philosophy and religion. Glittering sophistries, from the 
lips of a good or great man, real or supposed, are often more 
powerful than truth itself as inducements to noble and heroic 
living. 

Stripped of its rhetoric, Kenan's belief in a God amounts 
to little more than a consciousness that our phenomenal world 
is probably not the whole of existence. Some deeper reality, 
beginning and end of all things, most probably exists; but con- 



238 BULLETIN OF THE "UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

ceirning its ultimate nature and attributes nothing whatever is 
known. 

"La tentative d'expliquer l'meffable par des mots est aussi 

desesperee que celle de l'expliquer par des recite ou des images: 

la langue, condamnee a, cette torture, proteste, hurle, detonne. 

T'oute proposition appliquee a Dieu est importi- 

nente, une seule exceptee: II est." Frag., 323-5. 

Renan expressly repudiates the assumption that any conclu- 
sions can he drawn, as to the attributes of God., from the bare 
assertion of his existence, or even from the proposition that 
he is a spirit. Remembering that the word spirit bears a purely 
negative meaning in his ontology, we are prepared for the fol- 
lowing reductio ad absurdum of scholastic argumentation: 

"On dit, par example, Dieu est un esprit, il a tous les attribute 
des esprits. Esprit signifiant seulement tout ce qui n'est pas 
corps, ce raisonnement equivaut a celui-ci : II y a deux classes 
d'animiaux, les chevaux et les non-chevaux. L'oiseau est un 
non-cheval. Le poisson est aussi un non-cheval. Done l'oiseau 
et le poisson sont de la meme espece, et ce qui se dit de l'oiseau 
pent se dire du poisson." A. S., note 192. 

On questions concerning the nature and attributes of what 
is known as the Absolute, Renan was an agnostic. 

"Des voiles impenetrables," he writes in 1859, "nous de- 
robent le secret de ce monde etrange dont la realite a la fois 
s'impose a. nous et nous aecable; la philosophie et la science 
poursuivront a, jamais, sans jamais l'atteindre 1 , la formule de 
ce Protee qu'aucune raison ne limite, qu'aucun langage n'ex- 
prime." Mor. Cr., I — II; Disc, 216; also Preface to the 
Dial. ; Hist, rel., 418. 

Again, in his reply to the Discours de reception of M. Pas- 
teur, 1882: 

"Le resultat final, e'est encore que le plus grand des sages a 
ete l'Ecclesiaste, quand il represente le monde livre a,ux disputes 
des hommes, pour qu'ils n'y comprennent rien depuis un bout 
jusqu'a l'autre." Disc, 81. 

Already in his first book he takes up the position that the 
human mind, developed by contact with the phenomenal world 



P.RAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 23£ 

and therefore adapted to it alone, is unable to apprehend 
"things-in-themselves." As the human ear is adapted to the 
perception of sound only within a certain middle region of 
wave-lengths, and is deaf to everything above or below its range, 
so with reason : both the infinitely small and the infinitely great 
are beyond its reach. Man is unable to conceive either an ab- 
solute beginning or an absolute end ; a first cause is as unthink- 
able as a last effect. Carry ontological speculation beyond a 
certain limit, and you are brought to the merest tautology. 
Every act of mind, he declares, like every equation, is reduci- 
ble at last to A = A. See A. S., p. 477. 

"II faut renoncer a l'etroit concept de la scolastique, 
prenant l'esprit humain commie une machine parfaitement 
exact© et adequate a l'absolu. Des vues, des apercus, des jours, 
des ouvertures, des sensations, des couleurs, des physionomies, 
des aspects, voila les formes sous lesquelles l'esprit percoit les 
choses. La geometrie seule se forme en axiomes et en 
theoremes. Ailleurs le vague est le vrai." A. S., 58. Cf. 
ibid., 56; 152-153; 477; and note 26. Also Dial., VI, 147. 

"l^ous ne savons pas ! voila tout ce qu'on peut dire de clair 
sur ce qui est au-dela du fini. !N~e nions rien, n'afnrmons rien, 
esperons. Gardons une place, dans les funerailles, pour la 
musique et l'encens," F. Det,, XVII. Cf. C. d'Angl, 6-7. 

The question whether the human mind, inadequate and un- 
satisfactory though it be as a, measure of objective reality, is 
reliable within the limits of perception adapted to its own con- 
stitution, is raised by Eenan at the bginning of his Dialogues 
philosophiques : 

PhilaletJie : 

"Force nous est bien, cependant, d'essayer de construire 
d'apres ce que nous voyons la theorie de ce que nous ne voyons 
pas, sous peine de rassembler a 1' animal qui, courbe vers la 
terre, ne s'occupe que de l'objet le plus prochain de ses sens et 
de ses appetits. 



240 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Eutliypliron: 

"Soit, .... Mais un doute superieur plane sur 
toutes ces speculations. Le derate tient a une question insolu- 
ble. Notre constitution psychologique, qui est l'oeil par lequel 
nous voyons la realite, n'est-elle pas elle-meme tronapeuse ? ~Ne 
sommes-nous pas les jouets d'une erreur inevitable? Impossi- 
ble de repondre a une pareille interrogation sans tomber dans 
he cercle vicieux. 

Philalethe : 

"Je me suis habitue a ne plus m'arreter a ce doute, qui a 
jete tant de philosophes dans une voie sans issue. Comme 1' in- 
strument de la raison, manie scientifiquement et applique a la 
facon d'un etalon inflexible de la realite, n'a jamiais conduit a, 
une erreur, il faut en cone-lure qu'il est bon et qu'on peut s'y 
fier. Une balance se verifie par elle-meme, quand, en variant 
les pesees, elle donne des resultats constants." Dial., 6-7. 

The further question, whether man's present "faculties" of 
perception are final, whether new ones may not in time be de- 
veloped or unknown ones discovered, Renan seems nowhere to 
have considered explicitly, though an affirmative answer would 
seem to be implied in his belief that the evolving God is devel- 
oping through humanity. 

Concerning the future of religion, Renan is in complete agree- 
ment with Herbert. Spencer. Positive knowledge, he main- 
tains, can never fill out the whole region of possible thought. 
Beyond the circle of the known lies the region of the unknown. 
The very nature of intelligence and constitution of the mind 
imply that around this circle of knowledge must always ex- 
tend a margin of ignorance. The greater one's knowledge, in- 
deed, or the larger one's circle, the broader the outlook upon 
the surrounding area of the unknown, the region of igno- 
rance and wonder, of mystery and miracle. Renan concludes 
from this that man will always be religious, for he will always 
be impelled, by the very nature of his mind, to reach over into 
this border-land of mystery, and seek to establish communion 



BRATJEK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EKNEST KENAN". 241 

with what he regards as a super-sensuous world. And what is 
this, Kenan asks, if not religion? 

"L'homme en face des choses est fatalement porte a en cher- 
cher le secret. Le probleme se pose de lui-.mieme, et en vertu 
de cette faculte qu'a l'homme d'aller au dela, du phenomene 
qu'il percoit ; tou jours, en face de rinconnu, 

l'homme ressent un double sentiment, respect pour le mystere, 
noble temerite qui le porte a dechirer le voile pour connaitre ce 
.mi- est au dela." A. S., 17-18. 

And again before the Academie Frangaise : 

"II est des sujets ou l'on aime mieux deraisonner que de se 
taire. Verite ou chirnere, le reve de l'infini nous attirera tou- 

jours En pareille matiere, la puerilite meme 

des efforts est touchante. II ne f aut pas demander de logique 
aux solutions que l'homme imagine pour se rendre quelque 
raison du sort etrange qui lui est echu." I>isc, 40-1. Of. Dial., 
VI, VII; XIII. 

"La religion est necessaire. Le jour ou elle disparaitrait, 
ce serait le coeur meme de l'humanite qui se dessecherait. 
La religion est aussi eternelle que la poesie, aussi eternelle que 
1' amour; elle survivra a la destruction de toutes les illusions. 
Jamais l'homme ne se contentera d'une destinee 
finie." Q. 0., 235; ibid.. 414; also O. d'Ang., 6-7; Ant., 
XLIX— LI. 

This propensity of human nature to "other-worldliness" led 
Renan to the position of Kant. Of. Mor. Orit., IV. Besides 
the pure reason which serves in the phenomenal world, there 
is in man, he believed, a mysterious transcendental faculty or 
capacity, in virtue of which he is enabled to hold communion 
with a. super-sensuous world. This capacity he variously de- 
nominates "Moral Sense," "Categorical Imperative," "Practi- 
cal Reason," "Conscience," "Divine Instinct," and so forth; 
but called by whatever name, it is always opposed to the Pure 
Reason. It is the pure heart that sees God; pure reason is 
atheistic. Dr. Ph., 279-80. 

"II est une base indubitable que nul scepticisme n'ebranlera 
3 



242 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEBSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

et oil l'homme trouvera jusqu'a la fin des jours le point fixe de 
ses incertitudes : le bien, c'est le bien ; le mal, c'est le mal. Pour 
hair l'un et pour aimer l'autre, aucun systeme n'est necessaire, 
et c'est en ce sens que la foi et l'amour, en apparence sans lien 
avec l'intelligence, sont le vrai fondement de la certitude morale 
et l'unique moyen qu'a l'homme de comprendre quelque chose 
au probleme de son origine et de sa destinee."Mor. Cr, II. Cf . 
Job, XO-XCI. 

"Ce qui revele le vrai Dieu, c'st le sentiment moral. Si 
l'humanite n'etait qu'intelligente, elle serait athee; 
Le devoir, le devouement, le sacrifice, toutes choses dont l'his- 
toire est pleine, sont inexplicables sans Dieu." Frag., 321-3. 
Cf. Dial., 30-1, 38. 

Nor is the testimony of this moral sense less reliable than 
the deliverances of pure reason, or the verdict of sense-percep- 
tion. Kenan would admit that moral and religious intuitions 
cannot be expressed in rational speech, nor formulated in defi- 
nite logical propositions ; but he would insist, at the same time, 
that such an admission in no wise affects their veracity, and that 
ideas are not necessarily false because they are vague. Once 
admit that there is or can be such a thing as non-rational truth, 
and it seems impossible to avoid acknowledging symbolistic 
suggestion as legitimate language by the side of syllogistic 
assertion; the one for religion and the other for science. 6 

"La spiritualite de Fame et l'existence de Dieu .... 
sont des choses si claires qu'elles n'ont pas besoin d'etre demon- 
trees, ou, quand on les prend par 1' analyse, des choses si obscures 
qu'elles ne sont pas demontrables." Frag., 272. Cf. ibid., 
323. 

To what extent, if at all, Renan was influenced by contem- 
porary thinkers of the agnostic and positive schools, with whom 
he agrees in the main in mfuch of his religious philosophy, it 
is impossible to make out with sufficient clearness to warrant 
'positive statements. Cf. Faguet, Hist. lit. fr., 410-11. 

As for positivism, there is abundant evidence that he early 
became familiar with the doctrines of Comte and his disciple 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 243 

Littre, though neither of these appears to have been sympa- 
thetically read by him, 

Canute receives, frequent mention in his earlier writings, but 
always in a disparaging tone. In UAvenir de la science, for 
example, Kenan's criticism is summed up in these words: 

"En un mot, M. Comte n'entend rien aux sciences de l'hu- 
manite, parce qu'il n'est pas philologue." A. S., 151 ; also note 
117. 

And again in the Souvenirs: 

"J'eprouvai une sorte d'agacement a voir la reputation ex- 
ageree d ? Auguste Comte, erige en grand homme de premier 
ordre pour avoir dit, en mauvais francais, ce que tons les esprits 
scientifiques, depuis deux cents ans, ont vu aussi clairement que 
lui." Souv., 250. 

But in spite of his unlaudatory estimates of the founder of 
positivism), there can be no question that Kenan was deeply imJ- 
bued with its spirit, and this appears to be due to the influence 
of Comte. Cf. Brunetiere, Manl. hist lit fr., 482. Mr. Bab- 
bitt briefly and correctly defines Kenan as a scientist and posi- 
tivist with a Catholic imagination. Souv., Introd., IX. 

Far -more important than the influence of Comte, or of any 
of his own countrymen, except, perhaps, Malebranche, was the 
influence of the Germans, notably Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Herder, 
Goethe, and later Schopenhauer and v. Harfemann. With 
Kant^ Herder and Hegel, however, Kenan appears to have had 
only a secondhand acquaintance, apparently through Cousin 
and Quinet His scientific work, too, in history and biblical 
criticism!, was mainly built up on the results of German schol- 
arship, as he often himself very gratefully acknowledged. 
Souv., 58, 246, 291, 311, 385 ; Kef. Int, V— VI; Of. Hist lit 
fr., 456-7; Platzhoff, E. R., 71; Seailles,, E. R., 244. For 
Kenan's criticisms upon Hegel, see A. S., note 14 ; also p. 258 ; 
and Lang. Sem., 505. 

We have comfpared Kenan with agnostics. But here again 
he very much lacked consistency. Many of his utterances, es- 
pecially in the earlier period, are as far sls possible removed 



244 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN". 

from the agnostic creed. Imagine Huxley or Spencer writing 
these words: 

"Oui, il viendra un jour ou l'humanite ne croira plus, mais 
ou elle saura ; un jour ou elle saura le monde metaphysique et 
moral, comttme elle sait deja le monde physique." A. S., 91. 

And yet an agnostic Renan crtainly was, at least in the sense 
of distinguishing sharply between knowledge and opinion, fact 
and fable, and declaring the riddle of existence unsolvable by 
the human mind. Of. Monod: Renan, etc., XIV. 

"On ne fait pas de dialogues sur la geometric ; car la geome- 
tric est vraie d'une fagon impersonnelle. Mait tout ce qui im- 
plique une nuance de foi, d'adhesion voulue, de choix, d'anti- 
pathie, de sympathie, de haine et d' amour, se trouve bien 
d'une forme d'exposition ou chaque opinion s'incarne en une 
personne et se comporte comme un etre vivant." Dr. Ph., II. 
Of. Dial., XIII— XIV; Disc, 75 ; Mor. Crit,, I— II; A. S., 
53-4. 

"Refuser de determiner Dieu n'est pas le nier; cette reserve 
est bien plutot l'effet d'une profonde piete, qui tremble de blas- 
phemer en disant ce qu'il n'est pas." Frag., 317. 

There are two kinds of agnosticism, as everybody knows: 
that of flippant indifference, and that of baffled endeavor ; and 
between the two there is a contrast in spirit and aim as great 
as that between tavern and temple. Renan belongs very em- 
phatically in the latter class. There is no evidence, however, 
of any direct influence on Renan from contemporary agnosti- 
cism. As for the English school, there is nothing in his writ- 
ings to suggest that, he was even acquainted with their works. 
Neither Huxley, nor Spencer, nor Tyndall is once mentioned 
in any of his books. 

This chapter must not close without at least a passing refer- 
ence to Renan's latest phase, in which his philosophy of life 
fades out more and more into epicurean indifferentism. After 
a long life laboriously spent in the quest of what he conceived 
to be the truth, he falls more and more, like his model the 
Preacher, into a habit of discoursing discouragingly upon the 
vanity of all things. 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 245 

"La verite est gourde et froide; nos ardeurs ne la touchent 
pas. Die neue Philosophie, die neuere Philosophic, die neueste 
Philosophie. Mon Dieu ! que ces surencheres sent naives ! 
Pourquoi se disputer ainsi la priorite de l'erreur ? Sachons at- 
tendre; il n'y a peut-etre rien an bout; ou bien, qui gait si la 
verite n'est pas triste? !Ne soyons pas si presses de la con- 

naitre Mais, chers enfants, c ; est inutile de se 

donner tant de mal a. la: tete, pour n'arriver qu'a changer 
d'erreur. Aniusez-vous ; , puisque vous avez vingt ans ; travaillez 
aussi." F. Det., X. Of. Dr. Ph., 263. 

"Je ne peux m'oter de l'idee que c'est peut-etre apres tout le 
libertin qui a raison et qui pratique la vraie philosophie de la 
vie," Souv., 149-50. 

"Par la bouche de Eenan jeune," comments ML Seailles on 
this philosophy, "la jeunesse repond au vieux Kenan: 'Malheur 
a la generation pui a concu la vie comme un repos et Part comime 
une jouissanee !' " El K,, 318. Of. Q. C, 301. 

The only redeeming feature in this indifference, if that is 
the word, is the intellectual hospitality it implies. A more tol- 
erant man than Eenan never was ; and in the present instance 
his theory seemis inspired by his practice. He repeatedly de- 
clares that the most cordial and most genuine toleration is that 
which rests on the broad and firm foundations of universal dis- 
illusionment : 

"La plus solide bonte est celle qui se fonde sur le parfait. 
ennui, sur la vue claire de ce fait que tout en ce monde est 
frivole et sans fond reel. Dans cett© mine absolue de toute 
chose, que reste-t^il ? La mechancete ? Oh ! Oela n'en vaut 
pas. la; peine. La mechancete suppose une certaine foi au 
serieux de la vie, la foi du moins au plaisir, la foi a. la ven- 
geance, la foi a l'ambition. ISTeron croyait a l'art; Commode 
croyait au cirque, et cela les rendait cruels. Mais le desabuse 
qui sait que tout objet de desir est frivole, pourquoi se donne- 
raitril la peine d'un sentiment desagreable-" Mare-Aur., 483. 

"La bonte du sceptique est la plus solide de toutes; elle repose 
Cf. Disc, 75. 



246 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

sur un sentiment profond de la verite supreme: Nil expedite 
Bed. 89; repeated P. Isr., V: 159-60. 

If these statements are true, it seems safe to predict that 
"la bonte la plus solide du sceptique," this universal tolerance 
based on universal indifference, is not what humanity wants, 
or will permanently accept. Considerations of practical useful- 
ness, rather than of speculative truthfulness, will doubtless con- 
tinue to preside over the moral evolution of the race. The in- 
corrigible prejudices of virtuous mien will continue to count 
for more than the sceptic's "verite supreme: Nil expedit." 

It must be admitted, however, that most people are least tol- 
erant precisely in the sphere in which positive knowledge is 
most difficult, not to say impossible, the sphere of religion. 
Cf. James, Var. Pel. Exp., 338, 34-2-3; also P. Is., II, 102, 
141. Penan was the very reverse. To the end of his life he 
was always willing to accord to his fellowmen the same free- 
dom of belief, whether positive or negative, which he claimed 
for himself. His last word on this subject is contained in a 
little after-dinner speech: 

"Nous autres liberaux, nous ne demandons qu'une seule chose, 
c'est que ohacun ait la liberte de batir a, sa maniere son roman 
de l'innni. Tout ce qu'on balbutie en pareille matiere revient 
a, peu pres au meme et se resume a dire que, sur ce qui depasse 
notre pauvre monde, on ne sait pas grand chose." P. Det., 
124-5. i! I 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 247 



CHAPTER III. 

MAN. 

In passing from Kenan's philosophy of nature to his moral 
philosophy, we are not progressing to something more definite 
or more coherent. On the contrary, the vagueness which char- 
acterizes all his philosophical thought becomes increasingly 
prominent in his utterances concerning the moral life. It 
seems to have been one of his favorite convictions that a com- 
prehensive description of the moral life, or statement of moral 
principles, cannot be given in a series of definite propositions 
logically consistent with each other. 

"Telle est la veritable forme des. verites morales: c'est les 
f ausser que leur appliquer ces moules inflexible® des sciences 
mathcmatiques, nui ne conviennent qu'a des verites d'un autre 

ordre, acquises par d'autres procedes Quand 

done cesserons-nous d'etre d'e lourds scolastiques et d'exiger 
sur Dieu, sur l'ame, sur le morale, des petits bouts, de phrases 
a la f agon de la geometrie ? Je suppose ces phrases aussi ex- 
actes que possible; elles seraient fausses, radicalement fausses, 
par leur absurde tentative de defmir, de limiter l'infini: Ah! 
lisez-moi un dialogue de Platon, une meditation de Lamartine, 
une page de Herder, une scene de Faust. Voila une philoso- 
phic, e'est-a-dire une fagon de prendre la vie et les choses." 
A. S., 54-55. Of. ibid, 152-3. 

In Averroes et Vaverro'isme, we find the same doctrine in a 
more elaborate and reasoned form, affirmed in opposition to the 
Averroists of Padua : 

"La verite en toute chose etant extremement delicate et fugi- 
tive, ce n'est pas a la dialectique qu'il est donne de l'atteindre. 

Dans les sciences morales et politiques, . 
ou les principes, par leur expression insuffisante et toujours 



248 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

partielle, posent a moitie sur le vrai, a moitie sur le faux, les 
resultats du raisonnement ne sont legitimes qu'a condition d'etre 
controles a chaque pas par ^experience et le boai sens. Le syl 
logisme excluant toute nuance et la verite residant tout entiere 
dans les nuances, le syllogisme est un instrument inutile poui 
trouver le vrai dans les sciences morales. La penetration, la 
souplesse, la culture multiple de l'esprit, voila la vraie logique. 
La forme est, en philosophic, au moins aussi importante que le 
fond." Averr., 323 ; 170, X. Of. Hist. Eel., 339-40. 

"Autant vaudra.it essayer d'atteindre un insect© aile avec une 
massue que de pretendre, avec les serres pesantes du syllogisme, 
trouver le vrai en des matieres aussi delicates. La logique ne 
saisit pas les nuances ; or les verites de l'ordre moral resident 
tout entieres dans la nuance. Elles s'echappent par les mailles 
du filet de la seolastique." Mor. Grit, 189. Cf. ibid, 312-13. 
13. 

Perhaps the simplest and most direct way of exhibiting Re- 
nan's speculations in moral philosophy is to plunge at once in 
medias res and begin with its central feature, the problem of 
immortality. It is impossible', in fact, to discuss his view of 
morality without coming around again and again to' this ques- 
tion. In his writings morality is practically identified with 
religion, and religion with immortality. With the m|ost untir- 
ing emphasis he insists that the best foundation of morality 
after all, its only effective foundation indeed, is the belief in a 
future life. 

"La poesie et la, morale sont en effet deux choses differentes ; 
mais elles supposent l'une et l'autre que l'homme n'est pas un 
etre d'un jour sans lien avec l'infini qui le precede, sans respon- 
sabilite cavers l'infini qui le suit." Mor. Grit,, 112. 

His point of view is very clearly described by M. Scherer, 
who makes it his own: 

"Ayons le courage de le reconnaitrei : la morale ne peut 
sei passer de transcendance, et par consequent de metaphysique. 
S'achons voir les choses oomme elles sont: la mo- 
rale, la bonne, la vraie, l'ancienne, l'imperative, a besoin de l'ab- 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN". 24G 

solu; . . . elle ne trouve son point d'appui qu'en Dieu. 
La religion, c' est le surnaturel. Et j'ajoute: la mo- 
rale de meme; car la morale n'est rien si elle n'est pas reli- 
giense." Seherer, Litt. Cont,, vol. 8, pp. 171, 182-3. Of. also 
Prof. James: "Religion, in fact, for the great majority of 
our own race, means immortality, and nothing else." Var. 
Eel. Exp., 524. 

The problem of immortality early engaged Reman's atten- 
tion^ owing to his belief in universal evolution. He tells us 
that ever since he was capable of thinking for himself, it was 
to quCvStions concerning the origin and destiny of man that his 
thoughts most frequently turned. A. S., 160-1. 

In 1848 he declares that the question relating to the origiL 
of man must be solved, if at all, by the observational or his- 
torical method ; and he indicates, in a manner that shows ' a 
clear grasp of the situation, the numerous preliminary ques- 
tions to be answered before the solution of the general problem 
is possible. A. S., 161-3. For some years previous he had 
been convinced that man is not a "special creation," but the 
cumulative product of evolutionary forces still at work. A. S., 
161. Cf. ibid., note 75. 

To what extent did the new theory of man's origin affect his 
conception of man's destiny ? If humanity is the outcome of 
a long development reaching back to' the first beginnings of 
life; if it is really true that man has grown, spiritually and in- 
tellectually as well as physically, from the brute animal, which 
in turn was evolved in the same gradual way from 1 still lower 
forms, the question naturally arises: is it possible to continue 
affirming the immortality of man, without extending it also' to 
the beasts of the field, and even to fishes and worms ? At what 
point in the passage from protozoon to man does the immortal 
soul begin ? 

He clearly shows that the difficulty arises from the unbroken 
continuity of the evolutionary process. If evolution is indeed 
continuous, leading without a break from! the lowest forms of 
life to the highest, it must be impossible to draw any definite 



250 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

line of separation between mortal and immortal creatures. It 
would be quite arbitrary wliere such a line should be drawn. 

A similar objection against the traditional creed arose from 
what may be called his psycho-physical conception of man. 
The very idea of body and soul as two distinct and separate en- 
tities, united in some mysterious way during life and by their 
separation marking what is called death, is an idea which 
he believed to be incompatible with evolutional psychology. 
Where is the evidence that body and soul are separate exist- 
ences at all? Might they not be different aspects merely of 
one and the same phenomenon,? And if they are only differ- 
ent sides of one and the same thing, what sense can there be in 
the statement that the soul may continue to exist though the 
body have perished? 7 

These were some of the thorns which evolutionary science 
had sown in the once fruitful fields of theology, in which Re- 
nan was soi earnestly at work. With these and kindred difficul- 
ties he grappled and struggled, for a time by day and by night. 
The result is well known. Unable to reconcile what he be- 
lieved to be the teachings of science with those of the creed, he 
abandoned the priesthood and left the church. He was then a 
young man of two and twenty, and he lived to be almost seventy. 
Did his subsequent labors lead him to' any deeper insight into 
this momentous question of human destiny ? 

In later years his position on the question of human immor- 
tality was, like most of his philosophical beliefs, a double one. 
A rationally conceived and scientifically established fact, he in- 
sists on the one hand, immortality most certainly is not. In- 
deed, he strongly inclines to the belief that, so far as scientific 
enquiry and demonstration can go, individual human immor- 
tality is very probably an illusion. 

But while immortality cannot be asserted as a fact, neither 
can it, on the other hand, be convincingly shown to' be a mere 
fiction. Absolute denial would be as misplaced as positive as- 
sertion. F. Det,, XV-XVII. 

In Kenan's philosophy the universe is divided into two 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN". 251 

spheres, so to speak, the finite and the infinite, the relative and 
the absolute; and the criteria of truth which serve in the one 
are not, he believed, of necessity valid in the other. The 
idea of immortality therefore, though an entirely gratuitous as- 
sumption when addressed to the finite reason, may yet corre- 
spond to reality in the realm of the absolute. 

"Les deux grands postulats de la vie humiaine, Dieu et Pim- 
mortalite le Pame., gratuits au point de vue du fini ou nous vi- 
vons, sont peut-etre vrais a la limite de Pinfini." F. Det., 419. 

He often insists that belief in immortality is at bottom a 
corollary from faith, in divine justice. A just God, he argues, 
cannot allow that the virtuous should wholly die. F. Det., 
XV-XIX. If there is no 1 hereafter, a virtuous life is an im- 
position without compensation, and not worth while. The idea 
that virtue m)ust meet with its reward, he declares, is the most 
logical of all ideas in the human breast. P. Isr., IV, 277. 
Cf. Dial., 137. 

"S'il etait vrai que la vie humaine ne fut qu'une vaine suc- 
cession de faits vulgaires, sans valeur suprasensible, des la pre- 
miere reflection serieuse, il faudrait se donner la mort; il n'y 
aurait pas de milieu entre Pivresse, une occupation tyrannique 
de tous les instants, et le suicide." A. S., 8 ; 411. 

And again in his lecture before the Royal Institution, 1880 : 

"Dire que si ce monde n'a pas sa contrepartie>, Phomme qui 
s'est sacrifie pour le bien ou le vrai doit le quitter content et 
absoudre les dieux, eela est trop naif. ISTon, il a le droit de les 
blasphemer. . . Je veux que Pavenir soit une enigme ; mais 
s'il n'y a pas d'avenir, ce monde est un aifreux guetrapens." 
C. d'Angl, 242. 

"S'il n'y a pas une autre vie pour reparer les iniquites de 
celle-ci, soutenir que Dieu est juste et ami du bien est le plus 
pueril des paradoxes ou la plus niaise des contre-verites." 
Eccl., 33. 

Again in his Discours de reception, before the Academie 
Francais© : 

"L'homme . . . invinciblement parte a croire a la jus- 
tice et jete dans un monde qui est et sera tou jours P injustice 



252 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

meme . . ., que voulez-vous qu'il f asse ? II se revolt© con- 
tre le cercueil, il rend la chair a l'os decharne, la vie an cerveau 
plein de pourriture, la, luniiere a l'oeil eteint; il imagine des 
sophismies dont il rirait chez un enfant, pour ne pas avouer que 
la nature a pu pousser l'ironie jusqu'a, lui imposer le fardeau 
du devoir sans compensation." Disc, 41. 

Observe, however, that these statements admit of two 1 very 
different conclusions : either there is no hereafter, or there is 
no just God. With the utmost emphasis he affirms that in this 
present world justice is not done. 

"Loin de reveler Dieu, la nature est imniorale; le bien et le 
mal lui sont indifferents. Jamais avalanche ne s'est arretee 
pour ne pas ecraser un honnete homines; le soleil n'a pali de- 
vant aucun crime ; la terre boit le sang du juste commie le sang 
du peeheur. L'histoire de meme est un scandale permanent 
au point de vue de la morale." Frag., 319. Cf. ibid., 250; 
also Disc, 41 ; Eccl., 33 ; Souv. 119, 316. 

The assertion that virtue is rewarded here below, he declares, 
is at once encountered by unanswerable objections. "The asser- 
tion is not true. In fact, in whatever age of the world, and in 
whatever society we place ourselves, compensatory justice 
is constantly violated. More versed in social science than the 
ancients, we can go' further, and assert that it is not possible it 
should be otherwise. Injustice is to be found in ^Nature itself. 
. A man dies in the devoted attempt to save another ; 
no one can argue that absolute' justice in this present world has 
been displayed in the fate of that man." P. 1st., IV : 278. 

And again: 

"In history, as a rule, man is punished for the good he does, 
and recompensed for the evil. . . . History is quite the 
contrary of virtue rewarded." 8 P. 1st., I: 331. Cf. Kef., 
Int., XII: "The laws of history are the justice of God;" also 
Dr. Ph,., 262. 

But why multiply citations ? Statements like these have be- 
come platitudes. And yet, if they are really true, it would 
seem 1 indispensable, if the world is to be grounded in justice, 
that there should be opportunity for retribution and compen- 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 253 

sation in another life. But where is Kenan's proof for the ex- 
istence of such a life? To prove that justice will reign in 
neaven, something more is required, surely, than the assertion 
of its notorious absence on earth ! If there is no trace of di- 
vine justice in the past and the present, as Eenan declares there 
is not, what ground can this he for affirming its existence in 
the future ? 

His answer is supplied by his theory of deific evolution. 
The destiny of man, he argues, is inseparably bound up with 
the destiny of God. Whether or not immortality shall some 
day be an established fact depends upon whether or not the uni- 
verse succeeds in evolving a just God. At present paradise is 
a dream; billions of years hence it may be a reality. ~F. Det., 
419. Immortality as an essential and natural property of the 
human soul is a myth, to be sure; we shall most certainly die, 
soul and body, and nothing short of a miracle can bring us 
back into existence. This prodigious miracle may take place, 
however. The evolving Over-soul, having attained complete 
self-consciousness, will doubtless be just, and will recall to ex- 
istence all who> have labored in behalf of its own evolution. 
And then will immortality be established. 

"Qui sait si le dernier terme du progres, dans des millions 
de siecles, n'amenera pas la conscience absolue de l'univers, et 
dans cette conscience le reveil de tout ce qui a vecu?" V. J., 
288. 

"Quand Dieu sera en meme temps parfait et tout-puissant, 
c'est-a-dire quand l'omnipotence scientinque sera concentree 
entre les mains d'un etre bon et droit, cet etre voudra ressusci- 
ter le passe, pour en reparer les innombrables iniquites. Dieu 
existera de plus en plus; plus il existera, plus il sera juste." 
Dial., 135-6. 

"L'oeuvre de Phumanite est le bien ; ceux qui auront con- 
tribue au triomphe du bien fulgebunt sicut stellae." Dial., 
138. 

The clearest statement of this doctrine which he has any- 
where given occurs in his article on Amiel : 

"JSTous eprouvons un invincible besoin de supposer dans le 



254 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

gouvernement du monde la justice dont nous trouvons la dictee 
dans no® coeoirs; et, comme il est de toute evidence que cette 
justice n'existe pas dans la realite de Punivers, nous arrivons 
a exiger absolument, comme condition de la morale, la survi- 
vance de cliaque conscience humaine au dela, de la tombe. Ici 
eclate 1'antinomie supreme de la nature et de la raison. Un tel 
postulat, en effet, est la chose la plus necessaire a priori et la 
plus impossible a posteriori. ... La resurrection serait 
un miracle. . . . Elle serait Facte final du monde, le fait 
d'un Dieu tout-puissant et tout-sachant, capable d'etre juste 
et voulant l'etre. . . Ce serait un don reserve par l'etre, 

devenu absolu, parfait, omniscient, tout-puissant, a, ceux qui 
auraient eontribue a, son developpement." F. Det,, 390-2. Cf. 
ibid., 418; P. Isr., IV: 286-7, 284; A. S., 220-1; Dial., 129- 
30; 142-3. Dr. Ph., 262-3. Souv., XXI-II. 

Penan declares he can see no force in the objection that an 
immortality to be inaugurated ages hence is too remote a con- 
tingency to afford consolation in present suffering. Time is a 
purely subjective matter. Succession, which is a category of 
the finite mind, has no place in the realm of pure spirit. In 
the timeless eternity of the spirit-world, therefore, a sleep of a 
billion years is no longer than the sleep of a moment; and to 
shrink from the long interval of unconsciousness between death 
and the resurrection is like dreading the length of a night which 
is certain to» be passed in sound and dreamless sleep. F. Det., 
419-20. To those w!h> have died in a righteous cause, the 
reign of justice in heaven will seem like the immediate contin- 
uation and triumph of the very cause which they served on 
earth. P. Isr., IV, 287. 

"Ceux qu'une tardive justice y replacera croiront etre morts 
de la veille. Comme dans la legende du moyen age, en pal- 
pant leur lit d'agonie, ils le trouveront encore chaud." F. 
Det., 419. 

The truth is, on this as on most other questions of the same 
order, Penan has taken both sides alternately. At one time we 
are told, if virtue and vice are the same after death, if saint 
and sinner alike both end in the same putrefaction of the tomb, 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 255 

then God is not just. And then again we find him refuting 
his own argument. 

"Je n'admets pas comme rigoureuse la preuve de l'immor- 
talite tiree de la necessite oil serait la justice divine de reparer, 
dans une vie ulterieure, les injustices que l'ordre general de 
l'univers entraine ici-has. Cette preuve est congue au point de 
vue de l'individu. Nos peres ont souffert, et nous heritons du 
fruit de leurs souffrances. Nous soufTrons, l'avenir en profi- 
tera. Qui sait si un jour on ne dira pas: 'Eh ce temps-la, on 
devait croire ainsi, car l'humanite fondait alors par ses souf- 
f ranees l'etat meilleur dont nous jouissons. Sans cela nos 
peres n'eussent point eu le courage de supporter la chaleur du 
jour. Mais maintenant nous avons la clef de l'enigme, et Dieu 
est justifie par le plus grand bien de respece.' Pendant que 
la crovance a l'immortalite aura ete necessaire pour rendre la 
vie supportable, on y aura cru." A. S., note 162. 

The only kind of immortality that he unconditionally affirms 
as rooted in the nature of things is what may be called the sur- 
vival of influence. Man's work will endure as long as the 
world. A. S., 226, 223. ISfo action ever dies. The immortals 
are those who have contributed to an immortal work. IT. Det., 
441. Cf. Dial., 131-2. In this sense the very worms have 
a place in the eternal chain of causation. A. S., 223 ; also note 
42. Truth especially is imperishable; he that adds to the tem- 
ple of truth even a single stone may justly boast: Exegi mo- 
nimientum aere perennius. A., S., 226. 

"L'immortalite consiste a travailler a une oeuvre immortelle, 
telles que sont l'art, la science, la religion, la vertu, la tradi- 
tion du beau et du bien sous toutes leurs formes." M'or. Grit., 
140. Cf. ibid., 63-4. 

This doctrine likewise goes back to his earliest days. In the 
Avenir de la science, 1848-9, we read : 

"II faut done admettre que tout ce qui aura ete sacrifie pour 
le progres se retrouvera au bout de l'infini, par une facon 
d'immortalite que la science decouvrira un jour, et qui sera 
a l'immortalite fantastique du passe ce que le palais de Ver- 



256 BULLETIN OK TJLE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN". 

sailles est au chateau de cartes d'un enfant." A. S., 99. Cf. 
ibid., note 42. 

In a famous open letter to his friend M. Berthelot, his point 
of view is presented more f ully and more clearly : 

"Nous serons cendres depuis des milliards d'annees, les 
quelques molecules qui font la matiere de notre etre seront des- 
agregees et passees a d'incalculables transformations ; mais nous 
ressusciterons dans le monde que nous aurons contribue a f aire. 

Notre oeuvre triomphera, L'ame, la personne, 

doivent etre concues comme choses distinctes de la conscience. 

L'ame est ou elle agit, ou elle aime. Dieu 

etant l'ideal, objet de tout amour, Dieu est done essentielle- 
ment le lieu des ames. La place de l'homme en Dieu, l'opinion 
que la justice absolue a de lui, le rang qu'il tient dans le seul 
vrai monde, qui est le monde selon Dieu, sa part en un mot 

de la conscience, generale, voila son etre veritable 

C'est en Dieu que l'homme est immortel. Les categories 
de temps et d'espace etant effacees dans l'absolu, ce qui existe 
pour l'absolu est aussi bien ce qui a ete que ce qui sera. En 
Dieu vivent de la sorte toutes les ames qui out vecu. Pour- 
quoi le regne de l'esprit, fin de l'univers, ne serait-il pas ainsi 
la resurrection de toutes les consciences ?" Frag., 185-90. Cf. 
Dial., 139-43; Job, XCI; also Seailles, E. E., 208, note. 

But what has this kind of immortality in common, one can- 
not help asking, except the name, with the continued existence 
of individual personality after death ? "C'est en Dieu que 
l'homme est immortel. En Dieu vivent toutes les ames qui 
ont vecu." Very good: but do not these words, from Renan's 
point of view, convey more sound than sense? Eor God, ac- 
cording to our author, is still in process of evolution, and 
he often declares it is by no means certain that our planet 
may not fail after all to contribute abiding results to that end. 
Hence to say that man is immortal because his work is incor- 
porated as a link in the endless chain of cause and effect, seems 
only another way of saying, though a less disagreeable way, 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN". 257 

that his personal destiny after death is that of the wormi or the 
waterfall. 9 

In short, the belief in immortality represents, according to 
Kenan, not a, fact, but a hope : and fortunately for its own sur- 
vival, is independent of logical proof. Man is not all reason, 
nor entirely governed by reason. On this truth he often in- 
sists, For ages mien have believed in their own immortality 
without intellectual proof, and for ages to come they will con-- 
tinue so to believe, even in face of positive disproof. 

"On ne fera jamais taire les objections du materialisme. 
II n'y a pas d'exemple qu'une pensee, un sentiment, se soient 
produits sans cerveau, oiu avec un cerveau en decomposition. 
D'un autre cote, l'honime n'arrivera point a se persuader que sa 
destinee soit semblable a celle de l'animal. Heme quand cela 
sera demontre, on ne le croira pas." Ecel., 87-8. 

Immortality, in a word, is an inevitable postulate of human 
life. Whatever man's theories may be, in practice he cannot 
assume, that his earthly life is the be-all and end-all of his per- 
sonal existence. 

"I own that I have grave doubts," he writes of himself, "as 
to individual immortality, and yet I almost constantly act as 
if I held in view things beyond my life." P. Isr., IV: 285. 
On this point he is very emphatic. 

"L'histoire demontre cette verite qu'il y a dans la nature 
humaine un instinct transcendant qui la pO'U&se vers un but 
superieur. Le developpement de l'humanite n'est pas explica- 
ble dans l'hypothese on l'homme ne serait qu'un etre a destinee 
finie, la vertu qu'un raffinement d'egoi'sme, la religion, qu'une 
chimera" Peup. Sem., 42 ; Of. F. Det., 420. 

"L'humanite est ainsi acculee a cette singuliere impasse que, 
plus elle reflechit, mieux elle voit la necessite morale de Dieu 
«t de l'immortalite, et mieux aussi elle voit les difficultes qui 
s'elevent contre les dogmes dont elle affirme la necessite." 
F. Det., 434. 

"Une voix est en nous, que seules les bonnes et grandes amies 
savent entendre, et cette voix nous crie sans cesse: 'La verite 
et le bien sent la fin de ta vie ; sacrifie tout le reste a ce but ; 
4 



258 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

et quand, suivant l'appel de cette sirene interieure, qui dit 
a,voir les promesses de vie, nous sommes arrives au terme ou 
devrait etre la recompense, all ! la trompeuse consolatriee ! 
elle nous manque." Disc., 91. 

Tlie note of scepticism in this last passage is one that is fre- 
quently sounded by Kenan, especially in his later works (Dial., 
26-29) ; though it is already suggested in passing, even in the 
earliest. In the Eau de jouvenee, Prospero, his favorite sage, 
suggests that this "sirene inUrieure" is probably a device by 
which Nature dupes her children into furtherance of her own 
ulterior aims. That Prospero is in reality presenting the au- 
thor's own views is clear from Penan's repetition of the same 
doctrine in the article on Amiel. And indeed, if the only 
evidence for a life to come is entirely non-rational, as Penan 
maintains, how can we ever be sure that our belief in that life 
is any tiling more that the survival in us of emotions re- 
flecting the erroneous beliefs of primitive man ? 

"II se pent que ces voix interieures proviennent d'illusions 
honneteB>, entretenues par l'habitude, et que le monde ne soit 
qu'une amusante feerie dont aucun dieu ne se soucie. II f aut 
done nous arranger de mianiere que, dans les deux hypotheses, 
nous n'ayons pas eu completement tort. II faut ecouter les 
voix superieuresi, mais de f agon que, dans le cas ou la seconde 
hypothese serait la vraie, nous n'ayons pas ete trop dupes. Si 
le monde:, en effet, n'est pas chose serieuse, ce sont les gens 
dogmatiques qui auront ete frivoles, et les gens du monde, ceux 
que les theologiens traitent d'etourdis, qui auront ete les vrais 
sages." F. Det., 394-5. Cf. Disc, 245 ; P. Isr., IV: 287. 

Oddly enough, this uncertainty does not in the least interfere 
with positive statements on the same question elsewhere. There 
are; passages in Penan that would do* credit to any church- 
father. One is tempted to' urge in excuse that his contra- 
dictions represent his belief at different periods of life. Such 
is not the fact, however; they appear in the sarnie chapter, 
and even on the same page. His beliefs seem to vary not 
merely with his moods, but even with the requirements of 
euphony and rhythm in literary composition. Cf. Souv., 363. 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 259 

Tb on© point, however, in regard to religion^ he has con- 
sistently held from first to last, and that is its social utility. 
However uncertain its doctrines may he, there can he no ques- 
tion^ he reminds us, of the beneficent influence of religion over 
men's lives. V. J., 184. He goes so far as to affirm that 
a belief in immortality is an indispensable support of the moral 
life. JSTo greater calamity could befall mankind, he declares, 
than the universal abandonment of this belief. Fact or fiction, 
what matter, if it affords inspiration to more virtuous liv- 
ing ? In such matters, practical utility is more important than 
scientific accuracy. 

"Let us not deceive ourselves," he writes, "man is governed 
by nothing but his conception of the futura A nation which 
en masse gives up all faith in what lies beyond the grave will 
become utterly degraded. An individual may do great things 
and yet not believe in immortality ; but those around him must 

believe in it, for him and for themselves Faith 

in glory and all our pursuings of the ideal are but another form 
of faith in immortality; . . . every noble life is built, 
in great part, on foundations laid in the life beyond." P. Isr., 
IV: 285. 

"Rien de grand ne se fait sans chimeres. L'homme a besoin ? 
pour deployer toute son activite, de placer en avant de lui un 
but capable de l'exciter. . . . Les premiers musulmans,. 
auraientils marche jusqu'au bout du monde, si Aboubekr ne 
leur eut dit : Allez, le paradis est avant. Les conquistador es,. 
eussent-ils entrepris leurs aventureuses expeditions s'ils n'eus- 
sent espere trouver l'Eldorado, la Fontaine de Jouvence, Oi- 
pango aux toits d'or ? Alexandre poursuivait les Griffons et les 
Arimaspes. Colomb, en revant les iles de Saint-Brandon et 
le paradis terrestre, trouva l'Amerique. Avec l'idee que le 
paradis est par dela, on marche tou jours et on touve mieux que 
le paradis." A. S., 409-10. 

This view is maintained in all his writings. A disinterested 
moral life is impossible without illusions, and the most impor- 
tant of these is the belief in a life to come. 

"II vaut mieux que l'humianite ait espere le Messie que bien 



2 GO BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

entendu telle endroit d'Isaie ou elle a cru le voir annonce; 
il vaut mieux qu'elle ait era a la resurrection que bien lu et bien 
oompris tel passage obseur du Livre de Job sur la foi duquel 
elle a affirme sa delivrance future. Ou en serions-nous si les 
contemporains du Christ et les fondateurs du christianisme eus- 
sent ete d'aussi bons philologues que Gesenius ?" Cant., XII — 
XIII. 

One of his last utterances on the subject is found in his 
preface to the Avenir de la science,, composed nearly half a cen- 
tury later than the work itself : 

"Ce qu'il y a de grave, e'est que nous n'entrevoyons pour 
l'avenir, a moins d'un retour a la eredulite, le moyen de donner 
a l'humanite un catechisme desormais acceptable. II est done 
possible que la mine des croyances idealistes soit destinee a 
suivre la ruine des croyances surnaturelles, et qu'un abaisse- 
ment reel du moral de l'humanite date du jour ou elle a vu 
la realite des choses. A force de chimeres, on avait reussi a 
obtenir du bon gorille un efforti moral surprenant ; otees les chi- 
m|eres, une partie de l'energie factice qu'elles eveillaient dis- 
paraitra, Meme la gloire, comme force de traction, suppose 
a quelques egards l'immortalite, le fruit n'en devant d'ordinaire 
etre touche qu'apres la mart. Supprimez l'alcaal a,u travail- 
leur dont il fait la force, mais ne lui demandez plus la meme 
somme de travail. 

"Je le dis franchement, je ne me figure pas comment on 
rebatira,, sans les anciens reves, les assises d'une vie noble et 
heureuse/' A. S., XVIII. Cf. V. J., 184; Dr. Ph., 356-7, 
360. 

This brings us to Renan's remarkable doctrine that reason, 
inevitably selfish as he believed it to be, is hostile to the moral 
life. Morality has nothing to gain from a clear insight into 
ISTature's ways, and it has everything to lose. Philosophical 
AufMdrmvg is the arch-enemy of virtue, that is to say, of un- 
selfishness. 

"L'homme est si mediocre, qu'il n'est ban que quand il reve. 
II lui faut des illusions pour qu'il fasse ce qu'il devrait faire 
par amour du bien. Cet esclave a besoin de crainte et de 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST EENAN. 261 

mensonges pour accomplir son devoir. On n'obtient des sacri- 
fices de la masse qu'en lui promettant qu'elle sera payee de 
retour. L' abnegation du chretiem n'est, apres tout, qu'un cal- 
cul habile, un placement en vue du royaiune de Dieu." M.- 
Aur., 5.67. Cf. V. J., 457. 
This doctrine is repeated in many places throughout his .books. 
"Prejuge, vanite, voila la base de la vie. La philosophie, 
qui detruit les prejuges, detruit la base de la vie." Dr. Ph., 

28: 

"L'hoinme est lie par certaiues ruses de la nature, telles que 
la religion, 1' amour, le gout du bien et du vrai, tous instincts 
qui, si l'on s'en tient a. la consideration de l'interet egoi'ste, le 
trompent et le menent a. des fins voulues hors de lui. L'homme, 
par le progres de la reflection, reconnait de plus en plus les 
roueries de la nature, demolit par la critique religion, amour, 
bien, vrai. Ira-t-il jusqu'au bout, ou la nature l'empor- 
tera-t-elle ? Dial., 43. Of. P. Isr., IV : 312. 

In the philosophy of Renan unselfishness is made the very 
touch-stone of morality. His antipathy towards ethical hedon- 
ism, so marked in his earlier period, springs from this point 
of view. Whatever is done for pleasure, he contends, is with- 
out moral value, for pleasure^seeking is always and inevitably 
self-seeking. 

"Le plaisir, essentiellement egoiste, est par consequent la 
negation du divin, l'inverse de la religion." Q. C, 470. 

And again: 

"Ce qui fait que le plaisir est pour nous une chose tout a 
fait profane, c'est que nous le prenons comme une jouissa/nce 
personnelle; or, la jouissance personnelle n'a absolument aucune 
valeur suprasensible." A. S., 405. 

Even the belief in a, future existence, the very foundation 
of morality, according to Renan, becomes morally worthless, 
he declares, if embraced in consequence of rational persuasion. 
If heaven and hell were undoubted realities, the conduct resultr 
ing from hope of the one or fear of the other would be noth- 
ing more than pursuit of self-interest. And to be sure, it is 
obviously the same thing in principle whether the pleasure pur- 



262 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

sued is happiness on earth or blessedness in heaven, the only 
difference being that the latter policy is less short-sighted. A 
Simeon Stylites, enduring pain in this present life in order to 
escape the endless tortures or secure the endless joys of a life 
to come, is just as much pursuing his own greatest ultimate 
good as the veriest libertine. If these future pains and pleas- 
ures are regarded as actual facts, it is not the hermit but the 
libertine who fails to secure for himself the greatest balance 
of pleasures over pains in the end. 

"Si les verites morales etaient des resultats mathematique- 
ment demontres, elles perdraient tout leur prix ; elles cesseraient 
meme d'etres morales, puisqu'il n'y aurait pas plus de merite 
a les croire qu'a croire 1 la geometrie et a s'arreter devant le code 
penal." Dial, 331. Of. F. Det., XV; also Dr. Ph., 260. 

"Supposons, en eftet, une preuve direote, positive, evidente 
pour tons, des peines et des recompenses futures; ou sera le 
'merite de f aire le bien ? II n'y aurait que des f ous qui, de 
gaiete de coeur, courraient a leur damnation. Une foule d'ames 
basses feraient leur salut cartes sur table. . . . Qui ne 
voit que, dans) un tel systeme, il n'y a plus morale ni religion ? 
Dans l'ordre moral et religieux, il est indispensable de croire 
sans demonstration; il ne s'agit pas de certitude, il s'agit de 
foi." M-Aur., 264-5. Of. O. d'Angl., p. 260. 

These statements, taken together with those previously 
quoted, would seem at first glance to place Renan in a very 
paradoxical position : immortality as a hope is indispensable 
to an unselfish life, immortality as a certitude is incompatible 
wth such a life. In this case the contradiction is only appar- 
ent, however. For even admitting that believers and unbe- 
lievers alike are governed, in the last resort, by considerations 
of their own greatest ultimiate welfare, it is plain that their 
respective policies would lead to very different kinds of con- 
duct in this present world. The one would bend his efTort3 
to secure his own greatest happiness here and now, regardless 
of society at large, or showing a regard for the good of others 
only so far as this was necessary to secure his own ; while the 
believer, postponing his own enjoyments to a future world, is 



BKATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST PENAN. 263 

free to promote his neighbor's welfare, or the glory of God, 
quite regardless of pain or pleasure to himself. And thisi is 
all that Renan really means : A virtue that is made a matter 
of policy is no longer meritorious, because it no longer proceeds 
from unselfish motives. He does not really mean to deny that 
a selfish life would be very differently ordered in fact, accord- 
ing as it takes account or not of a life after death. 

~No doctrine in the realm of moral philosophy is more em- 
phatically or mlore persistently affirmed by Renan than the 
proposition that morality, or in other words altruism', is a be- 
quest from pre-rational or even pre-human times. Unselfish- 
ness, he believes, is always a non-rational impulse. Ascribe 
it to instinct, to family- or race inheritance, to social tradition, 
to religious belief, to what you will; but it is never the out- 
come of rational reflection. So far as true altruism is still 
to be found among men, it represents a survival from pre- 
rational or even pre-human times. 10 Of. James, Var. Rel. 
Exp., 431ff. 

"Aucune mere n'a besoin d'un systeme de philosophie morale 
pour aimer son enfant, Aucune jeune fille de bonne race n'est 
chaste en vertu d'une theorie. De meme aucun homme coura- 
geux ne court a, la mort mu par un raisonnement. !Nous f aisons 
le bien sans etre surs qu'en le faisant nous ne somanes pas 
dupes ; et saurions-nous cjp science certaine que nous le sommes, 
nous ferions le bien tout de mema" Dr. Ph., 260-1. Cf. 
Dial., XVIII— IX ; ibid., 32-3, 37, 39-40 ; Eccl., 88 ; F. Det., 
35, 426-7; Mor. Crit, 13 ; Q. C, 128; Souv., 12, 342-3, 359. 

This doctrine that morality is largely a result of past hab- 
its was exemplified, as Renan believed, in his own life. Ever 
since leaving the church, he often declares, he subsisted on the 
fund of morality which he had accumulated in early youth 
under the influence of beliefs which he later considered illu- 
sory. Souv., 12, 342-3, 346, 359; Dial., XVIII— IX. 

In discussing this question Renan follows Kant in drawing 
a sharp distinction between man's rational and his moral na- 
ture, and he adopts the terminology of his German original. 
The Pure Reason is contrasted with the Practical Reason. 



264 BULLETIN OF THE TJNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Pure Reason, lie maintains, is incapable of initiating, or even 
approving, an unselfish act. Altruism, Religion, Morality, — 
often interchangeable terms in Renan — have a transcendental 
source, which is called by many names : Practical Reason, Cat- 
egorical Imperative, God, Universe, Nature, la Categorie de 
l'Ideal, Abime de l'Etre, etc. 

"The reasoning of Kant remains as true as it ever was ; moral 
affirmation creates its object. . . . Without the hope of 
any recompense, man devotes himself to his duty even to death. 

Justice, truth and goodness are willed by a 

higher power." P. Isr., I: XXVII— VIII. Cf. Dr. Ph., 
413. 

"Les croyances de la religion naturelle, derivant toutes de 
l'imperatif categorique, out l'air d'un filet qui nous enlace, d'un 

philtre qui nous seduit La religion est dans 

l'humanite l'analogue de 1' instinct maternel chez les oiseaux, 
le sacrifice aveugle de soi a une fin inconnue, voulue par la na- 
ture; . . . ." Dial., 32. Cf. ibid., 38, 30, 142; also 
Ref. Int., 338. 

"Le devoir et les instincts de nidification et de couvee chez 
l'oiseau ont la meme origin© providentielle. . . Ces voix, 
tantot douees, tantot austere®, d'ou viennent-elles ? Elles vien- 
nent de l'univers, ou, si l'on veut, de Dieu. L'univers, avec qui 
nous sommes en rapport comme par un conduit ombilical, veut 
le devouement, le devoir, la vertu; il emlploie, pour arriver a 
ses fins, la religion, la poesie, 1' amour, le plaisir, toutes les 
deceptions. . . . La religion, resume des besoins moraux 
de l'homme, la vertu, la, pudeur, le desinteressement, le sacri- 
fice, sont la voix de l'univers. Tout se resume en un acte de 
foi a des instincts qui nous obsedent, sans nous convaincre, en 
ro'beissance a un langage venant de l'infini, langage parfaite- 
ment clair en ce qu'il nous commande, obscur en ce qu'il 
promet." P. Del, 425-7. 

As already observed in another connection, these inner voices 
of morality and religion, when examined from the point of 
view of man's relation to Nature's ulterior aims, are seen to 
be a device by which individuals are compelled to work for 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RESTAJ5T. 265 

the good of the whole; leading eventually, according to our 
author, to the evolution of God. The kind of life which these 
voices approve, considered apart from the satisfaction derived 
from this very approval, is not that which leads to' a. maximum 
of enjoyment for the individual in this present world. Obey- 
ing this oracle man is exploited in behalf of a cause entirely 
foreign to his own personal welfare. Dial. 29 ; also ibid. 35-6. 

"La nature agit a notre egard comme en vers une troupe da 
gladiateurs destines a se faire tuer pour une cause qui n'est 
pas la leur." Dial, 40 ; also of. 129-30. 

"Nous travaillons pour un Dieu, de memo que l'abeilie, sans 
le savoir, fait son miel pour l'hommje." Dial., 45 ; 30-1. 

"L'homme est comme l'ouvrier des Gobelins qui tisse a. l'en- 
vers une tapisserie dont il ne voit pas le dessein." Dial., 28. 

This idea of antagonism between Nature and man seems to 
have been taken from Schopenhauer. At any rate, both Scho- 
penhauer and Fichte are repeatedly mentioned in connection 
with the doctrine. Of. Dial, 42; also Seailles, E. E., 282, 
note 1. But while accepting the premises of the German pes- 
simist, Renan applies them in a very different way. He fully 
admits that man is exploited by Nature for certain ulterior aims, 
and he also concedes that rebellion against this arrangement 
is useless. But he differs. from Schopenhauer in concluding that 
precisely this conflict between Nature and man is the source 
from which morality springs; for morality is essentially a 
cheerful co-operation with the deific tendencies of the universe. 

"La moralite se reduit ainsi a, la soumission. L'immoralite, 
c'est la revolte contre un etat de choses dont on voit la duperie. 
H faut a la fois la voir et s'y soumettre." Dial, 43. 

"Le mal, c'est de se revolter contre la nature, quand on a 
vu qu'elle nous trompe. . . . Son but est bon ; veuillons 
ce qu'elle veut. La vertu est un amen obstine, dit aux fins ob- 
scures que poursuit la Providence par nous." Dial, 46; but 
cf. A. S,, 9. 

"Pourquoi dire que la nature nous trompe," asks M. Seailles, 
"si son but est bon ? Que l'utilitaire s'indigne, soit, il est ex- 
ploite ! mais l'idealiste, le soldat du combat de Dieu ? 



266 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Est-il besoin de faire rernarquer l'incoherence 
mythologique du langage de Kenan : numina, nomina. 
La vertu est line illusion divine, providentielle, parce qu'il n'y 
a ni Dieu, ni Providence; car, dans l'hypothese ou la vertu 
serait divine, providentielle, elle ne serait plus illusion." E. It. 
283 ; 318, note. 

It is interesting to note that in this view of morality as being 
essentially obedience to a higher power, Renan is virtually re- 
turning to the teachings of the Church; to the very position, 
that is, which in L'Avenir de la science he repudiates as a hu- 
miliating subjection incompatible with the dignity of man. 
Speaking of the christian ascetic, he wrote : 

"Non seulement il negligea totalement le vrai et le beau (la 
philosophic, la science, la poesie etaient des vanites) ; mais, en 
s'attachant exclusivement au bien, il le concut sous sa forme 
la plus mesquine : le bien f ut pour lui la realisation de la volonte 
d'un ctre superieur, une sorte de sujetion humiliante pour la 
dignite hum(aine : car la realisation du bien moral n'est pas plus 
une obeissance a des lois imposees que la realisation du beau 
dans une oeuvre d'art n'est l'execution de certaines regies." 
A. S., 9. 

Contrasting this earlier position with his latest creed, the 
principal difference appears to be this: while in both phases 
morality is conceived as obedience to a transcendental author- 
ity, in his later position this authority is no longer determinate ; 
the moral imperative has been emptied of its definite content. 
Morality is no longer obedience to a God whose will is defined 
in a bible and summarized in the decalogue; it is obedience 
to a ]STature who commands nothing in particular yet requires 
unconditional surrender to her commands; a Nature of whom 
nothing is known save that, tyrant-like, she exploits her own 
children for her selfish ends by duping them into unselfish 
lives. 11 

But is this "obedience" to Nature, or to its Author, any- 
thing more, after all, than making a virtue of necessity? 
Renan repeatedly asserts that against Nature's dupery man is 
powerless. Obedience to Nature is regarded as a. species of 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 267 

slavery, in which the slave is made to hug the very chains by 
which he is held to his task. These chains are his instincts, 
his desires, his aspirations, especially the "other-profiting" in- 
stincts by means of which individuals are duped into sacrificing 
their own present pleasures to Nature's ulterior aims. 

"L'homme depend de 1' ensemble de l'univers, lequel a un 
l>ut et fait tout converger a ce but. L'homme est un etre sub- 
•ordonne; quoi qu'il fasse, il adore, il sert." 1ST. Hist. Rel., XV; 
l}ial., 45. 

". . . La nature triomphera touj ours; 'elle a trop bien 
arrange les choses, elle a trop bien pipe les des ; elle atteindra, 
quoi que nous fassions, son but, qui est de nous tromper a son 
profit." Dial., 42 ; also 28. 

In view of such statements, and remembering that, accord- 
ing to his own theory, mieritorious acts alone can properly 
T>e called virtuous, how is it possible to affirmj that virtue con- 
sists in obedience to Nature, and then affirm in the same breath 
that man cannot possibly refuse the obedience? Is he not, 
as some one has said of Hegel, devising a logic for his own pri- 
vate use? Is he not, in the strictest sense of the terms, mak- 
ing a virtue of necessity ? 

It is true that Renan distinguishes between cheerful and 
grudging obedience, graceful and ungraceful service, and de- 
clares the former alone to be moral, as in the following passage 
(among many others) : 

"La vertu, c'est de contribuer avec joie et empressement au 
"bien supreme. Le mal, c'est de servir sans grace, de ressemjbler 
au sold at mediocre qui murmure contre son chef, tout en allant 
au feu comme les autres." !N". Hist. Rel., XV. 

But even so, what more does morality become than a cheer- 
lul submission to the inevitable ? And what else do we mean 
by mlaking a. virtue of necessity ? lla 

Man's obedience to Nature, again, viewed from another side. 
becomes altruism!, which in Kenan's terminology is the whole 
of morality. 

"Chose singuliere," he writes in his review of Sainte-Beuve's 
Port-Royal, 1860 ; " le principe qui fait les bons ecrivains est 



268 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

le meme que celui qui fait les saints. L'amour-propre, l'envie 
de brilleir sont le defaut capital, qu'il s'agisse de morale re- 
ligieuse on qu'il s'agisse d'eloeution; l'oubli de soi, le mepris 
du succes sont la regie du bien dans tous les genres." N. Hist. 
Rel. ; 492-3. 

There is no contradiction, of course, between his conception 
of morality as obedience to' Mature, and his conception of it 
as altruism; it is both, only from different points of view. 
Morality is obedience, — with reference to the source of the 
impulses and instincts by which unselfish action is prompted; 
it is altruism 1 , — with reference to the end which the impulse 
seeks to attain. The element of altruism, in fact, has to be 
made very prominent in order to guard this conception of 
morality against obvious misunderstandings. For if virtue is 
obedience to Nature, what then, it might be asked, is vice? 
Are murder, theft and adultery less "natural" than faith, hope 
and charity ? It is therefore important to lay stress on the 
motive, and not on the motive merely as such, but on a conscious 
and deliberate recognition of the motive as altruistic. 

But; in thus attempting to guard our author's conception 
against absurd misconstructions, we are landed, in fact, in an- 
other contradiction. For how can deliberate altruism be recon- 
ciled with his doctrine that Reason is always and inevitably 
self -centered % But this point we shall have occasion to dis- 
cuss more fully as we proceed. 

A threefold distinction seem® necessary in order to bring out 
Kenan's full meaning. Altruism may be viewed from three 
sides, according as we contemplate the result of an act, or its 
cause, or a consciousness of the cause on the part of the actor. 
It is this last phase alone which Kenan has in mind when he 
speaks of altruism! as virtue, and of virtue- as obedience to Na- 
ture. Throughout his moral philosophy, his attention seems 
directed, not to the goodness or badness of acts as determined 
by their consequences, but to the character or disposition from 
which they proceed. For an act to be altruistic, and therefore 
virtuous, in Kenan's sense of the terms, an act must reveal not 
only de facto obedience to unselfish impulses, but a conscious- 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RBMN. 269 

ness of the impulse as being unselfish. A man is not jet virtu- 
ous because his conduct is in fact unselfish, whether in motive 
or result, but only when the unselfish motive is knowingly and 
deliberately followed as such. Through the instrumentality of 
"other-profiting" instincts, — to adopt, a bad word, — man is ex- 
ploited, according to this view, whether he will or not, in the 
interests of universal evolution, or the good of the universe. 
Even when individuals imagine themselves pursuing their own 
interests they are all the time unconsciously furthering Nature's 
ulterior aims. But this is not yet virtue, or merit. It is only 
when we come to> be clearly aware of this dupery, and yet co- 
operate, knowingly and deliberately, with Nature's plans, that 
our obedience is entitled to> the lofty appellation of virtue. 

It is needless to say that Renan made no effort 1x> apply this 
exacting conception of virtue to work-a,-day life. In the task 
of allotting the prizes for virtue known as the Prix Montyon, 
awarded each year by the Academic Franchise, and on which 
Renan was himself several times commissioned to report, he 
appears to have made no attempt to ascertain as a, preliminary 
qualification to compete for this: prize, whether the candidates 
were clearly aware of their being exploited in behalf of deific 
evolution. 

It is interesting to note that in his conception of morality as 
altruism likewise, Renan is making a virtue of necessity; for 
he holds that a certain amount of unselfishness is unavoidable 
in every human life. An utterly selfish life is an impossibi- 
lity. 

"Pretendre enlever de ce monde le sentiment de la piete et 
reduire tout au pur egoi'sme est aussi impossible qu'enlever a la 
femme ses organes de mere. L'egoi'ste lui-meme, qui pretend 
dresser la theorie de l'interet bien entendu, est dupe de la na- 
ture. L'egoi'ste donne a chaque heure mille dementis a son sys- 
tem©; la vie d'un egoiste est un tissu d'inconsequenoes, d'ac- 
tions qui, a son point de vue, sont absurdes et folles." Dial., 
37; 39-40. 

A similar paradox appears in his statements regarding the 
relation of morality to reason. On the one hand he insists, as 



270 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

we liave seen, that reason is hostile to altruism, in other words 
to morality and religion. He deplores the fact that humanity, 
in these days of rationalism, should be living upon its moral 
capital, the laborious savings of past generations. 

"Les vieilles croyances au moyen desquelles on aidait 
l'homme a pratiquer la vertu sont ebranlees, et elles n'ont pas 
ete remplacees. Pour nous autres, esprits cultives, les equiva- 
lents de ces croyances que fournit l'idealisme suffisent tout a 
fait; car nous agissons sous l'empire d'anciennes habitudes; 
nous somanes comme ces animaux a qui les physiologistes en- 
levent le cerveau, et qui n'en continuent pas moins certaines 
f onctions de la vie par l'effet du pli contracte. Mais ces mouve- 
ments instinctifs s'an'aibliront avec le temps. . . . Les 
personnes religieuses vivent d'une ombre. Itfous vivons de 
l'omibre d'une ombre. De quoi vivra-t-on apres nous ?" Dial, 
XVIII-IX. F. Det., XVIII. 

But on the other hand lie just as frequently declares that 
morality and religion are beyond the reach of rational argu- 
mentation. Compared with the deep-rooted non-rational imh 
pulses of man's moral nature, reason isi but a superficial ven- 
eering, powerless to suppress the altruistic instincts which de- 
termine our practice in spite of our theories. There will 
always! be 1 those, he declares, who practice virtue without stop- 
ping" to- make sure that they are not fools for their pains. 

"Precher a l'homme de ne pas se devouer est comme precher 
a l'oiseau de ne pas f aire son nid, et de ne 1 pas nourrir ses petits. 
Cela est tres-peu dangereux; l'homme et l'oiseau continueront 
tou jours leur eternel manege, car la nature en a besoin. Une 
ingenieuse providence prend ses precautions pour assurer la 
sounne de vertu necessaire a la sustentation de l'univers." 
Dial., 32-3. 

"Ce que vent l'univers, il l'imposera toujours; car il a pour 
appuyer ses; volontes des ruses inoui'es. Les raisonnements les 
plus evidents des critiques ne feront rien pour demolir ces 
saintes illustions." P. Det., 426-7. 

"Les croyances necessaires sont au-dessus de toute atteinte. 
L'humanite ne nous ecoutera que dans la mesure oil nos sys- 



BRATJEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST E.ENAN. 271 

temes conviendront a ses devoir et a ses instincts. Disons ce 
qne nous pensons; la fenime n'en continuera pas moins sa 
joyeuse cantilene, l'enfant n'en deviendra pas plus soucieux, 
ni la jeunesse moins enivree; l'homme vertueux restera ver- 
teuex; la carmelite continuera a macerer sa chair, la mere a 
remplir ses devoirs, l'oiseau a chanter, l'abeille a, faire son 
miel." EccL, 88; repeated in P. Isr., Y: 159. 

There is no real contradiction, however, between these state- 
ments and the assertion that reason is hostile to virtue. Ra- 
tionalism injures altruism, yet altruism survives rationalism. 
Both statements would seem to he true. A society which for 
many generations has been accustomed, like modern Europe, 
to associate virtuous living with religious beliefs, is certain to 
have its morality injuriously affected by a philosophy which 
tends to subvert those beliefs. It is a matter of daily observa- 
tion that what is known as " Aufklarung" has no tendency to 
improve morals. But on the other hand, it is also true that 
no amount of rationalization can permanently destroy the moral 
life of the race. Kenan's meaning appears to be that altruistic 
impulses, being matters of instinct, will always exist; but that 
it is only in virtue of certain illusions that these impulses, and 
the conduct they prompt, can secure the sanction of reason. 

By reason, indeed, Renan simply means the capacity for cool, 
dispassionate judgment of values. Rational judgments, ex vi 
termini, are dispassionate judgments. But dispassionate delib- 
eration in morals, he believed, is essentially and inevitably self- 
centered; self-interest being the pivot, so to> speak, on which 
the deliberation must turn. Hence reason becomes, in morals, 
a capacity for the calculation of self-interest, and therefore a 
thorough-going and consistent rationalism must of course be 
strictly incompatible with an unselfish life. From this position 
Benan never swerves. A conscious and deliberate renunciation 
of self-interest, he insists, is never obtained through rational 
persuasion ; but he was very confident that humanity will never 
fail to supply all the illusions and sophistries necessary for the 
subsistence of moral ideals and virtuous habits. 

"Une seule chose est sure, c'est qne 1'humanite* tirera de son 



272 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

sein tout ce qui est necessaire en fait d'illusions pour qu'elle 
remplisse ses devoir et accomplisse sa destinee." Dial., XIX. 

We must remember, however, that all these illusions are ef- 
fective only because they are taken, or rather mistaken, for 
truths. However important they may be in sustaining the 
moral life, the time must come when they are seen to be fic- 
tions, at least by a disillusioned few. What then shall be the 
attitude of these philosophers towards the rest of mankind ? 
In 1 the event of a real conflict between the claims of truth and 
the requirements of morality, which, shall prevail ? Can it ever 
be right to suppress the truth in the interests of morality, real 
or supposed? 

As an example we may take once more the belief in a future 
judgment. Suppose it to be 1 known by the initiated (among 
whom, we must reckon Kenan), beyond the possibility of a 
doubt, that belief in a judgment after death is based on illu- 
sion. Shall the fact be openly professed, even though it is 
certain to lead to a lowering of the standard of morals ? 

Here again it is possible to quote Renan on both sides 
of the question. In one of his last utterances on the subject, 
his preface to' the Avenir de la science, he insists that even truth 
itself is a secondary consideration when it comes into conflict 
Avith the demands of morality. 

"Je veux certes la liberte de la pensee ; car le vrai a ses droits 
comme le bien, et on ne gagne rien a ces timides mensonges 
qui ne trompent personne et n'aboutissent qu'a l'hypocrisie. 
. . . . Mais, je l'avoue, la science mem© et la cri- 
tique sont a mes yeux des choses secondaires aupres de: la neces- 
site de conserver 1 la tradition du bien." Mor. Orit., Ill — IV ; 
also, XVII. 

More frequently, however, he insists that truth must come 
first, regardless of consequences to religion and morals; for the 
advancement of truth is an end to which morality is merely a 
means. F. Det, 436-7. 

"L'ordre social, comme l'ordre theologique, provoque la 
question: Qui sait si la verite n'est pas triste? L'edifice de 
la societe humaine porte sur un grand vide. Kous avons ose lo 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 273 

dire. Rien de plus dangereux que dei patiner sur une couche 
de glace sans songer combien cette couche est m,ince. Je n'ai 
jamais pu croire que, dans aucun ordre de choses, il fut mau- 
vais d'y voir tropi clair. Tout© verite est bonne a savoir. Oar 
tout© verite clairement sue rend fort ou prudent." Avant- 
propos to the Pretre de Nemi, Dr. Ph., 263. 

In his Examen de conscience philosophique h© seems to up- 
hold the extremi© position that man exists for truth, not truth 
for man. A planet on which the postulates of morality are 
incompatible with the facts of science were better wiped away : 

"Si l'erreur etait la; condition de la, moralite humiaine, il n'y 
aurait aucun© raison pour s'interesser a un glob© voue a l'igno- 
ranc©. Nous aimons l'humanite, pare© qu'ell© produit la 
science ; nous tenons a la moralite, pare© que desi races; honnetes 
peuvent seules etre des races scientinques. Si on posait l'ig- 
norance comme borne necessaire de l'humanite, nousi n© voyons 
plus aucun motif de tenir a son existence. . . . Le retour 
de l'humanite a ses vieilles erreurs, censees indispensables a 
sa moralite, serait pire que son entiere demoralisation." 12 F. 
Det., 436-7. Of. ibid., XXIV, 402 ; A. Si., 93. 

Of all th© contradictions in Renan's writings the most as- 
tounding is contained in the following passage, when, con- 
trasted with the doctrine which prevails in his later years: 

"Que les personnes qui n© croient pas a la realite du devoir, 
qui regardent la morale comme une illusion, prechent la these 
desolante de l'a.brutissenient necessaire d'une partie de l'espec© 
humaine, rien de mieux; mais pour nous qui ©royons que la 
moralite est vraie d'une mianiere absolue, une telle doctrine nous 
est interdite. A tout prix, et quoi qu'il arrive, que plus de 
lumiere se fosse. Voila notre devise ; nous ne l'abandonnerons 
jamais." Ref. Int., 308. Of. Disc, 232-3 ; 258-9 ; 39. 

"Nous ne V abandonnerons jamais." But, alas for human 
resolutions ! L'homme propose m'ais Dieu dispose. Only a, few 
months later, the very doctrines so indignantly repudiated here : 
"la morale comme une illusion," "la these desolante de l'abru- 
tissement necessaire d'une partie de l'espec© humaine," are de- 
veloped in extenso by Renan himself in the Dialogues philoso- 



274 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

phiques, and thenceforward become dominant thoughts! in all 
his political philosophy. 

The above passage is taken from a public address on the place 
of the State in the education of children, delivered in April, 
1869, shortly before the outbreak of the war, and during his 
candidacy for the electoral district of Seine-et-Marne. Can it 
be that his liberal attitude towards popular education in this 
address was determined by his candidacy for the Chamber of 
Deputies ? 

But it seems more likely, in view of his independent charac- 
ter, that his statement truly represented his dominant belief at 
the time; and that his espousal of the opposite view immedi- 
ately after the war is to be ascribed to the change of political 
organization which followed that disastrous event. Idealist 
that he was, he seems always to have been opposed to the pre- 
vailing' regime ; a democrat under the empire, an aristocrat un- 
der democracy. 

Not that his earlier beliefs were ever abandoned, however. 
The old and the new, regardless of consistency, are affirmed al- 
ternately, as mood or necessity prompt. Audiatur et altera 
pars! Even in his latest writings, his faith in rational prog- 
ress, and his earlier enthusiasm for popular education, are fre- 
quently and emphatically affirmed, though the latter on differ- 
ent grounds. 

"Mieux vaut un peuple immoral qu'un peuple f anatique ; car 
les masses immjorales ne sent pas genantes, tandis que les 
masses fanatiques abetissent le monde, et un monde condamne 
a la betise n'a plus de raison pour que je m'y interesse; j'aime 
autant le voir mourir. Supposons les orangers atteints d'une 
maladie dont on ne puisse les guerir qu'en les empechant de 
produire des oranges. Cela ne vaudrait pas la peine, puisque 
l'oranger qui ne produit pas d'oranges n'est plus bon a rien." 
A. S., X. 

An intermediate position is taken in the Avenir de la sci- 
ence, which represents the climax of the age of reason in his 
own life. In the long run, he there maintains, truth and util- 
ity, the interests of science and those of morality, must coin- 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 275 

cide. It is only during periods of transition, like that from 
supernaturalismi to naturalism, that the truth may seem hostile 
to morals. The only morality that is ever injured by truth, is 
a morality based on error. Reason, however inadequate and 
disappointing in nuany ways 1 , is still the best guide we have. 
(Souv., 408: letter of Sep. 11, 1846, to bis friend M. Cog- 
nat. ) Rationalism has never yet been the cause of social degen- 
eration. In fact, he insists, the experiment has never been tried, 
for the age of reason is even now only in its dawn. A'. S., 74. 
Of. ibid., 68; 93; 96; 101; XIX. ST. Hist Rel., 505. Mor. 
Crit, III, VII. 

Turning now to the question of moral criteria: it is very 
obvious that Renan's definition of morality as unselfishness can- 
not furnish a standard of right action:, for the simple reason 
that "selfish" and "unselfish" may mean as many different 
things as there are different characters or selves. Selfish con- 
duct is presumably that which secures, or is expected to secure, 
the agent's own welfare:, real or supposed, regardless of the wel- 
fare of others. But obviously, different kinds of conduct will 
bring satisfaction to different characters. The practice of vir- 
tue is pleasurable to the virtuous as 1 vice is to the vicious. 
If therefore, an act becomes selfish whenever it aims at the 
satisfaction or pleasure of the agent, it follows that the practice 
of virtue by the virtuous is selfish ; and if all selfish action is 
wrong, it must be wrong for the virtuous to practice virtue, 
which, as Euclid would say, is absurd. 

And besides, if all action which aims at the agent's own 1 wel- 
fare is wrong, it is not certain that any opportunity for right 
action remains. It would be easy to show, indeed, from Renan's 
own words, that morality is at bottom nothing more than a fic- 
tion. For if it is true that reason is utterly and unavoidably 
selfish, as he insists, and that hence there can be no such thing 
as a deliberately unselfish act ; and if, as he further maintains, 
deliberate unselfishness alone can be called meritorious, then 
does it not follow that the very idea of merit, or of morality, 
rests on illusion ? 

But this is as far as possible from the position expressly main- 



276 BULLETIN OF THE TJNIVEESITY OF WISCONSIN. 

tained by him elsewhere. For not only is faith in morality 
declared to be the most certain of all human beliefs, it is the 
only absolute certitude in the entire realm of philosophy. 
Speaking of the articles which make up his Essais de morale 
et de critique, he says : 

"Tous se resument en une pensee que je mets fort au-dessus 
des opinions et des hypotheses, e'est que le morale est la chose 
serieuse et vraie par excellence, et qu'elle suffit pour donner a 
la vie un sens et un but." Mor 1 . Grit., I. Cf. Frag., 311 ; also, 
Seailles, EL R., 218. 

M. Seailles comments on these passages : 

"A regarder les choses du point de vue de l'espace et du 
temps, il y a quelque chose de monstrueux dans la primaute 
que Renan accorde aux sciences morales, c'est revenir a l'an- 
thropomorphismle sans prendre la peine de le justifier." E. R., 
340. 

The truth is that we are confronted again with the capi- 
tal defect of Renan's moral philosophy, as of all his philosoph- 
ical speculations;: it is either so incurably vague as to afford 
no definite information, or so hopelessly self -contradictory as 
to baffle all attempts at reconciliation, and even at clear and 
consistent exposition. His language is loose and elastic, sup- 
ple and evasive to the last degree. Moreover, he seems never 
to have examined the problems of moral philosophy from a 
psychological point of view. There is nothing in his writings 
to indicate that he ever went to the trouble of analyzing men's 
moral judgments with reference to the ultimate reasons why 
acts are currently judged to be good or bad, or motives right 
or wrong. The only statement in his books which might sug- 
gest a familiarity with the subject occurs in one of his speeches 
before the Academie Francaise, in which all existing theories 
concerning the origin of morality and the ultimate grounds 
of obligation are declared to be untenable. Cf. Disc, 196-7. 

It is true that in all his utterances on the subject he de- 
clares or implies that morality consists in unselfishness; but 
it is too absurd to suppose that so clear-headed a man as Renan 
would expressly maintain that all selfish action is wrong, and 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 277 

all unselfish action right. The truth is that he approaches the 
problem from a different point of view. Morality, in his con- 
ception of it, is not so much a question of right and wrong, 
or of reasons for right and wrong, as a question of merit or 
absence of merit. Unselfish conduct, he would say with Kant, 
to whom his imjpressions in moral philosophy all appear to go 
back, is meritorious conduct; and that is his reason for calling 
it virtuous. 

But even so he gets himself hopelessly involved in tauto- 
logy, or entangled in contradictions, the moment he is pressed 
to define his terms. What, for example, does he mleam by mer- 
itorious conduct? 

In all the accepted meanings of the term, merit is rested 
upon virtue, and not the other way round. An action is meri- 
torious" because it is virtuous, or virtuous to am unusual de- 
gree. Merit is simply the value set upon virtue. The weaker 
the flesh the greater the merit if we do right. The harder it 
is to rise early in the mlorning, the greater the merit in doing 
so. Of. Leslie Stephen, Sci. Eth., Lond., 1882, p. 311 ; Alex- 
ander, Mor. Order and Prog., Lond., 1891, p. 194 ; Kant, Met 
d. Sit,, 1797, p. 29. 

To make merit the basis of virtue, therefore, involves a 
logical circle. For if we ask for the ground of the mjerit, the 
only answer can be that it is virtue, or an, unusual degree of 
virtue. The tautology is obvious: unselfish conduct is vir- 
tuous because it is meritorious, and it is meritorious because 
it is unselfish and therefore virtuous; in other words, it is 
good because it is good. 

And this really seemis to be Kenan's position. He expressly 
declares, over and over again, that no reason cam be given why 
a man should be virtuous. Whenever an individual is truly 
unselfish, it! is in consequence of some mysterious, transcenden- 
tal compulsion. A moral hero can give no rational grounds 
for his heroism. 

"La signification transcendante de l'acte vertueux est pre- 
cisement qu'en le faisant, on ne pourra pas bien dire pour- 
quoi on le fait, II n'y a pas d'acte vertueux qui puisse raison- 



278 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

nablemlenfc se deduire. Le heros, quand il se met a, renechir, 
trouve qu'il a agi commie im etre absurde, et c'est justement 
pour cela qu'il a etc" un heros. II a obei a un ordre superieur, 
a un oracle infaillible, a une voix qui commando de la fagon 
la plus claire, sans donner ses raisons." Disc, 196-7 ; Of. 
Mar. Grit., II. 

But again we must ask: Where is the merit of unselfish- 
ness, if it spring's, not from the human will, but from some 
unknown, irresistible source? What merit can there be in 
doing what we cannot avoid ? 

The attempt to bring logical coherence into Eenan's ethical 
teachings leads, in fact, as already suggested, to the strange 
result that there is no such thing as a truly meritorious or 
moral act, in his own sense of the termls; for the only con- 
duct to which merit attaches is not in reality the work of man. 

This seems another instance of the persistence in him of 
theological influences. If in the place of his transcendental 
compulsion we put the christian idea of divine grace, we have 
the theological doctrine that whatever is good or meritorious 
in human conduct proceeds from the grace of God. In the 
eyes of Renan as in those of Saint Augustine, man is inca- 
pable of even resolving a truly virtuous act of his own free, 
unaided choice. 

"Quid habes quod non accepisti? Le dogme de la grace est 
le plus vrai des dogmes chretiens. L'effort inconscient vers le 
bien et le vrai qui est dans l'univers joue son coup de de par 
chacun de nous. Tout arrive, les quaternes comime le reste. 
JSTous pouvons deranger le dessein providentiel dont nous 
som(mes Tobjet; nous ne sommes pour presque rien dans sa 
reussite." Souv., 373. 

Thus we are brought around at last, unawares, to the ever- 
lastingly debatable question of the free will, and perhaps this 
is the most convenient place to state Kenan's position in regard 
to this time^honored problemi 

He has nowhere discussed the question ex cathedra, for- 
tunately for this chapter, and even his passing references are 
few and brief. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAIST. 279 

The term free-will, as Hoffding and other's have shown, is 
played fast and loose with in philosophical discussion, being 
currently used in half a doizen or mora quite different mean- 
ings. Of. Hoffding's Ethik, Germ, transl., Leipz., 1888. 
Kenan's utterances on this topic are altogether too 1 vague to place 
him on either the determinist or the indeterminist side in this 
controversy. 

He insists that man is a free moral agent (whatever that 
may mean). Disc., III. An essential condition of right ac- 
tion, he declares, is the possibility of wrong action. Q. 0., 
65. It is mjan's mission in the world to substitute reason for 
blind physical necessity. A. S., 31. 

This view is more fully and more clearly set forth in the 
following anecdote, which incidentally illustrates Renan's habit 
of reflecting upon his own actions, and perpetually revising his 
own conclusions. 

"Je vis un jour dans un bois un essaim de vilains petits 
insectes, qui avaient entoure de leurs filets une jeune plante et 
sugaient ses pousses vertes avee un si laid caractere de para- 
sitisme, que cela faisait repugnance. J'eus un instant l'idee 
de les detruire. Puis je me dis: Ce n'est pas leur faute s'il 
sont laids; c'est une facon de vivre. II est d'un petit esprit, 
me disais-je, de moraliser la nature et de lui imposer nos 
jugeiDtents. Mais maintenant je vois que j'eus tort; j'aurais 
dii les tuer; car la mission de l'homme dans la nature c'est de 
reformer le laid et l'immoral." A. S., note 182. 

The most definite of his utterances on the question of the free 
will occurs in the Averroes et VAverro'isme, where the views of 
the Arabian philosopher are endorsed in the following words : 

"Ibn-Rioschd a soutenu .... les vraies 

theories de la philosophie sur la liberte. L'homme n'est ni ab- 
solument libre ni absolument predestine. La liberte envisagee 
dans l'ame, est entiere et sans restriction ; mais elle est limdtee 
par la fatalite des circonstances exterieures. La cause efli- 
ciente de nos actes est en nous; mais la cause: occasionnelle est 
hors de nous." Averr., 159-60. 

From a note to the Avenir de la science it appears that the 



280 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

reality of mian's freedom was so unquestioningly assumed by 
Renan as an indisputable fact, that it served him as a criterion 
of philosophical truth. 

"Qu'il me sufEse de dire que je orois a une raison vivante 
de toute chose, et que j'admets la, liberte et la personnalite hu- 
nuaine comme des f aits evidents ; que par consequent toute doc- 
trine qui serait amenee logiquemient a, les nier serait fausse a 
mies yeux." A. S., note 14. 

It should be noticed, however, that all these passages belong 
to his earliest period, immediately following his separation 
from the church. In his later works there does not appear to 
be even a passing reference to this classical product of scholas- 
tical lore. 

Returning to our question of moral criteria : 

The only standard of ethical judgments to which Renan has 
anywhere expressly declared his personal allegiance is the es- 
thetic standard, which in his earlier days he believed to be des- 
tined to supplant all other standards of right, in proportion as 
humanity progresses in culture. 

"Je reconnais que le sens moral on ses equivalents sont de 
P essence de l'humamte; . . II y a dans Phumanite 

une faculte ou un besoin, une capacite, en un mot, qui est 
comblee de nos jours par la morale, Je concois 

de memle pour Pavenir que le mot morale devienne impropre 
et soit remplace par un autre. Pour mon usage particulier, 
j'y substitue de preference le nam esthetique. En face d'une 
action, je me demlande plutot si elle est belle ou laide, que 
bonne ou mauvaise, et je crois avoir la un bon criterium; car 
avec la simple morale qui fait l'honnete homme, on peut encore 
mener une assez mesquine vie." A. S., 177. 

"Sois beau, et alors fais a chaque instant ce que t'inspirera 
ton coeur," voila. toute la morale. T'outes les autres regies 
sont fautives et mensongeres dans leur forme absolue. Les 
regies generales ne sont que des expedients mesquins pour sup- 
pleer a rabsence du grand sens moral, qui suffit a lui seul pour 
reveler en toute occasion a l'hommle ce qui est le plus beau." 
A. S., 179-80 ; 475 ; F. Det, 333. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AW. 281 

"Mai qui suis cultive, je ne trouve pas de mlal en moi, et 
spontan.em.ent en taute chose je me porte a ce qui me semble 
le plus beau. Si tons etaient aussi cultives que moi, tons serai- 
ent comitne moi dans l'heureuse impossibilite de mial faire. 
La morale a ete congue jusqu'ici d'une maniere 
fort etroite, comme une obeissance a une loi, comme une lutte 
interieure entre des lois opposees. Pour moi, je declare que 
quand je fais bien, je n'obei's a personnel, je ne livre aucune 
bataille et ne remporte aucune victoire. . . . L'homme 
eleve n'a qu'a suivre la, delicieuse pent© de son impulsion in- 
tinne ; il pourrait adopter la devise de St. Augustin. 
'Fais ce que tu voudras" ; car il ne peut vouloir que de belles 
choses. L'homme vertueux est un artiste qui realise le beau 
dans une vie humaine comme le statuaire le realise sur le 
marbre, comme le musicien par des sons. Y a-t-il obeissance 
et lutte dans 1'a.cte du statuaire et du musicien ?" A. S., 354- 
5. Cf. James, Var. Eel. Exp., 80. 

The religion of the future, he prophesies, will be a pure 
humjamsm, "c'est a dire le culte de tout ce qui est de l'homme, 
la vie entiere sanctifiee et elevee a une valeur morale. Soigner 
sa helle humanite (Schiller) sera alors la Loi et les Prophetes." 
A. S., 101. 

"Tout ce qui s'attache a la vie superieure de l'homme, a 
cette vie par laquelle il se distingue de 1' animal, tout cela est 
sacre, tout cela est digne de la passion des belles ames. 
L'homme parfait serait celui qui serait a la fois poete, philo- 
sophe, savant, homme vertueux." A. S., 11. Cf. ibid., 355 ; 
M.-Aur., 554; Mor. Crit., 367. 

In the following passage we have an interesting example oif 
Kenan's application of this criterion of right to a concrete in- 
stance: the institution of suttee among the natives of India. 
The English are severely condemned for attempting to repress 
this beautiful effusion of idealism, that is to say the burning 
of women alive. 

"Les Anglais ont era faire pour la saine morale en inter- 
disant dans l'lnde les processions ensanglantees par des sacri- 
fices volontaires, le suicide de la femme sur le tombeau 



282 BULLETIN OE THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

du mari. Strange meprise! Croyez-vous que ce fanatique 
qui va poser avec joie sa tete sous les roues du char de Jagat- 
nata n'est pas plus heureux et plus beau que vous, insipides 
marchands? Croyez-vous qu'il ne fait pas plus d'honneur a, 
la nature humaine en temloignant, d'une facon irrationnelle 
sans doute mais puissante, qu'il y a dans l'homme des instincts 
superieurs a. tons les desirs du fini et a, 1' amour de soi-rnem|e? 
II faut voir dans ces actes la fascination que l'infini exerce sur 
l'homme, l'enthousiasme impersonnel, le culte du suprasensible. 
Et e'est a, ces superbes debordements des grands instincts de 
la nature humaine que vous venez de tracer des limiites, avec 
votre petite morale et votre etroit bon sens." A. S., 87. 

Is any further proof needed of the insufficiency and unre- 
liableness of the beauty standard as a, criterion of right and 
wrong ? 

In another passage from the same book, monasticism) is pro- 
nounced more beautiful than industrialism; are we to con- 
clude that it is therefore morally more right ? Cf . Mor. Crit., 
356; Nouv. Et. Eel., 337-8. 

I cannot resist quoting two more passages on this topic, 
showing what opposite judgments he himself passed on the 
same characters in the samje book. 

"J'aimie mieux un iogui, j'aime mieux un mouni de l'lnde, 
j'aime mieux Simeon Stylite mange des vers sur son etrange 
piedestal qu'un prosaique industriel, capable de suivre pen- 
dant vingt ans une meme pensee de fortune. Heros de la vie 
desinteressee, saints, apotres, mounis, solitaires, cenobites, as- 
cites de tons les sieeles . . . que vous avez mieux comh 
pris la vie que ceux qui la prennent comme un etroit calcul 
d'interet, comme une lutte insignifiante d'ambition ou de 
vanite." 13 A. SI, 84-5. 

With this passage in mind, turn to the following, written 
the same year: 

"L'abstinence et la mortification sont des vertus de barbares 
et d'hommes materiels, qui, sujets a, de grossiers appetits, ne 
congoivent rien de plus hero'ique que d'y resister. . . Aux 
yeux d'hommes grossiers, un homme qui jeune, qui se flagelle, 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REMN. 283 

qui est chaste, qui passe sa vie sur une colonne, est Pideal de la 
vertu. . . L' abstinence affectee prouve qu'on fait beau- 
coup de cas des choses dont on se prive." A. S., 403-4. 

Taking the two statements together, it would be easy to show 
from his' own words that Eenan was "tin liomme materiel," 
"un homme grossier," when he penned his rhapsodic admiration 
of the vermin-eaten hermit on his column. That would be un- 
true, however, as well as unkind. It is simiply another in- 
stance of the countless conflicting opinions expressed in his 
books, according as he gives expression to the idealistic values 
of his poetic temperament or to the subtle speculations of an 
analytic mind. 

His preference for the esthetic standard in morals, it may be 
noted in passing, is entirely in keeping with his pronounced 
aversion for logic. Esthetic impressionism! in ethics fits ad- 
mirably with the perpetual tergiversation and mercurial fickle- 
ness of his general philosophy; both alike affording release 
from the odious fetters of logical consistency. It is another 
evidence of the wonderful versatility of his mind, perpetually 
oscillating between, different points of view, and delighting in 
the sense of its own ubiquity. Renan could not make up' his 
mind to exclude from his appreciation anything that naught 
possibly enrich his collection of intellectual and spiritual curi- 
osities. Logical consistency seemed to' him too great a price 
to pay for this self-impoverishment. The good, the beautiful 
and the true, in all their various manifestations, found eager 
and ardent recognition from his pen, quite regardless whether 
or not his esthetic appreciations were consistent with his intel- 
lectual ones. An institution might be good but not beautiful, 
or beautiful but not good ; a doctrine might be true but injuri- 
ous, or useful but false, ox beautiful without being either true 
or good; but this he considered no ground for withholding his 
recognition of their own peculiar merits. His exclusive aim 
at all times was sincerity, and the reconciliation of his sepa- 
rate sincerities he has left to his readers, or rather expositors. 

Renan's emphasis on the esthetic side of life in the period 
immediately following his separation from the church appears 



284 BULLETIN OF THE TJNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

to have been a reaction against Christian asceticism. He re- 
proaches the church for its one-sided emphasis upon goodness, 
to the neglect or even exclusion of truth and beauty. Human 
perfection, he insists, implies intellectual and esthetic culture 
as well as moral; and this remained a favorite topic with him 
to the end of his life. 

"On s'imagine trop sou vent," he writes "que la mora- 
lite seule fait la perfection, que la poursuite du vrai et du beau 
no constitue qu'une jouissance, que l'homme parfait, c'est 
1'honnete homfme, le f rere morave par example. Le modele de 
la perfection nous est donne par l'humanite elle-meme; la vie 
la plus parf aite. est celle qui represente le mieux toute l'hu- 
manite. Or l'humanite cultivee n'est pas seulement morale; 
elle 1 est encore savante 1 , curieuse, poetique, passionnee." A. S., 
12. Of. ibid., 355; Mor. Crit., 367. 

In his juvenile enthusiasm he even goes so far as to hope 
that somje day a more completely human moral ideal may be 
evolved, " — un Christ qui ne representerait plus seulement le 
cote moral a sa plus haute puissance, mais encore le cote es- 
thetique et soientifique de l'humanite." A. S., 13. 

This alleged one-sidedness of the Christian ideal of human 
perfection is reaffirmed, more than thirty years later, in his 
Marc-Aurele, and indeed to the end of his days : 

"Le defaut du christianisme apparait bien ici. II est trop 
uniquement moral; la beaute, chez lui, est tout a fait sacrifice. 
Or, aux yeux d'une philosophie complete, la beaute, loin 
d'etre un avantage superficiel, un danger, un inconvenient, est 
un don de Dieu, comm|e la vertu. Elle vaut la vertu; la 
femme belle exprime aussi bien une face du but divin, une des 
fins do Dieiu, que l'hommie de genie, ou la femmie vertueuse. 
Elle le sent, et de la sa fierte. . . . Elle sait bien qu'elle 
compte entre le® premieres manifestations de Dieu. 
La fem^ne, en se parant, accomplit un devoir ; . . la plus 
belle oeuvre de Dieu, c'est la beaute de la femme. M.-Aur., 
554-5. Cf. Souv., VIII-IX, 14-15, 33-4, 114. 

But in later years he applied this principle of all-sided de- 
velopment, more broadly, to humanity as a whole, rather than 



BEAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 285 

to separate institutions, or to individual men. He seems to 
Lave held in his latest phase that the ideal life for a given in- 
dividual at any time depends on a great many things: his age, 
history, rank, social function, his talents, opportunities, and so 
forth: 

"Ghaque classe de la societe est un rouage, un bras de le- 
vier dans cette immense machine. Voila pourquoi chacune a 
ses vertus. ]STous sommes tous des fonctions de l'univers; le 
devoir consiste a ce que chacun remjplisse bien sa fonction." 
Dial, 132-3. 

"II import© pen que St Vincent de Paul n'ait pas ete un 
grand esprit. Raphael n'aurait rien gagne a etre bien regie 
dans ses moeurs. L'efTort divin qui est en tout se produit par 
les juste®, les savants, les artistes. Chacun a sa part. Le de- 
voir de Goethe fut d'etre egoiste pour son oeuvre. L'immo- 
ralite transcendante de l'artiste est a sa fagon moralite su- 
premo, si elle sert a. l'accomplissement de la particuliere mis- 
sion divine dont chacun est charge ici-bas." Dial., 133. Cf. 
F. Det., 382-3. Ref. Int., 2; A. S., VIII-X; Cf. F. Det., 
110; also Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 3rd ed., p. 339. 

"La fete de l'univers manquerait de quelque chose, si 
le monde n'etait peuple que de fanatiques iconoclastes et de 
lourdauds vertueux." 13a 

But do not these later statements furnish a complete an- 
swer to his earlier criticisms on the onei-sidedness of the Chris- 
tian ideal of goodness ? The special emphasis laid by the 
Christian religion on moral excellence is simply, "from a cos- 
mdcal standpoint," a case of what the economists call division 
of labor. And is it so certain that the interests of the race, 
even on secular grounds, may not require a special emphasis 
on some one side of human capabilities, either as being of 
more fundamental importance in character, or less likely to 
receive sufficient attention from individuals in the absence of 
a constant social or institutional pressure? 

It was said some pages back that the only moral criterion 
explicitly acknowledged by Renan as guiding his personal val- 
uations of right and wrong, in judgment and action, was the 



286 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

standard of beauty. It would be misrepresenting bis mean- 
ing, however, to suppose that he intended this criterion to serve 
universally, regardless of the characters and the ideals of the 
persons judging. For refined, impeccable natures of high 
moral culture, like himself, he indeed believed that the right 
would always coincide with the beautiful; but it is only when 
all have attained, as he believed all could attain, this same de- 
gree of moral perfection, that the beauty of an act can be a 
reliable criterion of its rightness. We saw into what opposite 
judgments he himself was led, notwithstanding his impeccabil- 
ity, by this standard. The truth is that the criterion of 
beauty is not one, but many; varying with the character, the 
ideals, the knowledge, the propensities and even the moods of 
the persons judging. Different acts seem beautiful to differ- 
ent persons, and to the sam|e person at different times. 

'Nor did Kenan see that the esthetic standard is at bottom 
only a sublimation of the hedonistic standard, just as truly as 
appreciation of beauty affords pleasure. If by pleasure is 
meant an agreeable state of consciousness, — and what else can 
it mean?—, then beauty is a species of pleasure, and ugliness 
a species of pain, in however refined a form. But this 
fact seems never to have occurred to Renan ; for ethical 
hedonism is as violently antagonized in his earlier period as 
moral estheticismi is enthusiastically championed. He ex- 
pressly repudiates the idea that pleasure is the ultimate item 
of worth in life. If happiness were the highest aim! of life, 
or even the only rational aim, there would be no difference, he 
argues, in respect of their destinies, between man and beast. 
Mor. Grit., IV; A. S., 324-5. 

He frequently insists on what has been called the paradox 
of hedonism, the fact that a conscious and exclusive pursuit 
of pleasure defeats its own aim. Pleasure-seeking, he assures 
the unsophisticated populace of Treguier, is impolitic as well 
as immoral. The surest way of finding happiness is to stop 
looking for it. Disc, 219. Cf. C. D'Angl., 222; Souv. r 
127-8. 

In later years his attitude towards hedonistic conceptions 



BRATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST RENA1ST. 287 

of life were very radically changed, however, and much for 
the worse. But this decadent phase will call for further dis- 
cussion in the next chapter. 

It remains to observe in this place that another criterion of 
moral judgments, besides that of beauty, was in fact presup- 
posed and implied in all his utterances on the subject: the 
standard of social utility, or social efficiency. In the Abbesse 
de Jouarre, for example, the most objectionable of his Dromes 
philosophiques, he implies all along that acts are good or bad 
according as their consequences are socially advantageous or 
the reverse. The only reason why "free love" is judged to be 
wrong is because it is incompatible with the requirements of 
civilized life. This doctrine is clearly formulated in his 
Avant-propos to the play: 

"Je m' imagine souvent que, si Phumianite acquerait la certi- 
tude que le monde dut finir dans deux ou trois jours, P amour 
eclaterait de toutes parts avec une sorte de frenesie; car ce 
qui retient 1' amour, ce sont les conditions absolument neoes- 
saires que la conservation morale de la societe humaine a im- 
posees. Quand on se verrait en face d'une mort subite et cer- 
taine, la nature seule parlerait; le plus puissant de ses 
instincts, sans cesse bride et contrarie, reprendrait ses droits; 
un cri s'echapperait de toutes les poitrines, quand on saurait 
qu'on pent approcher avec une entiere legitimite de l'arbre enr 

toure de tant d'anathemes." Dr. Ph. 411 Le 

monde boirait a pleine coupe et sans arriere-pensee un aphro- 

disiaque puissant qui le ferait mourir de plaisir 

On mourrait dans le sentiment de la plus haute adoration et 
dans l'acte de priere le plus parfait." Dr. Ph., 411-12. Of. 
Dial., 133 ; F. Dei, 382-3. 

For once, then, morality is dissociated completely from all 
metaphysical speculations or transcendental moral impera- 
tives. 

"J'espere que rapn Abbesse plaira aux idealistes," he says 
of this play "qui n'ont pas besoin de croire a l'existence d'es- 
prits purs pour croire au devoir, et qui savent bien que la 



288 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

noblesse morale ne depend pas des opinions metaphysiques." 
Dr. Ph., 4-13. 
And again: 

"Le vrai, le beau, le bien ont par eux-memes assez d'attrait 
pour n'avoir pas besoin d'une autorite qui les comniande, ni 
d'une recompense qui y soit attache©." Dr. Ph., 413. 

Yet in the Avendr de la science, in his impassioned plea for 
the extension of science and its application to all departments 
of human life, he expressly repudiates a merely utilitarian ba- 
sis for his plea., and incidentally declares that morality has a 
value in itself, independently of any advantage to society: 

"(Test commei si, pour etablir la morale, on se bornait a. 
presenter les avantages qu'elle procure a la societe. La science, 
aussi bien que la morale, a sa valeur en elle-mieme et indepen- 
demment de tout resultat avantageux." A. S., 22. 

All the reasons for morality dispersed throughout his writ- 
ings, or nearly all, are run in together in the following prayer, 
with which he concludes his article la Metaphysique et son 
avenir. 

"O Pere celeste, j 'ignore ce que Tii nous reserves. Cette foi, 
que Tu ne nous permets pais d'effaeer de nos coeur», est-elle une 
consolation que T'u as menage© pour nous rendre supportable 
notre destined fragile % Est-ce la une bienf aisante illusion que 
ta pitie a savammfent combinee, on bien un instinct profond, 
une revelation qui suffit a ceux qui en sont dignes ? Est-ce 
le desespoir qui a raison, et la verite serait-elle triste? Tu 
n'as pas voulu que ces doutes recussent une claire reponse, 
aiin que la foi au bien ne restat pas sanis rderite, et que la 
vertu ne fut pas un calcul. Une claire revelation eut assimile 
l'ame noble a, Fame vulgaire; l'evidence en pareille matiere 
eut etc une attednte a notre liberte. C'est de nos dispositions 
interieures que Tu as voulu faire dependre notre foi. Dans 
tout ce qui est objet de science et de discussion rationnelle, 
Tu as livre la verite aux plus ingenieux; dans l'ordre moral 
et religieux, Tu as juge qu'elle devait appartenir aux meilleurs. 
II eut ete inique quei lei genie et l'esprit constituassent ici un 
privilege 1 , et que les eroyances qui doivent etre le bien commun 



BKAT7EK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 289 

de tons fussent le fruit d'un raisonnement plus on moins bien 
conduit, de recherches plus on moins favorisees." Frag., 
333-4. ' 

Before concluding this chapter, a word must be said about 
Kenan's position on the much-mooted question of optimism 
versus pessimism: 

It would seem' that there is no place in his philosophy 
for a theodicy, inasmuch as in his speculations about the cos- 
mos the relations of creator and creation are inverted. In- 
stead of God in the beginning creating heaven and earth, the 
heavens and the earth are engaged through all time in the task 
of evolving a God. Nevertheless, Kenan has attempted some- 
thing like a justification of the ways of God to man. 

In the semi-conscious groping of the deific process, he as>- 
sures us, a certain amount of evil is the necessary price of 
a greater good. F. Det,, 377-8. Of., Mor. Grit,, 179. 

Kenan took every opportunity to testify that life is good, 
and decidedly worth living. Replying to the Discours de re- 
ception of M. Pasteur, before the Academie Frcmcaise, 1882, he 
declares : 

"Le coin imperceptible de la realite que nous entrevoyons 
est plein de ravissantes harmonies, et la vie, telle qu'elle nous 
a ete octroy ee, est un don excellent et pour chaeun de nous 
la revelation d'une bonte infinie. Disc, 81. Cf. ibid., 207- 
8; 219. 

"Grace a, la vertu, la Providence se justifie; le pessimisme 
ne pent citer que quelgues cas bien rares d'etres pour lesquels 
1'existenoe n'ait pas ete un bien. Un dessein d'amour eclate 
dans l'univers; malgre ses immenses defautsi, ce monde reste 
apres tout une oeuvre de bonte infinie." Disc, 199-200. 

In his own experience of life, he often declares, the good 
was unquestionably far in excess of the evil ; and he confidently 
assumes that the same must be true of the lives of the vast 
mjajority of men. 

"Je n'ai jamais beauconp sounert," he writes in concluding 

his Souvenirs, " A mfoins que mes dernieres 

annees ne mle reservent des peines bien cruelles, je n'aurai, 



290 BULLETIN OF THE TTNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

en disant adieu a la vie, qu'a remercier la cause de tout bien 
de la charmante promenade qu'il m'a ete donne d'accomplir a 
travers la realite." Sour., 373-8. 

Ten more years were reserved for Renan after writing these 
words, years full of toil and much physical pain; yet we find 
him reaffirming this same faith in the fundamental goodness 
of life, to the end of his days. His charming little speech 
before the Felibres, in June, 1891, the year before his death, 
and again at the Fete de Brehat, in September of the same 
year, are among his latest direct confessions on the subject: 

"Je garderai jusqu'a, la fin la foi, la certitude, l'illusion, 
si l'on veut, que la vie est un fruit savoureux." F. Det., 124 ; 
ibid., 109, 168. 

The complete sincerity of these public professions is attested 
by the general tone and spirit of all his writings. 

Side by side with his belief in the essential goodness of life, 
and proceeding from the same spirit, went his faith in the 
essential goodness: of man. In his daily intercourse with people, 
he habitually assumed that he was dealing with honest men 
until he had proof of the contrary. It was impossible for him, 
he declares, to be unkind to anybody a priori. 

"Un des principes fondamentaux de ma vie;, principe auquel 
je m' attache obstinement, bien que plusieurs de rnes amis me 
disent que c'est line enorme duperie, est de considerer commie 
un honnete homme toute creature humaine pour laquelle le 

contraire ne infest pas demontre Je persiste 

a penser que si l'on tient compte des dif&cultes sans nombre 
de la condition humaine, la bienveillance generale est la vraie 
justice." F. Det., 194-5. Of. Soiiv., 374. 

Rumembering Kenan's habit of espousing alternately both 
sides of any debatable question, in order to be sure not to exclude 
any part of the truth, it seems surprising that he should not 
occasionally have defended the pessimistic attitude also. But 
the fact seems to be that he never did. Is this because he was 
incapable by temperament of being impressed with the evil 
in life, the Weltschmerz, or is it because he deliberately re- 
solved to ignore it? There is such a thing as temperamental 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 291 

optimism,, rendering its nappy possessor impervious to the 
manifestations of cosmic evil. 14 

There are several passages in Kenan's books, it is true, in 
which he seems at first glance to make open avowal of pessi- 
mism ; and it would seem that on the strength of these state- 
ments some eminent critics, M. Faguet among themi, have given 
him credit for a first-hand acquaintance with pessimism in 
his own person 1 . I 

"Bien que parfois je sois tente d'envier le don de ces natures 
heu'reuses, tou jours et faeilement satisfaites, j'avoue qu'a la 
reflexion, je me trouve fier de mon pessimisme, et que, si je 
le sentais s'amollir, le siecle restant le meme, je rechercherais 
avidement quelle fibre s'est relachee en mon coeur." Mor. 
Oik, XII. 

And again in his article on M. de Saey: 

"M. de Sacy est pessimiste, et il a bien raisom II est des 
temps ou l'optimisme fait involontairement soupconner chez 
celui qui le professe quelque petitesse d'esprit ou quelque 
bassesse de coeur." Mor. Grit., 20. Of. ibid., 21, 23; also 
Seailles, EL R., 51. 

But in these and similar passages, as a glance at the context 
will show, he is really using the word pessimism in a sense 
very different from that in which it would contradict his habit- 
ual professions of optimism. Adverse criticisms of a distaste- 
ful political and social regime 1 , or gloomy forecasts of their 
probable future, if we call this pessimism) at all, is yet a very 
different thing from the assertion that creation is a failure,, 
or that life is essentially and inherently not Worth: living. 

How profound and unshakable was Kenan's faith in the 
fundamental goodness of life and of men, is unmistakably ex- 
pressed even in his first book, and from the faith there pro- 
claimed he never appreciably swerved: 

"Peut-etre nos affirmations a cet egard ont-elles un peu du 
merite de la foi, qui croit sans avoir vu, et a vrai dire, quand 
on envisage les faits isoles, l'optimisme semble une generosite 
faite a Dieu en toute gratuite. Pour moi, je verrais l'hu- 
manite crouler sur ses fondements, je verrais les homines s'egor- 



292 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

g&t dans une nuit fatale, quo je proclamerais encore que la 
nature humaine est droite et faite pour le parf ait, que les mal- 
entendus se leveront, et qu'un jour viendra le regno de la raison 
et du parfait." A. S.,. 69. 

In his article on Amiel, however, in 1884, he reluctantly 
admits the deplorable fact that for some few unfortunates, not 
to be were better than to be. But he holds that these unfortu- 
nate exceptions are very few, and arise not so much from! the 
nature of things as from certain "coincidences funestes," 
which he hopes may some day be eliminated entirely. F. Det., 
388. 

One way of eliminating 1 these few outstanding exceptions, he 
suggests, — and there seemls no reason to suppose that he is not 
in earnest — is to provide for all men the means of a painless, 
decent and voluntary exit from life, in the form of public 
euthanasial parlors, maintained by the State, and apparently 
placed at the disposal of all comers. 

"J'ai toujours eu pour principe," says Prospero^-Renan, who 
himself dies in this way, "qu'une vie disposed selon les regies 
d'une belle eurythmie ne doit pas laisser au hasard une piece 
aussi importante que le denouement. Tout est bonheur dans 
la vie, quand on peut a. son gre disposer de la. mort. 
La vie. n'est chose digne que quand on peut la finir a volonte." 
Dr. PL, 228-9, 231. 

"Que dites-vous!" exclaims his attendant, (horrified. "Le 
suicide implique des idees repoussantes, une mare de sang, des 
souillures. La proprete l'interdit." 

"N"on, soyez tranquille, chere Brunissende," replies Pros- 
pers "Je n'aurai que des sensations douces, et mes traits con- 
serve/rout leur beaute. Mourir n'est rien. L'essentiel est de 
mourir avant le premier affaiblissement et d'eviter l'ennui 
d'etre plaint," Ibid., 229. 

"Viens done, mon eau de mort, e'est ton heure ! Cher tissu 
impregne d'ether, qui possedes dans tes plis le tresor de l'anes- 
thesie, donne-moi le repos. Ah ! je crois que tu seras en* defini- 
tive mon invention la. plus bienfaisante." Ibid., 234. 

Then, gradually expiring under his euthanasial veil: 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST REN AN. 293 

"Grace a ce linceul, je meurs entier, et sans perdre aucune 
des sensations delicieuses qui sent d'ordinaire obliterees chez 
le mourant par la douleur et l'afTaiblissemient. La coupe de 
la vie est delicieuse. Quelle sottise de s'indigner pare© qu'on 
en volt le fond ! C'est l'essence d'une coupe d'etre epuisable." 
And taking leave of his attendants : 

"Dites qu'on joue les airs d'Amalfi et du golfe de Naples. 
Ayez soin que je ne voie pas un visage triste et que je n'entende 
pas un soupir. 

"fit-re eternel et bon, merci pour l'existemce. J'ai collabore 
a toutes tes oeuvres', j'ai servi a toutes tes fins. Je t© bonis! 
(II s'endort en souriant. On lit sur sa figure le® signes de 
jouissances infinies.)" Dr. Ph., 246-7. Of. James, Var. Eel. 
Exp., 92. 

Does Kenan refuse to be held responsible for this revolting 
doctrine? Then here are the same ideas direct frami his own 
pen: 

"C'est commie si l'on repoussait une coupe de vin exquis 
paree qu'elle sera vite epuisee, un plaisir pare© qu'il ne dure 
pas longtemps. . . . Reste la douleur, qui surement est 
chose odieuse, humiliante 1 , nuisible aux fonctions nobles de la 
vie. L'homime pent la combattre, presque la supprimer, tou- 
jours s'y soustraire. Les cas ou Fhommie est rive a la vie sont 
tres rares. La, seule destine© absolument condamnee est cell© 
de l'ammal eselave, du eheval par example, qui n© pent se 
suicider, ou bien celle des condamnes a, mort, gardes a. vue, 
ou de l'aliene: miais ce sont la, des situations biem ©xception- 
nelles. L'inimense majorite des individus n'a pas a se plaindre 
de son passage par l'etre, puisque la balance de la vie se sold© 
en joie et que la mort pourra sans doute un jour etre rendu© 
sans douleur." 15 F. Det, 384-5. 

If life is a good, Kenan argues, the world as a whole must 
be good; for the continuance of life alone is evidenc© that, 
for ©aeh species of creatures taken asi a whole, the good must be 
in excess of the evil, else this species would ceas© to exist 
And if there is a balance of good for each, there must be a 
balance of good for all. 



294 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

"L'etre, ou du moms la conscience, n'a commence et ne con- 
tinue dans le monde que pare© qu'il y a dans l'etre une plus- 
value de bien pour l'ensemble des individus conscients. 

TJn monde ou le mal l'emporterait sur le bien serait un monde 
qui n'existerait pas, ou qui disparaitrait." F. Det., 387. 

And again, in bis Examen de conscience philosophique : 

"De cette resultante supreme de l'univers total, nous ne pou- 
vons dire qu'une seule cbose, c'est qu'elle est bonne. Car si 
elle n'etait pas bonne, l'univers total, qui existe depuis l'eter- 
nite ? se serait detruit. Supposons une maison de banque 
existant depuis l'etemite. Si cette maison avait le moindre 
defaut dans ses bases, elle eut mille fois fait faillite." 16 
F. Det. 427. 

Renan bad no patience with pessimists. Tbe fundamental 
error of pessimism, be declares, consists in applying to tbe 
world as a whole an anthropocentric measure of worth, as if 
the totality of things had been planned for the exclusive con- 
venience of man. F. Det, 388-389. 

But surely this again is a slip of the pen. It is impossible 
to suppose that Renan would seriously maintain that pessimists 
are specially prone to exaggerate the importance of man in the 
universe ! 

And besides, does not his reasoning hit tbe optimists quite 
as bard as tbe pessimists ? If it is a mistake to call the world 
bad because it is not. the best possible for man, by what right 
do we call it good in the opposite case ? Yet this is precisely 
what he is himself continually doing. 

The truth seems to lie somewhere between the two positions, 
or rather alternately with each of the disputants. Optimists 
and pessimists are both partly right and partly wrong. Asser- 
tions about the goodness or badness of tbe world, or of life in 
the world, are without meaning until the statements are reduced 
to concrete terms. The question must be whether life is good or 
bad for some particular individual, or group of individuals. For 
the World is both good and bad ; good for some creatures and 
bad for others, good in some respects and bad im others. When- 
ever a given species of beings is in a prosperous and progressive 



BKAUER. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EKNEST KENAN. 295 

condition, we infer that, for this particular group, the good 
must predominate over the evil ("good" being taken in the 
sense of life-sustaining) ; and the reverse is true whenever a 
given species is on the way to extinction. The same reason- 
ing applies to individuals. For them also, the world, in other 
words life in the world, is at once good and had, to different 
individuals, at different times, and in different respects. 

If this is true, it seems clear that anthropocentricism, or 
somje other "centricism," is unavoidable in our judgments of 
good and bad, if our language is to be more than empty sound. 
Plain statements of fact, however encouraging or discouraging 
these mjay be, should never be termed either optimism or pes- 
simism. These terms should be reserved, in the interests of 
clear thinking, for exaggerations of existing good and evil re- 
spectively. 

Eenan maintains, in conclusion, that the world, good as it 
is already, is growing better every day, thanks to< the labors 
of man. On this point he never changed from! the position af- 
firmed in his youth : 

"L'optimisme serait une erreur, si l'honime n'etait point per- 
fectible, s'il ne lui etait donne d'ameliorer par la science l'ordre 
etabli. La formule: 'Tout est pour le mdeux,' ne serait sans 
cela qu'une amere derision. Oui, tout est pour le mieux, grace 
a la raison humaine, capable de reformer les imperfections 
necessaires du premier etablissement des choses. Disons plu- 
tot: tout sera pour le mieux, quand l'homme, ayant accomtpli 
son oeuvre legitime, aura retabli l'harmionie dans le monde 
moral et se sera assujetti le monde physique." A. S., 31. Cf. 
ibid., 69. 



296 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 



CHAPTER IV. 

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The political and social philosophy of Reman is thoroughly 
permeated by his metaphysics, and suffers from the same capri- 
ciousmess and unseizable vagueness. From transcendentalism 
in ethics, we pass to idealism in politics, not to' say utopianism, 
as in the Avenir de la science. 

He has somewhere declared himself unable to take seriously 
the philosopher who has never worked as a specialist over some 
problem in science. The philosopher might retort that Reman 
himself would have profited no less by a little of the disci- 
pline which philosophical system-building affords. The jux- 
taposition of his own divergent ideas on related subjects, had 
he himself undertaken the task, would probably have eliminated 
from his beautiful pages many a sophism which now, concealed 
by the charm: of his magical phrase, glides by unnoticed ; and 
perhaps nothing short of such a labor could have brought this 
poetic writer of classical prose to a proper regard for that sacred 
jewel of philosophical tradition, consistency. Cf. Seailles, 
R R., 213-14. 

In his latest phase, thoroughly disillusioned im respect of 
all things human, and divine, an all-indulging scepticisml so 
far predominates in his writings as to be almost his normal point 
of view. 

A few items, however, are constant in his ever-changing 
creed, and among these must be mentioned his unlimited faith 
in the possibilities of hum|an reason in the field of positive sci- 
ence. The day will come, he insists, when reason, in spite 
of all that cam be done to impede its progress, will truly govern 
the world, even the political world. 



P.RATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 297 

At the present day, to be sure, science and politics have little 
in common. Corr., p. 29. But an age of reason is coming, 
he prophesies in the Avenir de la science, even for politics. 
The last word of science, he insists, must be the scientific organ- 
ization of humanity. 

"Pour la politique, dit Herder, l'hommle est un moyen; pour 
la morale, il est une fin.. La revolution de 1' avenir sera le tri- 
omphe de la morale sur la politique. Organiser scientifique- 
ment I'hnmanite, tel est le lernier mot de la, science moderne, 
telle est son audaeieusei, m'ais legitime pretention." A. S., 37 ; 
repeated in Q. O., 334. Cf. preface to L'Eau de jouvence, 
Dr. Ph., 111. 

In respect of his method! in social philosophy, Penan belongs 
to the synthetic or historical school. He contends that the so^- 
cial sciences must be based on a. study of the laws which have 
guided the development of society thus far. Q. C, 76. 

In a lecture first delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882, and 
which has since become famous, Penan has given an elaborate 
definition of his idea of a nation. He begins by recalling the 
manifold forms which human association has taken in the past. 
There are those vague agglomerations of men after the manner 
of ancient Babylonia,, China and Egypt; tribes like those of 
the Hebrews and Arabs ; city states, like Athens and Sparta ; 
unions of different countries, as in the Romjan and Carlo- 
vingian empires ; communities without a country, held together 
by religious ties, like the Israelites and the Parsees. Then 
we have the different types of nations and confederations of the 
modern world: France, England, Germany, Switzerland and 
the United States; and finally there is that feeling of brother- 
hood and kinship established by community of race or lan- 
guage, uniting men into still larger groups, as when we speak 
of the Slavic or Germanic peoples. All these diverse forms of 
human association have actually existed, or still exist ; are they 
all nations? 

In regard to the ancient world, his answer is: obviously not. 
A nation, in the modern sense of the term, was unknown to an- 
tiquity. Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were not nations ; 



298 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEESITY OF WISCONSIN. 

they were mjasses or hordes, led by a supposed descendant of 
the sky. Egypt had no citizens, any more than has China 
today. 

What, then, is it that constitutes a nation ? Is it cornjmu- 
nity of race? But in which of our modern nations is this to 
be found ? The truth is that ethnographic considerations have 
had little or nothing to do with the formation of modern na- 
tions. France, for example, is Celtic, Iberian and Germanic; 
Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slavic. In other nations, 
as in Italy, the ethnographic elements are still more compli- 
cated. It is impossible, in fact, to determine the race-element 
of a modern nation in the physiological sense of the term, for 
the zoological beginnings of humanity long antedate the ori- 
gin of civilization and language. 

And what is true of community of race applies equally, 
mutatis mutandis, to community of language and religion; 
neither of these is sufficient for the founding of a nation. 

Is it community of comjmcrcial and industrial interests, then, 
that constitutes a nation ? This also Eenan denies ; a Zoll- 
vereiri is not a patrie. 

~Nov is it the "natural frontiers," such as mountains or riv- 
ers, that determine the limits of a nation. In a word, neither 
race, nor language, nor community of interests, nor religious 
affinity, nor geographical conditions, — none of these is suffi- 
cient to found a nation. 

A nation is a soul or spiritual principle, resulting from 
efforts and sacrifices made in the past, A heroic past: 
great men, great achievements, — this is the social capital upon 
which a national idea may be established. Tb' have done 
great tilings together and be willing to do more ; comjmon souve- 
nirs of a glorious past and a united will in the present; com- 
mon sufferings, common joys, a common hope: these are bonds 
of union stronger than race, language or religion; these are 
the foundations of national existence. Cf. Disc, 2Y7ff. 

"La, patrie est un compose de corps et d'amjes. L'ame, ce 
sont les souvenirs, les usages, les legendes, les malheurs, les 
esperances, les regrets communs; le corps, c'est le sol, la race, 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAIST. 299 

la langue, les montagnes, les fleuves : , les productions caracte- 
ristiques." 0. d'Angl., 34. 

"Dante, Petrarque, les grands artistes de la renaissance ont 
ete les vrais fondateurs de l'unite italienne. Goethe, Schiller, 
Kant, Herder, ont cree la patrie allemande." Ref. Int., 138. 

The idea that a nation is something more than the sum of 
its members appears already in the Avenir de la science, and 
is repeated in all his later works. 

"La societe n'est pas la reunion atomistique des individus, 
formee par la repetition de l'unite; elle est une unite consti- 
tuee; elle est primitive." A. S., 252. 

"Aux yeux d'une philosophic eclairee, la societe est un grand 
fait providentiel ; elle est etablie, non par l'hommle, mais par 
la nature elle^meme, afin qu'a la. surface de notre planete se 
produise la vie intellectuelle et morale. L'homme isole n'a 
jamais existe. La societe humaine, mere de tout ideal, est 
le produit direct de la volonte supreme qui veut que le Hen, 
le vrai, le beau, aient dans l'univers des contemplateurs." Eef. 
Int, 241-2. Of. ibid., 302-3. 

There is naturally not mtuch in the writings of Eenan with 
reference to the earlier forms of human association, or the man- 
ner in which the clan, the tribe or the nation develops. His 
only utterance on this point is that the family, and more par- 
ticularly the monogamic family, is necessary toi the formation 
of great races. Dial., 35. This statement he often repeats. 
The conjugal fidelity of women which monogamy implies is the 
result, he declares, of long-continued cruelty to her sex in the 
remote past Like all great thingsi the family was founded by 
the most atrocious means; millions of women stoned to death 
paved the way to conjugal fidelity. P. Isr., 1:5. 

From the fact that society is an evolutionary and therefore 
non-rational product, and not the creation of some contrat 
social, combined with the fact that reason is acquiring an ever 
growing influence in political and social affairs, he appears 
to conclude that political progress is destined to do away with 
patriotism!. Social progress, from his point of view, may be 
defined as a substitution of reason for tradition. With the 



300 BULLETIN OP THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

progress of reason, considerations of humanity will more and 
more prevail over those of country. Patriotism, therefore, 
being essentially a non-rational form of social cohesion, is cer- 
tain to grow weaker as men grow more rational, and will ulti- 
mately disappear altogether; — a catastrophe, it may be added, 
which Renani would be the last to regret. 

Renan has said many hard things' against patriotism : 

The fact is, he writes, that nation and philosophy have little to 
do' with each other. Patriotism, among other meannesses, has the 
pretention of having a God of its own. Jcihveh elohenu, said 
the Israelite; unser Gott, says the German. A nation is al- 
ways egotistical. It desires that the God of heaven and earth 
should think of no other interests than its own. Under one 
name or another it creates for itself tutelary divinities. P. 
Isr., 1:220. 

Again in the Hibbert Lecture for 1880 : 

"Grande est la patrie, et saints sont les heros de Marathon 
et des Thermopyles. La patrie, cependant, n'est pas tout 
ici-bas. Ota est homme et fils de Dieu, avant d'etre francais 
ou allemand. Le royaume de Dieu, reve eternel qu'on n'arra- 
chera pas du coeur de l'homme, est la protestation contre ce que 
le patriotisme a de trop exclusif." C. d'Angl., 37-8 ; also 
V. J., 123. 

"Ma philosophic est l'idealisme; ou je vois le bien, le beau, 
le vrai, la est ma patrie." Ref. Int., 177-8. Of. Corr., Je. 
14, 1853. 

Similar declarations abound in his letters, especially those 
of the earlier period. Writing in 1849 to his friend Berthelot, 
he refers to an observation he has made among the French 
peasants: after only a single century of civilization, they are 
showing signs of decadence; and he consoles himself with the 
hope that the Slavic peoples, invading western Europe, may 
perhaps adopt its ideas and carry them forward with a new 
energy. Cf. Ref. Int., 192. It is only when the vanquished 
are superior in capacity and culture to their conquerors, he 
adds, that an appeal to nationality is justifiable. Corr., 37-9. 

"Qu'importe par qui le bien se fait? ISTous somrnes main- 



BEATJEK THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST PENAN. 301 

tenant pour les barbares contre les Rounains. II n'y a pas de 
decadence an point de vne de l'humanite." 17 Corr., 39. 

But though it is true that Renan made little of patriotism, 
especially in the ultra-rationalistic period of his earlier years ; 
and though he treats it as a logical fallacy kept alive by preju- 
dice, yet he felt it to be of the utmost importance, in the in- 
terests of national strength, that the fallacy should continue 
widely to prevail. For a long time to comje, he declares, the 
existence of separate nationalities is necessary to the preserva- 
tion of liberty, which would be lost if the world had but one 
law and one master. A confederation of the world involving 
the abolition of independent nationalities, even if possible, 
would not be desirable. 

"La division est la condition de la liberie. II dependrait 
de quelqu'un de fondre les nations en une senile nation, les 
figlises en une seule Eglise, les sectes, les ecoles, en une seule 
secte, en une seule ecole, qu'il faudrait s'y opposer. Le vieux 
monde remain a peri par l'unite, le salut du monde moderne 
sera sa diversite." Q. C, 352. 

The same is affirmed of religions: 

"Des trois grandes formes que le christianisme a prises dans 
nos societes, catholicisme, protestantisme, orthodoxie, en est-il 
une qui doive supprimer les deux autres ? La puissance de la 
Russie fait l'avenir de l'orthodoxie, la race anglo-saxonne porte 
avec elle 1' esprit du protestantisme sur tous les points du globe, 
le catholicisme a pour resister sa centralisation puissante et sa 
forte discipline. Rejouissons-nous de ces divisions irreduo- 
tibles qui sont la, garantie de la liberie." Nouv. Hist. Rel., 
403. 

Renan has been much criticised for his attitude towards dem- 
ocratic institutions. 

M. Berthelot, who had a closer acquaintance with him than 
probably any one else, describes Renan's attitude towards de- 
mocracy by comparing it with his own: 

"Nos conceptions fondamentales etaient assez diflerentes. 
Si nous etions tous deux egalement devoues a la science et a la 
libre pensee, Renan, en raison de ses origines bretonnes et de 



302 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

son education ecclesiastique et contemplative, tournee vers le 
passe, avait moins de gout pour la democratie, pour la Revo- 
lution franchise, et surtout pour cette transformation a la fois 
rationnelle, industrielle et socialiste, dans laquelle est engagee 
la civilisation mjoderne. Les anciennes manieres d'envisager 
la protection des sciences, des lettres et des arts, par un pou- 
voir superieur et autocratique, l'attiraient davantage: il n'en 
a jamais fait mystere." Corr., 2. Cf. Souv., XI, 335. 

It would be a mistake to suppose that Renan was anti-demo- 
cratic from the beginning, however. The contrary is the fact. 
The political and social ideas of his first book are democratic 
to the last degree. The revolution of 1848, coming soon after 
his withdrawal from the church, found himj a young man of 
extremely radical tendencies, fired with a zeal for social 
as well as religious reform. 18 Corr., 26-7 ; 35-6 ; Ref. Int., 
14-15. 

In his later writings, his attitude towards democracy is an- 
tagonistic enough, it is true. His Reforms intelleduelle et 
morale, written in 1870, is oue long tirade against democratic 
institutions. The very source of democracy is condemned. 
Popular government, he declares, springs from a false and ig- 
noble view of life, being based on envy and selfishness. 

Another charge is that democracy is a cause of national 
weakness; a transgression, that is, of the first and greatest of 
Nature's commandments : be strong! Ref. Int., 49; 18; 29- 
30. 

"La democratie est le plus fort dissolvant de l'organisation 
militaire. L'organisation militaire est fondee sur la disci- 
pline; la democratie est la negation de la discipline." Ref. 
Int., 54. 

Moreover, democracy rests on a fallacious assumption of hu- 
man equality. It is not true that all men are by nature free 
and equal ; rather the proposition is absurd. Everyone 
knows that men are eminently unequal, in body, mind 
and character, and no human institution can. change tins 
fundamental fact. Nor is it possible for men to treat each 
other as though they were equal, to* say nothing of the viola 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 303 

tion of justice in doing so. Personal beauty, intellectual and 
physical vigor, a noble character, are intrinsically respectable, 
as their opposites are inherently despicable. No amount of. 
revolutionary legislation can sweep away the distinctions be- 
tween vice and virtue, beauty and ugliness, strength and weak- 
ness, honesty and dishonesty. Titles and privileges may be 
abolished, but those who really deserved them will be looked up 
to and bowed down to as much as before. A gentleman does not 
become the equal of gavroche by calling them both citoyen>. 

He calls attention to the superiority of Germany to France 
in this respect. 

"Tandis que parmi nous un meme type d'honneur est l'ide-al 
de tons, en Allemagne, le noble, le bourgeois, le professeur, le 
paysan, l'ouvrier, ont leur formiule particuliere du devoir; les 
devoirs de l'homme, les droits de l'hommie sont peu compris; 
et c'est la une grande force, car l'egalite est la plus grande 
cause d'affaiblissement politique et militaire qu'il y ait." Kef. 
Int.; 52-3 ; also p. 176. 

"On supprime l'humianite, si l'on n'admet pas que des 
classes entieres doivent vivre de la gloire et de la jouissance 
des autres," Ref. Int., 246; 296. 

But of all the absurdities of democracy, he declares, the most 
idiotic is the institution of universal suffrage. He could 
never forgive what he calls the unparallelled recklessness of the 
Trench statesmen of 1848 for conferring universal suffrage 
upon the country when it was not even called for. Kef. Int., 
14-15. 

His objections to the ballot-box have become platitudes. It 
affords no criterion of right policy, of true theory, or of wise 
and efficient administration. On the contrary, the appeal to 
the ballot-box is an appeal from knowledge to ignorance, and 
from civilization to barbarism. Furthermore, the masses are 
always exposed, by their love of flattery, to> the evil designs and 
malpractices of the "peripatetic political practitioner." Dr. 
Ph., 383. F. Det., 171. 

"La masse n'a droit de gouverner que si l'on suppose qu'elle 
sait mieux que personne ce qui est le meilleur. Le gouverne- 



304 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

ment represente la raison, Dieai, si 1'on vent, l'humanite dans 
le sens eleve (c'est a dire les hautes tendances de la nature hu- 
maine) mais non un chiffre. . . Le suffrage universel n'est 
legitime que s'il pent hater l'amelioration sociale. Un despote 
qui realiserait cette amelioration contre la volonte du plus 
grand nonibre serait parfaitement dans son droit." A. S., 
349-50 ; Ref. Int., 47, 67-8 ; O. C, 302. 

Nor is the ballot-box a test of strength even: 

"Eh se proolamant ultima ratio, le suffrage 1 universel part 
de cette idee que le plus grand nomhre est un indice de force; 
il suppose que, si la minorite ne pliait pas devant l'opinion de 
la majorite, elle aurait toute chance d'etre vaincue. Mais ce 
raisonnement n'est pas exact, car la minorite pent etre plus 
energique et plus versee dans le maniement des armes que la 
majorite." Kef. Int., 303. 

Already in the Avenir de la science he suggests that the 
m|ore direct method of actual battle is preferable to the count- 
ing of heads, since the truth is likely toi be with those who are 
impelled by conviction to risk their own heads in defense of 
their claims. A. S., 344-5. 

Besides, he asks, by what right can a majority, merely as 
such, claim the privilege of deciding a nation's destiny ? The 
only justification of government is the good of humanity; but 
to realize this good is not necessarily the same thing as to obey 
the will of the greatest number. If therefore in a given in- 
stance the majority, whether from! ignorance, prejudice or any 
other cause, are found to 1 oppose the best interests of humanity, 
including their own, is it not right that they should be carried 
along by a wiser minority, even against their will ? A. S., 
429-30; cf. 340. 

"Le bien de l'humanite etant la, fin supreme, la minorite 
ne doit nullemlent se faire scrupule de mener contre son gre, 
s'il le faut, la majorite sotte ou egoiste. Mais pour cela il 
faut qu'elle ait raison. Sans cela, c'est une abominable tyran- 
nie." A. S,, 429. 

A further charge against democracy is its unfitness to attain 
what he considers the principal raison d'etre of national exist- 



BKATTEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 305 

enoe, — the production of great men. Nothing without great 
men, he exclaims ; it is through great men that humanity will 
work out its salvation. Dial., 103. But democracy, he insists, 
is doomed to mediocrity in all things. Mor. Crit., 371-3. 

With reference to methods of selecting national executives, 
lie writes : 

"II est incontestable que, s'il fallait s'en tenir a, un moyen de 
selection unique;, la naissance vaudrait mieux que 1' election. Le 
hasard de la naissance est moindre que le hasard du scrutin." 
Kef. Int., 45. 

Last not least, democracy stands condemned by its own inher- 
ent instability. France committed suicide the day it beheaded 
its king. Ref. Int., 8, 250-2. 

It would be mistaking Kenan's meaning, however, to conclude 
that he intends by these charges to condemn constitutional gov- 
ernment. Indeed, a truly constitutional government is just 
what democracy is incapable of producing, according to himi 
Considered historically, he says, constitutional government is 
not a creation of democracy. England, which, instead of the 
absolute doctrine of popular sovereignty admits only the more 
moderate principle that there must be no government without 
the people, nor against the people, has been far better governed 
than France. 

"L'Angleterre . . . s'est trouvee mille fois plus libre que 
la France, qui avait si fierement plante le drapeau philosophique 
des droits de l'homme. C'est que la souverainete du peuple ne 
fonde pas le gouvernement constitutionnel." Ref. Int., 240. Cf. 
ibid., 43-5 ; L>r. Ph., 85, 99. 

In 1871 he writes in a letter to his friend Berthelot: 

"La France s'est trompee sur la forme que peut prendre la 
conscience d'un peuple. Un tas de sable n'est pas une nation ; 
or, le suffrage universel n'admet que le tas de sable. . . La 
civilisation a ete de tout temps une oeuvre aristocratique, main- 
tenue par un petit nombre ; Tame d'une nation est chose aristo- 
cratique aussi : cette ame doit etre guidee par un certain nombre 
de pasteurs officiels, formant la continuite de la nation." Corr., 
395-6. Ref. Int., 67, 147. 
7 



306 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

He explains that this "pastear ofjiciel" is not necessarily a 
dynasty. Leadership may be exercised by a senate, like that of 
ancient Rome, or of Venice; or better still by religious, social, 
educational or gymnastic institutions, like those of the Greek 
cities. But a thing that has never been seen,, he insists, is a 
society without traditional institutions, a, national education, 
or an accepted religion. Corr., p. 68. 

The most sympathetic attitude Avhich he has anywhere 
taken towards democracy occurs in his preface to the Souvenirs, 
pp. X-XX, where different forms of political organization are 
compared with regard to the influence they are likely to exert 
on the progress of reason, of which the first condition is declared 
to be freedom of thought and speech. 

"Le but du monde est le developpement de l'esprit, et la 
premiere condition du developpement de l'esprit, c'est la li- 
berte." Souv., XIIL Cf. Eef. Int., 99-100. 

"Le monde marche vers une sorte d'americanisme, qui blesse 
nos idees raffinees, mais qui, une fois les crises de l'heure 
actuelle passees, pourra bien n'etre pas plus mauvais que 
l'ancien regime pour la seule chose qui importe, c'est-a-dire 
l'affranehissement et le progres de l'esprit humain." Souv., 
X-XI. 

With reference to the ancien regime, he continues: Les con- 
cessions qu'il fallait faire a la cour, a la societe, ail clerge 
etaient pires que les petits desagrements que peut nous infliger 
la democratie." Souv., XII. 

But even these attenuations of his habitual bias are made re- 
luctantly, and not without reserve. For a few pages forward 
in the same preface, contrasting democracy in France with its 
better organization in England and America, he says of the 
former : 

"Je crois bien que, si les idees democratiques venaient a tri- 
ompher definitivement, la science et l'enseignement scientifique 
perdraient assez vita leurs modest es dotations. II en faudrait 
faire som derail." p. XVI-XVII. "Noli me tangere est tout 
ce qu'il faut demander a la democratie." 19 Ibid. XX. Of. 
Dial., 11 ; Ref . Int., 218. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 307 

On the other hand, the praises which aristocracy gets from his 
pen are many and generous. All civilization is of aristocratic 
origin. Dr. Ph., 85. An aristocracy of the wise was the law 
of primitive man. Or. Lang., 25. It is by aristocracy that 
the inferior races have been disciplined, grammatical language 
created, that laws have been framed, and. morality and reason.! 
developed. Dr. Ph., 99 ; Corr., 395. Even to-day its services 
to the State are incalculable. O. d'Angl., 122 ; also Kef. Int. 
67, 244; Dial., 64-65. Seailles, 269-70. 

"La vertu diminue ou augmente dans l'humanite selon que 
I'imperceptible aristocratie en qui reside le depot de la noblesse 
humaine trouve ou non une atmosphere pour vivre et se pro- 
pager." Mor. Crit., 23. Cf. A. SL 319 ff. 

This one-sided antagonism is all the more remarkable as it 
was characteristic of his method to advocate both sides of a 
question in turn, whenever it seemed fairly debatable. Can it 
be that he really had nothing to say in favor of democracy ? 

It is plain that his preference for aristocratic institutions is 
based on something more than an impartial examination of their 
comparative merits. An obvious criticism which, his treatment 
of democracy provokes is that he condemns it in general terms, 
without considering the conditions 1 in which it is placed (his- 
torical, geographical, ethnographical, political). If democracy 
is a failure in one country, that can prove nothing against its 
being a permanent success in another. The same nation, in- 
deed, not only may but does need different forms of social and. 
political organization at different stages in its developmjent. It 
is of course impossible to decide questions as to the relative 
worth of political institutions one way or another in the form of 
general propositions, regardless of the special conditions under 
which these institutions are tested. 

In the Dialogues philosophiques, half in jest and half in. 
earnest, Kenan describes an ideal social order, in which reason at 
last is the undisputed sovereign of the world. The progress of 
science, he suggests, may conceivably lead to the discovery of 
new forms of force, so hard to wield and so dangerous to manip-. 
ulate that only a few superior minds would be capable of turn- 



308 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

ing the same to practical use. In the hands of these intellectual 
giants, veritable gods as compared with even the choicest intel- 
lects of the present day, these hidden forces would be instru- 
ments of truly super-human power. The mass of mankind, 
lacking capacity for such knowledge, would be forced to submit. 
Dial., 82. The power which popular fancy ascribed to magicians 
of old would then become a reality. A select few would 
rule the many in virtue of mysterious influences which they 
alone understood. Such a government would be despotic, to be 
sure, but not therefore unjust ; for he supposes these magicians 
to be as high above the average in virtue as in knowledge. It 
would be the beneficent tyranny of justice and truth. As soon 
as it was discovered that the power of these demi-gods was al- 
ways in the service of the right, there would be no objection to 
its exercise ; and very soon these heaven-born rulers would come 
to be loved, and their commands be accepted like irresistible 
natural laws. Dial., 112. In course of time, having discov- 
ered the secrets of matter and of life, they would rule over phys- 
ical creation likewise, and eventually come to be worshipped 
as gods. "Primos in orbe deos fecit timor." Dial., 113, Cf. 
Frag., 153 ff. 

This is mere dreaming, of course ; but it points in the direc- 
tion of Kenan's ideal of social organization. An enlightened 
despotism*, not supposedly merely but truly enlightened, and 
despotic only in the sense of being all-powerful, was his beau 
ideal of political order. Cf. A. S., 350-2 ; Souv., 335. 

But, notwithstanding his strictures upon democracy, Kenan 
was at all times an ardent advocate of personal liberty. 

"Le regime liberal est une necessity absolue," he writes, 
"pour toutes les nations modernes. Qui ne pourra s'y accom- 
moder perira. . . . Une nation qui ne sera capable ni de 
la liberte de la presse, ni de la liberte de reunion, ni de la li- 
berie politique, sera certainement depassee et vaincue par les 
nations qui peuvent supporter de telles libertes. Ces dernieres 
seront tou jours mieux informees, plus instruites, plus seri- 
euses, mieux gouvernees." Eef. Int., 273. 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST RENAN. 309 

"Le but supreme de l'humanite est la liberie des individus." 
M.-Aur., 588. 

Many other passages of like tenor might be quoted from! his 
books. 

Conservatism, to be sure, is also indispensable. Radicalism 
and conservatism are the two weights, so to speak, by which 
society maintains its balance over the tight-ropes of destiny. 
"La vie est le resultat d'un conflit entre deux forces con- 
traires. On meurt aussi bien par 1' absence de tout souffle re- 
volutionnaire que par l'exces de la revolution." O. d'AngL, 
100. 

It is liberalism, however, that needs most encouragement, 
for of conservatism there is always an abundant supply. Lib- 
eralism itself becomes conservatism) through mere lapse of 
time. The liberals of to-day are the conservatives of to-mor- 
row. Dr. Ph., 269. 

In a letter of 184:7 to his friend Berthelot the relation of 
these opposite forces to social progress is clearly set forth: 

"La loi, en politique, c'est de m|archer toujours. L'opinion 
ne peut rester un instant stationnaire. . . Mais l'opinion 
marchant toujours et le gouvernement etant necessairement 
stationnaire et conservateur, le lendemain de la revolution l'ac- 
cord est rompu, et une nouvelle revolution est necessaire.. 
Elle ne se fera pas, et cela fort heureusemlent, parce que l'op- 
position n'a pas encore la force; cela arrivera plus tard, quandl 
le desaccord sera trop criant; alors une nouvelle revolution,, 
puis a recommencer. En un mot, j 'imagine l'opinion comm© 
avangant d'un mouvement continu et les gouvernements avan- 
<?ant par soubresauts, en sorte qu'ils ne peuvent que par in- 
stants se trouver de front." Corr., 26. 

Renan was thoroughly modern in the distrust he showed for 
abstract "natural rights." A liberty which exists in fact as 
well as name is not the result of mere constitutional enactment. 
Civil liberty is not assured, he says, until it is rooted in insti- 
tutions which have long endured. It might be shown that the 
only ground upon which a certain amount of independence 
still finds refuge in our time is a remnant of what 



310 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

in France is known as the ancien regime. Mor. Crit., 335. 
T"he French revolution made the mistake of all revolu- 
tions which are founded on abstract ideas, instead of antece- 
dent rights. Ibid., 98 ; also 37-8. 

"La liberte achetee ou arrachee pied a pied a ete plus du- 
rable que la liberte par nature. Eta croyant fonder le droit ab- 
strait, on fondait la servitude, tandis que les hauts barons 
d'Angleterre, ... en defendant leurs privileges, ont 
fonde la vraie liberte." Mor. Orit., 39. 

"L'Angleterre, sans rompre aveo sa royaute, avec sa no- 
blesse, aveo ses oomtes, avec ses communes, avec son £glise, 
avec ses universites, a trouve moyen d'etre 1'Etat le plus libre, 
le plus prospere et le plus patriote qu'il y ait." 20 Eef. Int., 5. 
Cf. ibid., 239. 

Foremost among civil liberties, in his estimation, are free 
thought and free speech. Without this personal freedom po- 
litical liberty is the merest sham. Q. 0., 411. 

This seemjs to have been his normal point of view, though 
he did not hold to' it consistently. In the Avenir de la science, 
for example, he defends the opposite view, insisting that free 
speech, like universal suffrage, cannot be reasonable until all 
mien have acquired the capacity to distinguish between truth 
and error. The right freely to express one's thoughts presup- 
poses a capacity to think aright, for there can be no such thing 
as a right to disseminate falsehood. A. S., 357. Cf. Mor. 
Crit, 161. 

A far more urgent duty of society than' the guarantee of uni- 
versal free speech, he declares, is to improve the minds and 
characters of its members. So long as the mtasses are kept 
in ignorance, it is simply absurd to claim in their behalf the 
right to free assembly and free speech. 

"Le vrai trouve tou jours assez de liberte pour se faire jour, 
et la liberte ne peut etre que prejudiciable, quand ce sont des 
insenses qui la reclament. . . . ISTous usons la force pour 
conserver a tons le droit de radoter a. leur aise ; ne vaudrait-il 
pas mieux ehereher a parler raison et enseigner a tous a parler 
et a comprendre ce langage? Former les clubs, ouvrez les 



SHATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 311 

ecoles, et vous servirez vraiment la cause populaire." A. S., 
356. Also Q. 0., 477. C. d'Angl., 26-7. 

Legal guarantees of free speech he considered of little im- 
portance. A m,an who is really in the right is always suffi- 
ciently free to disseminate his convictions. In some respects, 
indeed, opposition to innovating ideas is a good thing. When 
would-be reformers are obliged to risk their own life in the 
advocacy of their cause, the peace will be disturbed only by 
those who are sure of their mjessage. A. S., 362. 

"La. persecution a le grand avantage d'ecarter la petite ori- 
ginalite qui cherche son profit dans une mesquine opposition. 
. Autrefois, sur dix novateurs, neuf etaient violem- 
ment etouffes, aussi le dixieme etait bien vraiment et franohe- 
ment original. La serpe qui emonde les rameaux faibles ne 
fait que donner aux autres plus de force. Aujourd'hui plus 
de serpe; mais aussi plus de seve. En somme, tout cela est 
assez indifferent, et l'humanite fera son chemin sans 1 les li- 
beraux et malgre les retrogrades." A. S., 362. 

"L'idee vraie ne demande pas de permission; elle se soucie 
peu que son droit soit ou non reconnu. Le christianism|e n'a 
pas eu besoin de la liberte de la presse ni de la liberte de re- 
union pour conquerir le monde. . . . Occuponsr-nous done 
un peu plus de penser, et un peu moins d' avoir le droit d'ex- 
primer notre pensee. L'homme qui a raison est to uj ours assez 
libre." Q. O., 303-4 

Moreover, the suppression of free-thought is, strictly speak- 
ing, impossible. A heretic placed on the rack may alter his lan- 
guage, but his private conviction is beyond the reach of external 
coercion. Even in the days when free-thinking meant reasoning 
that was not consistent with statements in the Bible, or the 
Coran, and people were burnt alive for professing their real 
beliefs, free-thinking was not in reality suppressed. All that 
philosophers needed to do was to< twist their own language into 
harmony with the scriptures, or vice versa; in which case ex- 
ternal coercion resulted merely in the multiplication of glos- 
saries and commentaries. A. S., 58. What else are the in- 
tricate commientsi on knotty points in the scriptures but the pro- 



312 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

test of reason against the enslaving letter of the text? And 
what is the cause of all the hermeneutical dodges and subter- 
fuges of theological apologetics, both christian and pagan, save 
the rebellion of present knowledge against past ignorance? 

"La liberte de penser est imprescriptible. . . Sous le re- 
gime d'Aristote, comme sous celui de la Bible^ on a pu penser 
presque aussi librement que de nos jours, mais a la condition 
de prouver que telle pensee etait reelleanent dans Aristote ou 
dans la Bible, ce qui ne faisait jamais grande difficulte. . . 
Tons les comtmlentaires des livres sacres se ressemblent, depuis 
ceux de Manou, jusqu'a ceux de la Bible, jusqu'a ceux du 
Coran. Tons sont la protestation de l'esprit humain centre 
la lettre asservissante. . . G'est la regie etroite que fait 
naitre l'equivoque." A. S,, 58-9. Cf. ibid., 290. 

So little did Renan m|ake of the right to free speech at the 
most rationalistic period of his own life that even the inquisi- 
tion itself, with all its cruelty, is condemned solely on 
the ground of not being in the service of truth. If the doc- 
trine of the church had been true, he says, the inquisi- 
tion would have been a bemeficient institution. The moment 
a doctrine acquires universal acceptance and is made the foun- 
dation of social and national existence, society is right in pun- 
ishing those who attempt to subvert it. A. S., 345-7. 

"Du moment qu'une societe entiere accepte un dogme et pro- 
clame que ce dogmie est la verite absolue, et cela sans opposi- 
tion, on est charitable en persecutant. C'est defendre la soci- 
ete." A. S., 345. Cf. Mor. Grit, 161. 

"Je congois l'Etat reconnaissant un seul culte; je le congois 
ne reconnaissant aucun culte; mais je ne le congois pas recon- 
naissant tous les cultes. II faut de la doctrine a l'humianite. 
Si le catholicisme est le vrai, les pretentions les plus extremes 
des ultramjontains sont legitimes, l'Inquisition est une institu- 
tion bienfaisante. . . De ce point de vue, . . le sou- 
verain fait acte de pere en separant le bon grain de l'ivraie et 
brulant celle-ci. Bien ne tient devant la seule chose neces- 
saire, sauver les ames." A. S., 348-9. Cf. SOuv., 112-13. 

The needs of society^ he repeatedly affirms, must in all cases 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 313 

take precedence of individual rights. Whenever personal lib- 
erty comes in conflict with social welfare, it is the latter which 
ought to prevail. It is so, he believed, throughout nature. 
He goes so far as to declare that any curtailment of individual 
liberties is right, even to slavery, itself, if the welfare of soci- 
ety demands it. 20a 

The first and most imperative duty of any society, as of any 
individual, is the duty of self-preservation. Fighting-ability, 
he insists, is of the utmost importance to a nation's welfare. 
A society which is too kindly in disposition is weak. The 
world is not made up of perfect people; certain abuses, there- 
fore, are necessary and unavoidable. It is dangerous for a 
nation to be more civilized than its neighbors. P. Isr., Ill, 
230 ; Dr. Ph., 346. 

A sound philosophy of life should fit men for killing as well 
as for dying. Dr. Ph., 349. The surest guarantee of peace 
is preparation for war. 

Speaking of the regime under which the happiness of the 
individual, guaranteed by the social group to which he belongs, 
is the sole object of the law: "Who will maintain this fine 
ideal ?" he asks ; "who will protect this little paradise of broth- 
ers against the attacks of external force?" P. Isr., Ill: 354. 

"C'est une verite bien constatee que le progress philoso- 
phique des loiis ne repond pas toujours a, un progres dans la 
force de l'Etat, La guerre est chose brutale ; elle veut des bru- 
taux; souvent il arrive ainsi que les ameliorations morales et 
sociales entrainent un afTaiblissement militaire." M.-Aur., 
253-4. 

He reminds his readers that war is a legacy from uncivil- 
ized times, a relic of primitive barbarism. M.-Aur., 253. 
Militarism therefore, appealing as it does to instincts deep- 
rooted in human nature, cannot be suddenly abolished by mere 
resolutions; nor the cannon be safely discarded by any sin- 
gle nation alone. He believed that peoples, far more than in- 
dividuals even, are compelled to be selfish by the very condi- 
tions of existence. P. Isr., I: 219. The way to certain na- 
tional death is persistence in a policy of unselfish humanitar- 



314 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN". 

ianism. A nation that labors for humanity is always a victim 
of the universal work which it accomplishes. P. Isr., HI: 
224 ; XII. A nation which devotes itself to social and religions 
problems, courts its own ruin. C. d'Angl., 106. 

This is one of his oft-repeated inductions from history. In 
the Hibbert lecture for 1880, he writes: 

"Presque toujours les nations creees pour jouer un role de 
civilisation universelle, comme la Judee> la Grece, l'ltalie de 
la renaissance, n'exercent leur pleine action sur le monde 
qu'apres avoir ete victimes de leur propre grandeur. . 
Lea peuples doivent ohoisir, en effet, entre les destinees lon- 
gues, tranquilles et obscures, de celui qui vit pour soi, et la 
carrier© troublee, orageuse, de celui qui vit pour l'humanite. 
La nation qui agite dans son sein des problemes sociaux et re- 
ligieux est presque toujours faible politiquement. Tout pays 
qui reve un royaume de Dieu, qui vit pour les idees generales, 
qui poursuit une oeuvre d'interet universel, sacrifie par la, 
meme sa destinee particuliere, airaiblit et detruit son role 
comme patrie teorrestre. On ne porte jamais im<punement le 
feu en soi." C. d'Angl., 103-4. Pef. Int., 236; Q. C, 
XXVIII. 

Renan had little sympathy, on the whole, with socialism, as 
a project for the re-organization of society on a basis of equal 
rights for all men. Not that he was blind to the manifold in- 
justice of the present social regime, or felt no sympathy with 
the undeserved sufferings of the less fortunate classes. The 
reverse is the truth. Nor would he deny that socialism is a 
well-grounded protest against the present regime. His want 
of sympathy with the movement appears rather to have sprung 
from a conviction that, at bottom, the wrongs for which social- 
ists are seeking a remedy are beyond the power of man to re- 
move, being inherent in the nature of things. 

He was much impressed with the analogy of socialism to 
early Christianity. The two movements appeared to him to 
spring from a common source: the evils and sufferings and 
general unsatisfactoriness of average humlan life in this world. 
The great consolation of man, he says with reference to the 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN". 315 

New Jerusalem, in the presence of the incurable evils of soci- 
ety, is to imagine an ideal city, from which he excludes every 
sorrow and which he endows with every perfection. P. Isr., 
Ill : 400. 

He notes a fundamental difference, however, amounting to 
contrast, in their respective conceptions of the possibilities of 
human nature. In the christian eceonomy the reign of jus- 
tice, impossible on earth because the "prince of this world" is 
the "prince of darkness," is deferred to another life and con- 
stitutes the reward of those who are worthy to enter the heav- 
enly city. Socialism, on the other hand, with its different con- 
ception of nature and of man's place in nature, also less cer- 
tain of man's future and with more faith in his present, hopes 
to establish its New Jerusalem on this planet. In a word, so- 
cialism is Christianity modernized and secularized. Christi- 
anity is socialism minus its fanh in man; socialism is Chris- 
tianity minus its faith in God. 

The parallelism of the two extends to details. Like Christi- 
anity, socialism is international in its sympathies and aspira- 
tions, which is a serious matter, considering that socialism is 
a live issue in politics. 

Socialism again, with its phalansteries, communities, unions, 
orders, and brotherhoods, tends, like Christianity, to create 
separate allegiances within the state, in rivalry with patriot- 
ism. 

All religious orders, he writes, are in the same position. If 
socialism could attain any organization, its phalansteries, 
groups, syndicates, would exist in the state, like small egoisms 
caring very little for public interests. . . . Ideal Jerusa- 
lems bring misfortune. P. Isr., Ill: 355. Cf. Y. J., 172. 

Above nationalities there is, in fact, an eternal ideal. So- 
cialism, according to the Israelite and Christian dream, will 
probably one day kill the patriots, and make a reality of the 
words read in the service for the dead : Judicare seculum per 
ignem. P. Isr., Ill: 386. 

Socialism, moreover, is unmilitary in spirit and policy, — & 
further trait of resemblance with early Christianity. 



316 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

"II est clair que le socialisme des ouvriers est l'antipode de 
l'esprit militaire; c'est presque la negation de la patrie; lea 
doctrines de l'Internationale sont la pour le prouver." Eef. 
Int., 23. 

But if socialism and Christianity are so nearly related, it 
may be asked, how comes it that the church is commonly re- 
garded by socialists as one of their very worst enemies? 
Should we not expect that so far as they are pursuing common 
aims, such as the extension of human brotherhood, Christian- 
ity and socialism would reinforce each other ? 

Renan admits that in some respects Christianity is a formid- 
able barrier to socialism,. It is, in fact, at once an obstacle 
and a reinforcement; a reinforcement through its doctrine of 
universal brotherhood, and an, obstacle through its doctrine of 
the future life. The Christian who really tries to love his 
neighbor as himself and to do unto others as he would that they 
should do unto him, is so far a socialist. But on the other 
hand, so far as the disciple of Jesus loves not the world nor 
the things that are in the world, and considers life on earth 
as a. pilgrimage to his heavenly home ; so far as, concerned only 
to lay up treasures in heaven, he despises earthly riches and, 
embracing poverty, welcomes suffering and sorrow as a disci- 
pline to fit him for the kingdom; of God: in so far his relig- 
ion is the very opposite of socialism. Imagine Simeon Styl- 
ites heading a procession for a fairer distribution of the com- 
forts and pleasures of life! 

Already in his first book Kenan calls attention to the fact 
that an excessive regard for the life to come is am obstacle to 
social reform). 

"Quand on pense que toute chose se trouvera la-haut r^tablie, 
ce n'est plus taut la peine de poursuivre l'ordre et l'equite 
ici-bas. ISTotre principe, a nous, c'est qu'il faut regler la vie 
presente comme si la vie future n'existait pas, qu'il n'est ja- 
mais permis pour justifier un etat ou urn acte social de s'en 
referer a l'au-dela. En appeler incessamment a la vie fu- 
ture, c'est endormir l'esprit de reformer c'est ralentir le zele 
pour I'organisation rationnelle de l'humanite." A. S., 331-2. 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 317 

•Of. P. Isr., Ill: 208. He is especially indignant against 
those who feign a belief in the hereafter because they imagine 
this to be in the interests of social order : 

"Quand un sceptique preche an pauvre le dogme consolateur 
de l'immortalite, afin de le faire tenir tranquille, cela, doit s'ap- 
peler une escroquerie; o'est payer en billets qu'on sait faux, 
■e'est detourner le simple par une chimere de la poursuite du 
reel." A. S,, 331. 

That this side of religion is unfavorable to social reform is 
further shown, according to Hen an, by the fact that contempo- 
rary socialism finds its very tap-root in the wide-spread dis- 
belief in a future life. The reason the masses are insisting 
.so energetically on a fairer distribution of the good things of 
life is because they have ceased to believe that one can merit 
heaven by making earth a hell. 

"O'est fatalement que l'humanite cultivee a brise le joug des 
anciennes croyances ; est-ce sa f aute ? Peut^on 

eroire ce que Ton veut % II n'y a rien de plus fatal que la rai- 
son. Cf. Stouv., 383. O'est fatalement ... que le peu- 
ple est devenu a son tour incredulei. . . O'est fatalement 
enfin que le peuple incredule s'est eleve centre ses maitres en 
incredulite et leur a. dit: Donnez-moi une part ici-bas, puis- 
que vous m'enlevez la part du ciel. . . Maintenir une por- 
tion de l'humianite dans la brutalite, est immoral et dangereux ; 
lui rendre la chaine des anciennes croyances religieuses, qui 
la moralisaient suffisamment, est impossible. II reste done un 
seul parti, e'est d'elargir la grande famille, de donner place 
a tons au banquet de la lumdere." A. S., 333-4. 

This view of the question is repeated in all his later works. 

"II faut augmenter la sommle de bonheur de la vie hu- 
maine," he says in his article on Amiel. "Ce n'est pas de 
peche, d'expiation, de redemption qu'il faut desormiais parler 
a l'homme; e'est de bonte, de gaiete, d'indulgence, de bonne 
humeur, de resignation. A mesure que les esperances d'outre- 
tombe disparaissent, il faut habituer les etres passagers a re- 
garder la vie comme supportable; sans cela ils se revolteront. 
On ne maintiendra plus l'homme en repos que par le bonheur. 



318 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Le pessimism© at le nihilisme out pour cause l'ennui 
d'une vie qui, par suite d'une organisation sociale defectueuse, 
ne vaut pas la peine d'etre vecue. La vie ne vaut que par ses 
fruits; si l'on desire que l'homme y tienne, il faut la rendre 
savoureuse et delectable a mener." F. Det., 381-2. 

Kenan is sometimes accused of an absence of sympathy 
with the lower classes, and it must be admitted that his habit- 
ual attitude towards certain questions of social policy, his ap- 
parent indifference to social reforms, his dislike of the ballotr 
box and general distrust of democracy, lend countenance to the 
charge. But the accusation is false, nevertheless. Nobody fa- 
miliar with his writings, especially those of the earlier period, 
can doubt for a moment that his sympathy with the poor was 
genuine and deep. 

"S'il etait vrai que l'humanite fut constitute de telle sorte 
qu'il n'y eut rien a faire pour le bien general, s'il etait vrai 
que la politique consistat a etouffer le cri des malheureux et a 
se croiser les bras sur des maux irremediables, rien ne pour- 
rait decider les belles ames a supporter la vie. Si le monde 
etait fait comanle cela, il f audrait maudire Dieu et puis se sui- 
cider." A. S., 325. Cf. ibid., 319-329; also Souv., 148; 
349-50; Dr. Ph., 173-6. 

And again in a later work: 

"Quand on a charge d'ames, il faut done s'exprimer avec as- 
sez de reserve pour que, dans l'hypothese de la grande ban- 
queroute, ceux qu'on y a compromis se trouvent n' avoir pas 
ete trop victimies." F. Det., 395-6. 

Kenan's apparent hostility to political and social reforms in 
reality reflects his indifference to material interests and pre- 
occupations as such ; and from a passage in the Souvenirs it 
appears that his attitude was due to impressions received in 
early youth. That spirit of unworldly idealism which he 
caught from, his earliest teachers, the priests of Treguier Col- 
lege, while it heightened his sympathy for the poor, inspired dis- 
taste for the vulgar methods and selfish motives of secular 
affairs. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that he alone in his 
century has rightly understood Jesus and St. Francis, — a slip 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 319 

of the pen for which he has often been censured by his numer- 
ous critics. Of. Souv., 148 ; also 11, 135, 140. 

It is interesting to compare the epicureanism of his old age, 
with the stoicism of his youth. In his earlier books he is always 
insisting that nobody has a right to enjoyment ; for the end of 
society is not the happiness of its members, but the greatest 
attainable moral and intellectual perfection of all. A. S. 378, 
421, 386; Hist. Eel., 393. 

"Le but de l'humanite n'est pas le repos; c'est la perfection 
intellectuelle et morale. II s'agit bien de se reposer, grand 
Diee ! quand on a l'infini a parcourir et le parfa.it a, atteindre ! 
L'humanite ne se reposera que dans le parfait." Q. C, 306 Cf. 
ibid., 49. For Kenan's conception of human perfection, see 
A. S., 12, 355, 376, 387. 

"La devise des saint-simoniens : "Sanctifiez-vous par le 
plaisir," est abominable; c'est le pur gnosticisme. Celle du 
christianisme : "Sanctifiez-vous en vous abstenant du plaisir," 
est encore impiarf aite. E"ous disons, nous autres spiritualistes : 
"Sanctifiez-vous et le plaisir deviendra pour vous insignifiant, 
et vous ne songerez pas au plaisir." La, saintete, c'est de vivre 
de 1'esprit, non du corps." A. S., 404. 

As pleasure-seeldng is destructive of all that is best in the 
individual, so is it the bane of nations. A people that gives 
itself up to frivolity and ease is doomed to certain decadence. 
Socialism is expressly condemned on the ground that it springs 
from a false, hedonistic conception of life. 

If socialism ever becomes an established fact, he declares, it 
must sooner or later lead to national decay. The pinch of 
necessity is the mother of all effort. All progress comes from 
the hope of doing better or avoiding worse. A. S., 373 ; also 
note 158. 

"Si l'ideal du bien-etre materialiste que revent quelques re- 
formateurs venait a se reaiiser, le monde, prive de l'aiguillon de 
la souffrance, perdrait un des moyens qui ont le plus contribue 
a faire de l'homime un etre intelligent et moral." Mor. Crit., 
18. Of. A. S., 421-2,429 ; Kef Int., 111. 

"L'erreur commune des socialistes et de leurs adversaires est 



320 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

de suppose!* que la question de l'humJanite est une question de 
bien-etre et de jouissance. Si cela etait, Fourier et Cabet aurai- 
ent parfaitement raison . . . S'il ne s'agissait que de jouir, 
mieux vaudra.it pour tons le brouet noir que pour les unes lea 
delices, pour les autres la faim." A. S., 377-8 ; also 431-2. 

"Malheur a. la generation . . . qui a concu la vie 
comme un repos et Part comme une jouissance! Les grandes 
choses n'apparaissent jamais dans ces tiedes milieux." A. S., 
421. 

Even war itself acquires a redeeming feature from its con- 
ducing to a strenuous life: 

"Le jour ou l'humanite deviendrait un grand empire romain 
pacifie et n'ayant plus d'ennemis exterieurs, sera.it le jour ou la 
mtoralite et rintelligence courraient les plus grands dangers." 
Kef. Int., 111. Of. ibid., 40 : also A. S., IX ; Dial., 23. 

"II faut done s'y resigner: les belles choses naissent dans les 
larmies ; ce n'est pas acheter trop chere la. beaute que de l'acheter 
au prix de la douleur." A. S., 426. Of., Q. C, 466-7. 

ISTow turn to the gospel which prevails in his writings half a 
century later: 

"La plus dangereuse erreur, en fait de morale sociale, est la 
suppression svstematique du plaisir." F. Det., 383. 

"Moraliser les masses!" exclaims Prospero-Renan. A notre 
age, peut-on dire de pareils enf antillages ? Si nous ne sommes 
pas desabuses, quand le serons-nous, mon cher ? ... La 
moralite doit etre reservee pour ceux qui ont une mission comme 
nous . . . Mais les pauvres gens, les gens ordinaires, 
allez done! lis sont pauvres, et vous voulez que, par-dessus le 
marche, ils soient vertueux! C'est trop exiger. ... Si 
1'homme n'existait pas, les formes les plus elevees de l'adoration 
sur notre planete eussent ete les jeux des dauphins, le tourbil- 
lonnement folatre des papillons, le chant des oiseaux." Dr. 
Ph., 170-2. 

"L© peuple doit s'amuser; c'est la sa grande compensation. 
Un peuple gai est le meilleur des peuples. Ce qu'un peuple 
donne a la gaiete, il le prend presque tou jours sur la mechan- 
cete." 



BRATJEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OE ERNEST REN AN. 321 

As for expecting the masses to be temperate in drink : 

"Mais o'est la une veritable indignite. Priver les simfplea 
gens de la seule joie qu'ils ont, en leur promettant un paradis 
qu'ils n'auront pas ! Allons done ! Pauvres vies de- 

florees ! Pourquoi voulez-vous empecher ces malheu- 

reux de se plonger un moment dans Y ideal ? Oe sont peut-etre 
les heures ou ils valent quelqne chose." 21 Dr. Ph., 172-3. 

It mfust be admitted that Kenan's later writings have con- 
tributed not a little to render public opinion in Prance as in- 
dulgent as possible in matters of sexual immorality. He seems 
to. have grown more and more lax in his speech, as he grew 
older; though not, of course, in his personal life. 22 He appa- 
rently had lost all faith in the very possibility of effecting any 
considerable permanent improvement in the economic condition 
of the mass of mankind. Equality, even the more modest 
claim to equality of opportunity, he had come to consider an 
' unrealisable dream. In his earlier period he enthusiastically 
hoped that all men might be lifted to a level of culture where 
the coarser pleasures would be too repulsive to bring satisfaction 
to a human soul. But in these ideals he now believed no longer. 
In his later position he reasoned like this: If life is a good 
only in proportion to its surplus of pleasures over pains, why 
should not the masses, these "pauvres vies deflorees," be allowed 
to indulge those forms of amusement by which alone they are 
reconciled to the hardships of their brutal existence? 

But this is plainly a gospel of decadence, individual and 
national. It overlooks the all-important fact that pleasure- 
seeking, like any other degrading habit, must grow by what it 
feeds on. The more this conception of life is allowed to gain 
prevalence, the more animalistic and bestial must men become. 
Remove the restraints and supports of a healthy public opinion, 
and who shall predict at what point in the decalogue the down- 
ward drift will come to a stop? 

But perhaps we should judge his later effusions in the light 
of the following warning, with which he concludes his Sou- 
venirs: 

"Je proteste d'avance centre les faiblesses qu'un cerveau 



322 BULLETIN" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

ramolli pourrait me faire dire oil signer. C'est Penan sain 
d'esprit et de coeur, coinme je le suis aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas 
Penan a moitie detruit par la mbrt et n'etant plus lui-meme, 
commie je le serai si je me decompose lentement, que je veux 
qu'on croie et qu'on ecoute. Je renie les blasphemes que les 
defaillances de la derniere heure pourraient me faire prononcer 
contre V Eternal." Souv., 377. 

His habitual attitude in later years towards social and politi- 
cal questions is well expressed in a JSTew Year's message to his 
friend M. Berthelot, then prime minister of his country. It re- 
veals again the capital defect of all his later philosophy: the 
inveterate habit of contemplating all things, even morality itself, 
sub specie aeternitatis. 

"Les accidents les plus graves des choses humaines, quand 
on se place au point de vue de la terre entiere, n'ont pas plus 
d'importance que le mouvement d'un guepier ou le va-et-vient 
d'une fourmiliere. Quand on se place au point de vue du sys- 
teme solaire, nos revolutions out a. peine 1' amplitude de mouve> 
ments d'atomes. Du point de vue de Sirius, c'est moins encore. 
Du point de vue de l'infini, ce n'est rien. Oe point de vue est 
le seul d'ou l'on juge bien les choses dans leurs verite." 22a F. 
Det, 156-7. Cf. A. St, 330. 

Renan has somewhere argued that belief in a future life tends 
to make people indifferent to the bettering of the conditions of 
life in this 1 world, and this may perhaps be true in some cases. 
But if any lesson is taught by the example of his own life, it is 
this that the most universal disillusionment may lead to at least 
an equal indifference; and indeed he himself has affirmed this 
in so many words: 

"To have recognized that human aifairs are an approximation 
without earnestness and without precision is a great result in 
philosophy, but involves the abdication of every active role. 
The future lies in the hands of those who are not undeceived. 
Woe to those of whom Saint Paul speaks: qui spem non liabent! 
P. Isr., Ill, 404. Cf. James, Var. Eel. Exp,, 265. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 323 



CHAPTER V. 



CRITICAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS. 



The reader who has followed the exposition in the preceding 
pages, especially the numerous quotations from Renan himself, 
can hardly help feeling that his philosophical speculations, when 
stripped of the charm they derive from the beautiful language 
in which they invariably are clothed, are too often characterized 
either by unprofitable vagueness or fundamental incoherence; 
that his conclusions are either so indefinite as to accord with 
almost any view of the question under discussion, or so hope- 
lessly inconsistent as to lead to no positive results. 

And this is the truth. Andrew Lang was quite right when 
he wrote : 

"Renan has no fixed theory of philosophy. . . . ; he is 
Jeckyl and he is also Hyde ; he is Pulvis and he is Umbra ; he 
is Indra and he is the sacrifice on the altar of Indra ; he is Jean 
qui pleure and he is Jean qui rit : he is Democritus and he is 
Heraelitus," Fort. Rev., vol., 47. Cf. Seailles, E. R, 293. 

Renan's characterization of the philisophy of Plato, in fact,, 
applies equally well to his own : 

"Platon n'a pas de symbole, pas de propositions arretees, 

dans le sens scolastique que nous attachons a ce mot; 

c'est fausser sa pensee que de vouloir en extraire une theorie 

dogmatique. Et pourtant, Platon represente un esprit ; Platon 

est une religion." A. S., 54. Cf. ibid., 446-7. 

These words are true of himself. Renan, like Plato, repre- 
sents an esprit, a philosophy, a religion if you will. 

He sometimes writes, as if this esprit, this personal note, this 
religion, were the whole of philosophy, or at least its chief char- 
acteristic. He expressly defines philosophy as a species of 
poetry: 



324 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

"De la poesie a. la critique, il n'y a pas si loin qu'on le sup- 
pose ; les races poetiques sont les races philosophiques, et la phi- 
losophie n'est au fond qu'une maniere le poesie comine une 
autre." Mor. Or., 4-55. 

"TTn systeme, c'est une epopee sur les choses. II serait aussi 
absurd© qu'un systeme renfermat le dernier mot de la realite 
qu'il le serait qu'une epopee epuisat le cercle entier de la 
beaute. A. SI, 57 Of. P. Sem., 40. 

And again in his article VAvenir de la metaphysique: 
La philosophie est moins une science qu'un cote de toutes les 
sciences ... La plus humble commie la plus sublime in- 
telligence a eu sa f agon de concevoir le monde ; chaque tete pen- 
sante a ete a sa guise le miroir de Punivers ; chaque etre vivant 
a eu son reve qui Pa charme, eleve, console : grandiose ou mes- 
■quin, plat ou sublime, ce reve a ete sa philosophie." Frag., 
280-7. 

There would thus be as many different philosophies as dif- 
ferent personalities; and indeed, he says this in so many words: 
"La philosophie, c'est l'homme memo; chacun nait aveo sa 
philosophie commie avec son style." Frag., 288. 

Only a few, pages earlier, however, in the sarnie article, philos- 
ophy is described in a manner quite incompatible with this view, 
being practically identified with ^positive science: 

"Les vrais philosophes se sont faits philologues, chimistes, 
physiologistes . . . Aux vieilles tentatives d'explication 
universelle se sont substitutees des series de patieutes investiga- 
tions sur la nature et Phistoire. La philosophie semble ainsi 
aspirer a redevenir co qu'elle etait a Porigine, la science uni- 
verselle." Frag,, 265. The same idea, A. S., 301. 

But two-sided statements from Kenan, or even many-sided 
ones, no longer surprise us. We have learned to regard them 
as an essential part of his philosophical method, not to say its 
leading characteristic. He seems to have really believed and 
practiced, what in his later period he so often preached, that 
in philosophy and religion, the only way to mlake sure of being 
right som©tim|es, is to affirm in turn all the alternatives. Dr. 
Ph. 256, Of. James, Hum. Im., 12, 16. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OE ERNEST RENAN. 325 

A complete explanation of Kenan's heterogeneous personal- 
ity, and the numerous contradictions in his writings to which it 
led, is of course not attempted ini this chapter. All that can be 
accomplished here is to indicate the direction' in which, as the 
writer believes 1 , a more exhaustive study of the subject must 
turn. 23 

Perhaps we may best begin by examining first the explana- 
tions he (himself has offered. 

In his Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse, he tries to account 
for what he is pleased to call his apparent contradictions, by 
tracing them back to a certain dualism in his character, which 
in turn is variously ascribed, now to an atavistic influence of 
his complex descent, and again to a later disillusionment* 

"Par ma race," he says, "j'etais partage, et comme ecartele, 
entre des forces contraires . . . Cette complexite d'origine 
est en grande partie, je crois, la cause de mes apparentes con- 
tradictions. Je suis double; quelquefois une partie de moi 
rit quand l'autre pleure." Souv., 141-5 ; 73, 90. 

But a few pages earlier in the same book we find this dualism 
attributed to a later disenchantment, due to a wider knowledge 
of men and a deeper insight, into the ways and the needs of the 
world. His native idealism, he tells us, seemed to liimi out of 
place in a world such as ours, and this discovery led him to apply 
a double standard of worth in his judgments of men and things ; 
"de prendre pour mes jugements pratiques le con- 
trepied exact de mles jugements theoriques, de ne regarder 
comme possible que ce qui contredisait mes aspirations. " 
Souv., 123. 

"Alors s'etablit en moi une lutte ou plutot une dualite qui a 
ete le secret de toutes mes opinions Je vis que 

l'ideal et la realite n'ont rien a, f aire ensemble ; que le monde, 
jusqu'a. nouvel ordre, est voue sans appel a la platitude, a. la 
mediocrite ; que la cause qui plait aux ames bien nee® est sure 
d'etre vaincue ; que ce cjui est vrai en litterature, en poesie, aux 
yeux des gens raffines, est toujours faux dans le monde grossier 
des faits accomplis." Souv., 122 ; 123—1. 

Still another explanation is suggested in his preface to the 



326 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

samje hook, whore opposite tendencies and temperaments within 
the same personality are explained as a case of opposite poles 
attracting each other. 

"P'resque tons nous somimes doubles. Plus l'homme se deve- 
loppe par la tete, plus il reve le pole contraire, c'est a dire l'ir- 
rationnel, le repos dans la complete ignorance, la femme qui 
n'est que femme, l'etre instinctif qui n'agit que par l'impulsion 
d'une conscience obscure." Souv., VII-VIII ; Cf ., F. Det., 39. 

Comparing these explanations with one another, it seems at 
first glance that Renan has fallen merely into new contradictions 
in attempting to explain the old ones. But it is quite probable 
that his explanations are all of them true as far as they go; 
heredity, experience, the attraction of opposites, have doubtless 
all co-operated in the total result. 

It is easy to present these contradictions in such a way as to 
insinuate that Renan was incapable of close reasoning, or a 
■stranger to sound scientific methods ; and to assume that his con- 
tradictionst are merely the result of flippant levity or self -satis- 
fied superficiality. But such a procedure is too absurd, and 
reveals a total misapprehension of the nature of his contradic- 
tions, as well as of his true character. 

TWo prime factors seem to lie at the root of all his contra- 
dictions : sincerity and progressiveness. A more unfeigned sin- 
cerity there never was, either in seeking the truth or inl stating 
it. In Renan's own explanations, ascribing these contradic- 
tions to a kind of double personality, this ultimate trait, sin- 
cerity, is taken for granted ; but it has to be made explicit if the 
explanation is to be complete. 

It is quite possible, of course, for contradictory impulses and 
opposite points of view to exist together within the same per- 
sonality, without appearing in speech and conduct ; and it is 
only because in Renan's case these opposite promptings were all 
expressed with, an equal freedom and frequency that his double 
personality gave rise to that systematic two-sidedness which 
uninitiated readers of Renan find so bewildering. Whatever 
seemed to him| to be true, in different moods and from different 
points of view, he frankly and fully expressed, quite regard- 



BEAUEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 327 

less of consistency with other moods or other points of view. 
His own testimony on this question will not be disputed by 
any one familiar with his works. 

"Dans mes ecritsi, j'ai ete d'une sincerite absolue. ISTon seule- 
ment je n'ai rien dit que ce que je pense; chose bien plus rare 
et plus difficile, j'ai dit tout ce que je pense." Sbuv., 151. 

"Le public m'a eu autant que mes amis. ... II m'est 
arrive frequemment, en ecrivant une lettre, de m'arreter pour 
tourner en propos general les idees qui me venaient. Je n'ai 
existe pleinement que pour le public. II a eu tout de moi; il 
n'aura apres ma mort aucune surprise ; je n'ai rien reserve pour 
personne." Souv., 365. 

And few indeed are those who have had a. wider range of 
thoughts and feelings, of facts and fancies to express. His life 
has been compared to a voyage through the realmi of ideas and 
sentiments. 

"H avait connu l'etat d'ame religieux, l'etat d'ame scien- 
tifique, un etat d'ame ou science et religion' co-existaient sans 
s'exclure; il connut l'etat d'ame optimiste, l'etat d'ame pessi- 
miste, la hautaine ironie et l'indulgence indefinie, la resignation 
«t le sarcasme, l'elevation religieuse et le persiflage Yoltairien, 
tons les modes en quelque sorte, de pensee et meme de croyance, 
donnant a chacune une expression si vive qu'on eut pu croire a 
•chaque fois, que c'etait le seul qu'il entendit et pratiquat." 
M. Faguet, Rev. Par., Vol. 4, p. 119. 

"By his mastery of Eastern and Oriental languages and liter- 
atures," says Mr. Conway, "he had familiarly dwelt among 
primitive tribes, with them set up their dolmens, knelt at their 
altars, travelled with their migrations in India, Persia, Egypt, 
Syria, shared their pilgrimages from lower to higher beliefs, 
had listened to their prophets, visited the home of Mary and 
Joseph, walked with the disciples." Monist, vol. 3, pp. 201 ff. 
Cf. Monod, Penan, etc., p. 40, 48. 

"Pour moi," says Theoctiste-Renan, "je goute tout l'univers 
par cette sorte de sentiment general qu fait que nous sommes 
tristes en une ville triste, gais en une ville gaie. Je jouis ainsi 
■des voluptes du voluptueux, des debauches du debauehe, de la 



328 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

mondanite du mondain, de la saintete de l'homme vertueux, des 
meditations du savant, de l'austerite de l'ascete. Par une sorte 
de synrpathie douce, je me figure que je suis leur conscience. 
Les deeouvertes du savant, sent mon bien; les triomiphes de 
l'ambitieux me sont une fete. Je serais fache que quelque 
chose manquat au monde; car j'ai conscience de tout ce qu'il en- 
ferme." Dial., 133-4. CI, ibid., XIII; Dr. Ph., 233; F. 
Det., 382-3 ; A. S., 10, 123 ; Ant., 140. 

It was this universal recognition and comprehensive apprecia- 
tion of all codes and customs and philosophies, this ubiquity of 
interest and unprejudiced intellectual hospitality, more than 
any other single trait that could be named, which made Penan 
the spokesman of all sorts and conditions of men. He was con- 
tinually making new acquisitions, and at the same tim|e was 
unable to give up the old ones. His thirst for knowledge and 
experience was insatiable. His wish was to lead a multitude of 
lives all abreast of each other. 

"Je voudrais, dans un autre monde, parler au feminin, d'une 
voix de femme, penser en femme, aimer en femjme, prier en 
femime, voir comment les femmes ont raison." P. Det., 39. 
Of. Penjamin Constant, Journal, Paris, 1895, p. 56. 

Speaking in 1890 of the faults of his early manner of writing, 
he sumis therm all up in the sentence : Je tenais trop a. ne rien 
perdre, A. Si, VI ; and this remained to* the end the condition of 
his mind, though not of his style. He had learned the capital 
art of omitting, indeed; but only to embrace the next occasion 
for expressing the opposite side. 

Three orders of reality in particular are sharply distin- 
guished and made very prominent in all Penan's writings; so 
prominent, in fact, that one of his best and most appreciative 
critics, M. Gabriel Monod, declares this three-fold grouping 
of experience:, and the assertion of mutual equivalence among 
the groups thus obtained, to be the chief characteristic and the 
central feature in Penan's philosophical thought. These 
groups are: Truth, Goodness, and Peauty. 

The following passage, from his earliest book, is typical of 
scores of others throughout his writings : 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOrHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 329 

"Un beau sentiment vaut une belle pensee ; une belle pensee 
vaut une belle action. Un. systeme de philosophie vaut un 
poeme, un poeme vaut une decouverte scientifique, une vie de 
science vaut une vie de vertu. I/homme parfait serait celui 
qui serait a la fois poete, philosophe, savant, bomme vertueux." 
A. S., 11 ; also 101 ; Mor. Crit., 358-9. 

Truth, goodness and beauty, according to Ranan, represent 
different modes in which the ultimate cosmic reality, whatever 
that may be, is reflected in human consciousness. 

The question arises whether this is not, after all, simply an 
interpretation of reality in terms of human nature, a projection 
of his own self into external facts ; in other words, a return to 
that very anthropocentricism which he so often condemned in 
other people? 

The truth is that a man so many-sided as Renan, wbo has 
run the entire gamut, one 1 may fairly say, of feelings and tem- 
peraments, and who lived so many lives in one, is too complex 
and abnormal a character to be fairly judged by ordinary 
standards. Is it any wonder that a personality so heteroge- 
neous, who in thought was a man, in feeling a woman and in 
action a child ; whose writings reflect now the reminiscent 
poetry of an outworn faith and again the subtle criticism of 
an aridly erudite intellect; a "tissue of contradictions," as he 
calls himself: is it any wonder that such a man should find it 
impossible to represent on paper all the disparate medley of 
his conflicting judgments upon experience, even to their finest 
shades and transitions, within the inflexible limits of syllogistic 
logic? 

But perhaps a, more important cause still of logical contradic- 
tion than the freedom he at all times practiced in expressing his 
judgments is the freedom with which he allowed these judg- 
ments to form in his mind. Imbued with the Cartesian ration- 
alism of the seventeenth century, especially as represented in 
Malebranche, he had early embraced the doctrine that reason, 
and reason alone, unhampered by will or desire, is the judge 
of all truth. Reason was conceived as a kind of balance for 
weighing ideas, producing belief or disbelief, according as the 



330 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

scale® dip this way or that. All reasoning, therefore, to be 
trustworthy, must be an objective process, unbiased as the mar- 
iner's compass. 

"Les gens du monde qui croient qu'on se decide dans le choix 
de sea opinions par des raisons de sympathie ou d'antipathie 
s'etonneront certainemient du genre de raisonnements qui 
m^ecarta de la foi chretienne, a la quelle j'avais tant de motifs 
de coeur et d' interet de rester attache. Les personnes qui n'ont 
pas l'esprit scientifique ne comprennent guere qu'on laisse ses 
opinions se former hors de soi par une sorte de concretion imr 
personnelle, dont on n'est en quelque sorte que le spectateur. Eh 
me livrant ainsi a la force des choses, je croyais me conformer 
aux regies de la grande ecole du XYIIe siecle, surtout de Male- 
branche, dont le premier principe est que la raison doit etre con- 
templee, et qu'on n'est pour rien dans sa procreation ; en sorte 
que le devoir de l'homme est de se mettre devant la verite, denue 
de toute personnalite, pret a. se laisser trainer ou. voudra la 
demonstration preponderante. Loin de viser d' avance certains 
resultats, ces illustres penseurs voulaient que, dans la recherche 
de la verite, on s'interdit d'avoir un desir, une tendance, un 
attachment personnel." 24 Souv., 296-7. 

Biut so far is this conception of reason from corresponding in 
fact to the psychical processes of humanity at large, that the 
opposite appears to be implied in nearly all the mental opera- 
tions of the vast majority of mankind. 

The position of Prof. James, for example, is the very oppo- 
site of that maintained by Eenan in the passages above quoted. 
This writer insists that not only do men, as a matter of fact, 
allow their beliefs to be influenced by their emotions, such as 
hope, fear, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, 
but that it is right we should be so influenced in certain cases. 

"Oar passional nature," he writes, "not only lawfully may, 
but must, decide an option, whenever it is a genuine option that 
cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds ; for to 
say, under such circumstances, "do not decide, but leave the 
question open," is itself a passional decision, — just like deciding 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 331 

yes or no, — and is attended with the same risk of losing the 
truth." The Will to Believe, 1897, p. II. 

"Is it wiser or better," he asks, "to yield to the fear that re- 
ligion may be an error than to yield to the hope that it mjay be 
be true ? p. 27. 

"Where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be 
an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of 
scientific evidence is the lowest kind of immortality into which 
a thinking being can fall." p., 25. 

"A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from 
acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth 
were really there, would be an irrational rule." p. 28. 

So far is reason from being the sole and ultimate arbiter of 
all truth, or an infallible and sufficient guide for attaining it, 
according to Prof. James, that 

"Our reason is quite satisfied, in 999 cases out of every thou- 
sand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite 
in case our credulity is criticised by some one else. Our faith 
is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters this 
is most the case." P., 9. 

But why quote this writer against Renan? The truth is 
that, notwithstanding the statements of Renan above quoted, 
and many others in the same key, he has himself affirmed the 
very position for which Prof. James contends. It is interest- 
ing to contrast the following passages with those last cited : 

"L'attitude la pins logique du penseur devant la religion est 
de faire comme si elle etait vraie. II faut agir commie si Dieu 
et l'ame existaient. La religion entre ainsi dans le cas de ces 
nombreuses hypotheses telles que Tether, les fluides electriques, 
lumineux, caloriques, nerveux, l'atome lui-meme, que nous Sa- 
vons bien n'etre que des symboles, des moyens commodes pour 
expliquer les phenomenes, et que nous maintenons tout de 
memo." P. Det., 432 ; cf . ibid., XVII. 
And again: 

"La Nature est immorale. . . Mais dans la conscience 
s'eleve une voix sainte qui parle a l'homme d'un tout autre 
monde, le monde de 1'ideal, le inonde de la verite, de la bonte, 



332 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

de la justice. S'il n'y avait que la nature, on pourrait se de- 
mander si Dieu est necessaire. Mais, depuis qu'il a existe un 
honnete nomine, Dieu a ete prouve." Frag., 250. Of. Job, 
XC; Frag., 321-323; A. S., 17-18, 56, 58, 152-3, 477; note 
26; C. d'Angl., 6-7; Dial., VI, 30-1, 38, 147; Mor. Or., II; 
Q. C, 235, 414. 

But while in his writings, where it was a question merely of 
theorizing on the subject., we find both sides of his tempera- 
ment affirmed in turn; it was the rationalistic side that seems 
to have prevailed in his conduct throughout. It was this pre- 
dominance of the intellect over the emotions and the will which 
in early life had led him out of the church ; and this event, in a 
psychological view of his development, was by far the most im- 
portant of his life. 

His separation from the church, in fact, marks the epoch of 
his mental growth when the torturing strain of his opposite 
tendencies had become unbearable, and it is impossible to sepa- 
rate a study of the causes of his contradictions from an exam- 
ination of the factors which produced this central crisis in his 
life. The same causes operate in both cases. It was the sharp 
distinction Between the rational and the emotional nature which 
his studies had led him to observe, combined with the unfinality 
of his unusually progressive mind, that made it impossible for 
him to continue in the career of a priest; and these same ulti- 
mate factors, intellectual duality and progressive unfinality, are 
responsible for many of the contradictions in his work. 

Indeed, the more closely one examines the psychological fac- 
tors of his apostacy, the more does this crisis appear as an ex- 
periment, under exceptionally favorable conditions, with the 
Cartesian principle of objective reason, rigorously and consist- 
ently applied in the sphere of theology and religion. It was 
Descartes and Malebranche, far more than Strauss or Gesenius, 
that led him away from the faith of his childhood. 25 

His intense rationalism at the time of his apostacy is in strik- 
ing contrast with the poetic idealism of his early surroundings ; 
and these opposite temperaments no doubt underlie that system- 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 333 

atic two-sidedness so obtrusively characteristic of all his philo- 
sophic speculations. 

For the idealistic side, his "moral romanticism" as he calls 
it, no explanation seems necessary, or rather none is possible, 
beyond the general recognition of environmental pressure, the 
passive contagion of example and precept, working upon he- 
reditary predispositions in the same direction. The general 
character of these influences has been sufficiently indicated in 
an earlier chapter. 

For the rational side, however, which represents a later de- 
velopment, it is possible to assign more specific causes, and 
these must now be briefly set forth. 

The more closely one looks at Kenan's early development, 
the more does the course he actually followed appear to have 
been inevitable. Everything, after his removal to Paris, 
seems to> have combined to' undo the work of his childhood sur- 
roundings, by which he had been moulded for sixteen years. 

The mere geographical change, from the quiet seclusion of 
Treguier to* cosmopolitan, glittering Paris, marks an epoch in 
his mental development. It was not merely a transfer from 
country to city, but a change to a different civilization; a sud- 
den leap from medievalism into the modern age. 

At Treguier he had been in actual contact, he tells us, with the 
primitive world. The most remote past was still in existence 
in Brittany up to 1830. The life of the fourteenth and fif- 
teenth centuries was daily before the eyes of those who lived 
in the towns. In the country, the epoch of the Welsh emigra- 
tion, the fifth and sixth centuries, was plainly visible to the 
practiced eye. 

"Le paganisme se degageait derriere la couche chretienne, 
souvent fort transparente. A cela se melaient des traits d'un 
mjonde plus vieux encore, que j'ai retrouve chez les Lapons. 
En visitant, en 1870, avec le prince Napoleon, les huttes d'un 
campement de Lapons, pres de Troimjsoe, je eras plus d'une 
fois, dans des types de femmes et d'enfants, dans certains 
traits, dans certaines habitudes, voir ressusciter devant moi 
mes plus anciens souvenirs," Souv., 87-8. 



334 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

For the possibility of going to Paris lie was indebted, next 
to his own industry and talents, to his sister Henriette. In 
the summer of 1838 he had won all the prizes of his class at 
Treguier college, an achievement which enabled his sister, then 
a school-teacher in Paris, to procure himi admission without 
cost to the famous little boarding-school, Saint-Nicolas du 
Chardonnet. Lett. Sem., 1-2. He was in his sixteenth year. 
After a two days' journey — there were no railroads of course 
— j he was set down among scenes as novel to him as if he had 
comte direct from Tahiti or Timibuctoo. 

"Un laima bouddhiste ou un faquir musulman, transporte en 
un clin d'oeil d'Asie en plein boulevard, serait moins surpris 
que je ne le fus en tombant subitement dans un milieu aussi 
different de celui de mes vieux pretres de Bretagne." Souv., 
172. 

Nor was it his immediate surroundings alone, — mother, 
teachers, companions and playmates — of which he was de- 
prived by this change of abode; all his habits of life were 
broken through. Even the church itself, Parisian Catholi- 
cism 1 , was so widely different from the Catholicism of Tre- 
guier in which he had grown up, as to be in effect a different 
religion. 

"Ma venue a Paris fut le passage d'une religion a une autre. 

. . . Ce fut la crise la plus grave de ma vie." Souv., 
172-3. 

This sharp contrast between the old and the new could 
hardly fail to> invite comparison and provoke criticism. The 
Treguier in his memory and the Paris around him, the naive 
sincerity of the vie spontanee and the polish and tact of the 
vie reflechie, were too incongruous to exist side by side in the 
same mind without starting the machinery of reflection, com- 
parison and criticism. Tip to this time his ideas and ideals 
had been shaped by authority, example and habit; they were 
now to be placed on a rational basis of his own construction. 

In later life Penan saw very clearly the immense signifi- 
cance of this change. He indeed declares it to have been the 
primary cause not only of his leaving the church, but of all the 



BRATTER— -THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 335 

subsequent phases of development to which, this separation in 
turn was to lead. 

"II est bien probable que, si un incident exterieur n'etait 
venu me tirer brusquement du milieu honnete, mais borne, ou 
s'etait passee mon enf ance, j'aurais conserve toute ma vie la foi 
qui m'etait apparue d'abord comme l'expression absolue de la 
verite." Souv., 130-1; 158. 

"Au fond, quand je m'etudie, j'ai en effet tres peu change; 
le sort m'avait en quelque sorte rive des l'enfance a la fonction 
que jo devais accomplir. J'etais fait en arrivant a, Paris; 
avant de quitter la Bretagne, ma vie etait ecrite d'avance.'' 
Souv., 73. 

The effects of his transplantation were still further inten- 
sified by his going home for the summer vacations. In this 
way the contrast was kept fresh in his mind. We may imag- 
ine the reflections of the young student, modernized and 
rationalized more and more as the years went by, and with the 
same exemption he had always enjoyed from manual toil, as 
he contemplated the customs and studied the minds of the un- 
sophisticated, naively religious, sincere, conservative, virtuous 
rustics around hinx 

At school, too, during his three years at Saint Nicolas, the in- 
tellectual atmosphere was as different as possible from that at 
Treguier College. He had come to Paris, he says, with a com- 
plete moral training, but ignorant to> the last degree. With the 
exception of mathematics and ancient languages, in which he 
had laid a good foundation, he had everything to learn. Of sci- 
ence, history and modern literatures he knew nothing. It 
was a great surprise to him 1 , he tells us, when he found that 
there was such a thing as a learned lay-man. Be discovered 
that antiquity and the church are not everything, and ceased 
to look upon the death of Louis XIV as marking the end of 
the world. 

"Le monde s'ouvrit pour moi. . . Saint-Mcolas etait a 
cette epoque la maison la plus brillante et la plus mondaine. 

. . Mes vieux pretres de Bretagne savaient bien mieux les 
mathemiatiques et le latin que mes nouveaux maitres; mais ils 



336 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

vivaient dans des catacombes sans lumiere et sans air. Ici, 
l'atmosphere du siecle circulait librement. Hugo et La- 
martine me remplissaient la tete. Je compris la gloire, que 
j'avais cherchee si vaguement a la vofite de la cliapelle de Tre- 
guier. . . Les mots talent, eclat, reputation eurent un sens 
pour moi. J'etais perdu pour l'ideal modeste que mes anciens 
maitres mfavaient inculque." Souv., 185-6. 

His early ideals, though not in reality discarded, were laid 
aside for a time, and a new direction given to his ambition. 
His three years at Saint Nicolas had completely transformed 
him. From a poor little country lad struggling vainly to 
emerge from! his shell, he had grown to be a young man of re- 
markable alertness and quick perceptions. Souv., 195. 

When from this school he passed, in 1841, to the theological 
seminary at Issy, he was obliged once more to adjust himself 
to a different medium, in respect both of teachers and studies. 
His new instructors recalled to his mind the venerable priests 
of Treguier College, who had always seemed to him, with their 
heavy, old-fashioned copes, like the magi, from whose lips 
came the eternal truths. Souv., 11. His readings, too, again 
became miore austere. The superficial rhetoric of Saint Nic- 
olaSj as he retrospectively calls it, — somewhat unfairly, it 
would seem. Cf. Lett. Sem., 38, 131 — was replaced by nat- 
ural philosophy, logic, mathematics and history. Hugo and 
Lamartine were exchanged for Pascal and Malebranche, and 
he applied himself, besides, to Euler and Leibnitz, Descartes, 
Locke, Eeid, and Dugald Stewart. 

Among the texts which served as a basis for instruction at 
Issy, during two years, one was destined to be of special sig- 
nificance in his mental evolution. This was the so-called 
Philosophie de Lyon, a kind of Cartesian scholasticism com- 
piled in the eighteenth century by the Jansenist arch-bishop 
of Lyons, and which bears the ominous title: Institutiones 
Philosophicae, Auctoritate D. D. Archiepiscopi Lugdunensis 
Ad IJsum Scholarum Suae Dioecesis Editae. 

This treatise is divided into three parts, dealing respectively 
with logic, metaphysics and physics. The following sample, 



BKATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 337 

taken almlost at random;, may serve to indicate the general char- 
acter and method of this work: 

"Part III, Physica. Specialis, seu de Terra et Corporibus 
Terrestribus. Sectio Prima, Capitis Primi : De Igne. 

Propositio : .Ignis est fluidum, nbiqne diffusum, cujus partes 
sunt tenuissimae, elasticae, rigidae, motuqne pernicissimo agi- 
tatae." 

Various questions are then discussed concerning the proper- 
ties of fire and the mode of its action upon bodies, and finally 
directions given for experiments with fire. Whenever it seems 
to the author that the propositions affirmed in the text are 
likely to be called in question, a number of possible objections 
are disposed of, by hook or by crook, under the separate head- 
ing: Solvuntur Objecta. 

In this separate heading Penan very soon took a special in- 
terest, and more often than not the objections discussed were 
his own, i 

"Ces objections sont ensuite resolues, souvent d'une maniere 
qui laisse toute leur force aux idees heterodoxes qu'on pretend 
reduire a neant. Ainsi, sous le couvert de refutations faibles, 
tout l'ensemble des indees modernes venait a nous." Souv., 
248. 

Thus was his critical faculty provoked and his rationalism 
encouraged more and more, and his Catholic faith undermined, 
even by the very studies which were intended to establish that 
faith, on firm and stable foundations. 

"Dans un tel systcme," he writes nearly half a century la- 
ter, "la raison est avant toute chose, la raison prouve la reve- 
lation, la divinite de l'Ecriture et l'autorite de l'figlise. Cela 
fait, la porte est ouverte a toutes les deductions. . . . Ce 
n'est pas ma faute si mes maitres m'avaient enseigne la lo- 
gique, et, par leurs argumentations impitoyables, avaient fait 
de mon esprit un tranchant d'acier." Souv., 281, 303. Also 
cf. 246, 296-7, 341, 318-19, 389. 

The first result of this course in theological dialectics, which 
at least afforded an excellent drill in deductive logic, was to 
destroy completely Kenan's confidence in scholastic methods of 
9 



338 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEESITY OF WISCONSIN. 

testing and establishing truth. Souv., 250. Yet it was by 
mleans of these very methods that his growing doubts were to 
be dispelled and his tottering faith renewed. The result 
might have been predicted. 

Still further were his rationalistic tendencies encouraged by 
the extreme solitude to which his manner of living condemned 
him in the seminaries. During his two> years at Issy, he tells 
us, he never 1 once sought permission to see Paris. It is true 
that he indulged in occasional outings with the rest of 
the school (Lett. Sem., 58, 70, 107, 113, 114, 119, 144, 149- 
50, 163, 174, 223, 288) ; but at home he appears to have lived 
to himself, like the veriest hermit. 

His books were his world. Even in recreation hours, instead 
of joining in the games, he would pass the time on a seat in the 
grounds, reading philosophic disquisitions about the existence 
of God, (how significant ! ) and trying to keep warm in the win- 
ter by wearing several overcoats. 

Such a life of reflection and study, of introspective seclu- 
sion and turning-away from matters of present and practical 
moment, combined with physical inaction, was certain to leave 
permanent traces in his mind no less than his body. 

"Ma croissance. etait a peine achevee; ma taille se voutait. 
Mais ma passion l'emporta. Je m'y livrai avec d'autant plus 
de securite que je la croyais bonne. Cy etait une sorte de fu- 
reur; mais pouvais-je eroire que 1'ardeur de penser, que 
je voyais loner . . . f fit blamable et dut me mener a un 
resultat que j'eusse repousse de toutes mes forces si j'avais pu 
l'entrevoir ?" Sonv., 244-5. 

'His reason for being so exclusively devoted to books at this 
tim|e becomes clear on reading his letters, especially those to 
his sister. He was busy transferring the faith of his child- 
hood from the rock of tradition to the arid sands of Cartesian 
psychology; and his sister was the only person in the world to 
whom he could turn for effective sympathy in this struggle to 
get rid of his doubts through a process of rational conviction. 
But she was now far away. Since January, 1841, she had 
left Paris to accept a position as governess in Poland, which in 



BEATJEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EBNEST KENAN. 339 

those days was several weeks distant, and where she remained in 
bitter exile for ten long years. It is to this separation that we 
owe the beautiful volume, Lettres Intirnes, every reader of 
which has learned to pronounce the name of Henrietta Kenan 
with profound respect. 

There can be no doubt that her letters did more than any 
other single influence to determine the course of Kenan's life. 
Cf. Lett. Sem., 1-2, 26, 33, 102, 104, 136, 161, 173, 259, 327. 
It is true that sue never attempted to influence her brother's 
beliefs directly, but her indirect influence was all the greater. 
Again and again she exhorts him, implores himi, to' be honest 
with the truth; to make no concessions to fear, nor compro- 
mise with expediency. Truth and duty alone, his own rea- 
son and his own conscience, the most absolute intellectual and 
moral integrity, she never wearies of insisting, must decide so 
weighty a question. Cf. Lett. Semi., 326. 

When his studies were drawing to a close and the time ap- 
proached for him to decide irrevocably whether or not he 
would continue in his priestly career, she sent him, through a 
friend, out of her own hard-earned savings, the sum) of 1,500 
francs for immediate needs, in order that he might feel 
entirely free, so far as irrelevant considerations of livelihood 
were concerned, to decide either for or against remaining in 
the church. 

But with all her womanly sympathy and inexhaustible sis- 
terly love it is certain that the net result of her influence was 
only to exalt still further the ofiice of reason in the process of 
forming and sifting religious beliefs. By always insisting 
that he must fight out the battle for himself and think his own 
way out of his difficulties, guided by reason and conscience 
alone, she still further confirmed his own conception of reason 
as the sole and ultimate arbiter of all truth. It is an interest- 
ing fact that this same sister, the guardian angel of his early 
life, as Madame Darmsteter very properly calls her, who in 
his childhood had taken himi by the hand on winter evenings 
to prayers in the village cathedral, sheltered from snow and 
rain under the ample folds of her cloak; this same sister in 



340 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

later years, his cloud by day and pillar of fire by night, as he 
himself describes her, was to lead him away from that self- 
same faith in Which she had cradled his earliest youth. 

And if it is true that hers was the leading influence in her 
brother's apostacy, must we not say that his very decision to 
repress or ignore all the promptings' of emotion or passion, and 
to follow pure reason alone, was itself the result of a passional 
impulse : the omnipotent love of a sister ? It was not merely 
his own faith in reason ; it was still more his faith in his sister's 
faith, that led to this crisis in his life. 

This chapter has failed of its purpose if it has not brought 
into clear relief the powerful contrast between the environmen- 
tal influences at work on Penan during his studies in Paris, and 
those which had moulded his character in Brittany up to his 
sixteenth year. 

His removal to Paris, seven years of diligent study and ex- 
tensive reading, and much reflection; an intellectual and spir- 
itual solitude broken only by the frequent letters of his distant 
sister, who essentially reinforced the ultra-rationalistic ten- 
dencies of his favorite authors: all these influences from 
within and without combined to superimpose on his ear- 
lier character a second self, and make him a man of opposite 
temperaments and correspondingly opposite ideals. The 
saintly and the worldly ideals, for ever at feud in literature as 
in life, are reflected in his writings alternately, according as 
the Treguier or the Parisian self is holding the pen. 

Before concluding this chapter with an estimlate of Kenan's 
life and work as a whole, it may be of interest to note with 
what feelings he himself looked back upon his career. We 
shall find that his judgment is different according as he con- 
templates his past life from the point of view of greatest en- 
joyment for himself, or of making the most of his opportun- 
ities in behalf of humanity at large. 

Few great writers have been more deeply convinced that life 
is a good, — the mere living. His Souvenir's concludes with the 
words : 

"Mon experience de la vie a done ete fort douce, et je ne 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 341 

crois pas qu'il y ait en '. . . beaucoup d'etres plus neu- 
reux que moi. . . . J'ai taut joui dans cette vie, que je 
n'ai vraiment pas le droit de reclaimer une compeusatioii 
d'outre-tombe. L'infinie bonte que j'ai rencontree en ee monde 
m'inspire la conviction que l'eternite est reuiplie par une bonte 
non moindre, en qui j'ai une confiance absolua L' existence 
qui m'a ete donnee sans que je l'eusse demandee a ete pour 
moi un bienfait. Si elle m'etait offerte, je l'accepterais de 
nouveau avec reconnaissance," Souv., 373-8. 

Similar statements abound in bis books. From a hedom- 
istie point of view no one ever surveyed bis own life with more 
genuine self-satisfaction. 

"Tout pese, si j'avais a. recommencer ma vie, avec le droit 
d'y faire des ratures, je n'y changerais rien." Souv., 362. 

"Son ideal ne depasse pas la realite," complains M. Seailles, 
"II ne conceit pas mieux que la vie d'un bomme commencant 
commie il a commence pour finir comme il finit." E. R., 324. 

But Reman bas himself forestalled tbis criticism. For a 
very different tone is adopted in speaking of bis own past when- 
ever be considers what migbt have been done, with bis talents 
and opportunities, for civilization at large through the ad- 
vancement of science. 

There can be no doubt that rational progress was, after all, 
his highest ideal, and the advancement of science his real re- 
ligion. ~No one familiar with his work as a whole will dispute 
his own confession on this point: 

"Les mathematiques et l'induction physique ont toujours 
ete les elements fondamentaux de mon esprit, les seulee pier- 
res de ma batisse qui n'aient jamais change d'assise et qui ser- 
vent toujours." Souv., 251. Cf. Dr. Ph., 111. Cf. Lett. 
Sem., 5, 15, 16, 41, 164, 344. 

It is said that after his death there was found in his desk 
a piece of paper on which he bad written the words: 

"De tout ce que j'ai fait, c'est le Corpus que j'aime 
le mieux." This was the Corpus Inscriptionum- Semiticarum. 

Renan's predilection for positive science and exact scholar- 
ship explains his frequent regrets at having devoted bis life 



342 BULLETIN OF THE TJNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

to history and literature, instead of to natural science. 26 When- 
ever in later life he recalled the extreme interest he had early 
felt in biological science, and compared his own achievements 
with the undying fame of a Darwin, he seems to have looked 
with envy upon the work of his English contemporary, whose 
epoeh-miaking demonstrations he might, as he later believed, 
have partly anticipated. 

"Je serais sorti du semlinaire sans avoir fait d'hebreu ni de 
theologie? La physiologic et les sciences naturelles m'aurai- 
ent entraine ; or, je peux bien le dire, l'ardeur extreme que ces 
sciences vitales excitaient dans mon esprit me fait croire que, 
si je les avals cultivees d'une facon suivie, je fusse arrive a 
plusieurs des resultats de Darwin, que j'entrevoyais." Souv., 
262-3. 

"O'est a en donner le frisson," exclaims M. Scherer, "et nous 
Favons echappe belle. M. Renan, je n'en doute pas, avait 
tout ce qu'il faut pour etre un Darwin, mais Darwin, lui, ne 
nous aurait pas rendu notre Renan." Et. litt. con., VIII, p. 
98. 

But Kenan's readers doubtless have no occasion to regret his 
alienation from natural science; nor, most probably, have the 
readers of Darwin. Renan could hardly have improved upon 
the Origin of Species, to say the least; and who would have 
written the Vie de Jesus? 

The simple truth is that Renan's regret over what might 
have been was, as usual, a; quarrelling with the inevitable ; for 
it is safe to' say, in view of his dominant interests at the time, 
that he never was really free to exchange the library for the 
laboratory. At every step in his progress, from his schooldays 
at Treguier to his apostacy in 1845, and thence forward, his 
work in the future seems predetermined, in general outline at 
least, by the intellectual and spiritual momentum acquired 
through his work in the past. Not indeed in the sense that 
no other course was possible, but in the sense that no other 
could have seemed reasonable. It is not meant that the im- 
pelling necessity was a species of fatalism independent of his 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAIST. 343 

own personality; it "was simply his own endeavor to miake the 
most of past acquisitions. 

His entrance upon a theological career, to begin with, was 
not in any sense a matter of free choice. Almost frotmi in- 
fancy he had been destined for the priesthood. 

"J'etais ne pretre a, priori, comme tant d'autres naissent 
militaires, magistrats." Souv., 153. Cf. ibid., 309. 

"Mes rnaitres me rendirent tenement impropre a toute be- 
sogne temporelle, que je fus frappe d'une marque irrevocable 
pour la vie spirituelle." Souv., 135; also 140. Cf. Lett. 
Sem., 196-7, 202, 238, 279. 

Fatherless at the age of five, his early education was left 
entirely to women and priests. In the little Treguier seniinr 
ary, everything, example no less than precept, impelled him in 
the direction of theology. All his fellow students, unless they 
failed in their studies, became priests as a matter of course. 
Souv., 137, 153-4. Studious and gifted as he was, therefore, 
the possibility of a lay career never for a moment entered 
his mind. His teachers were his living ideals ; and his highest 
ambition was to be like unto them, — a priest. Souv., II ; 140. 
How indeed can a child be properly said to choose a calling, 
having no comparative knowledge whatever, either of the pro- 
fessions among which he is expected to choose, nor of his own 
capacities or aptitudes for such professions ? 

In his later period Kenan took every opportunity to say pleas- 
ant things about his early teachers, and about the education they 
imparted. Souv., 134-5. It was to those stern-visaged, aus- 
tere-mannered monks, he very truthfully says, that he owed the 
best that was in him;. Souv., 11. But, of course, these men 
were as far as possible from creating in their pupils an interest 
for natural science:, as he further explains, Souv., 130-5, and 
his admiration for their persons merely shows how strong was 
the bond by which he was bound to the church. Even after his 
transfer to Paris, in the autumn of 1838, there was no provo- 
cation, during his four years at St. ISTicolas, and in fact no op- 
portunity for a change of career. Souv., 169, 180, 195. It is 
quite certain, indeed, according to numerous passing allusions 



344 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

in his letters of the time, that his interest in science "was not 
aroused till 1841, when he entered the seminary at Issy. It 
was there that he first developed that aversion for metaphysics 
and admiration of positive science which he retained to the end. 
Souv., 250, 297-8. 

Here, then, for the first time, was there a parting of 
the ways, and an opportunity to change his course; and 
the question arises why, despite his recently acquired en- 
thusiasm for science and distrust of metaphysics, he still 
went on with his theological course. There were several 
reasons. Apart from the influence of his directors and con- 
fessors, the power of mental inertia and of daily routine, 
and what miay be called the contagion of personal and material 
surroundings, his letters of the time make it plain that, between 
Issy and St. Sulpiee, in reality only different branches of the 
same institution, there was no halting-place. There was no 
inducement to change, and there was every inducempnt to go> on. 
It is true that, at this critical period of his life, he was contin- 
ually agitated, by religious doubts, provoked by his readings in 
philosophy and encouraged by the letters of his sister (Cf. Lett. 
Int., 39 . But he had not gone far enough yet in his studies to 
be entirely certain that, in this conflict between doubt and 
dogma, doubt was right and dogma wrong. Souv., 319. It 
was not till several years later, when suspicion had ripened into 
conviction, that he had the courage to break with his past; and 
even then the immediate occasion was an external pressure. 
Souv., 392-3. Indeed, when we consider his sister's constant 
warnings against hasty and final committal to a career he mio-ht 
one day regret, the fact that he did not change alone affords a 
strong presumption that he could not. His professors, more- 
over, who had the advantage of being also his confessors, urged 
him onward in his clerical course, Souv., 2G0-1, 271-2, 405; 
and their reasons, all the miore persuasive for his own indecision 
and lack of financial means, finally prevailed over the gentler, 
and it must be admitted the wiser, counsels of his sister. 

The only other period of his life when he miight reasonably 
have turned to natural science was immediately after his seces- 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 345 

sion from the church, in 1845. The opportunity was all the 
more favorable as his new position brought him into intimate 
relations with M. Berthelot, then, like himself, laying the foun- 
dations of his future greatness. But here again his letters show 
that the course he actually pursued was inevitable. He was 
now 22 years old, well versed in Hebrew and biblical studies 
generally, and with a power over the pen which gave promise of 
success as a writer. On the other hand, there was nothing in 
his prospects to tempt him to abandon the way on which he had 
now gone so far. A change to biological science would appear 
to have been the least possible of all, for he lacked at this junc- 
ture, as he himself declares, the most essential quality of the 
scientist: the capacity for specialization. Souv., 397-9; 402. 
Cf. A. S., 11-12 ; Seailles, E. B,, 31. 

In truth, the struggles involved in his recent apostacy had. 
made too deep a groove in his mind ; he was too much preoccu- 
pied in thought and feeling with the creeds he had just dis- 
carded, to be able to settle down calmjly to the patient plodding 
of laboratory experimentation. The inner momentum of his 
whole being, naturally enough, impelled him in the direction of 
religious reform, and there was no external influence to deflect 
him from this path. Like St. Paul — the comparison is his 
own — his purpose, in life was summed up in the wish : "cupio 
om-mes fieri qualis et ego sum." Souv., 404. In his then con- 
dition of mind, secular science seemjed to him unworthy a mo- 
ment's serious thought, save in so far as it might take the place 
of religion in human life. A. S., 38-9. Cf. Souv., 398. 

"Petals terriblement depayse," he writes of this period 
nearly half a century later. "L'univers me faisait Tenet d'un 
desert sac et froid. Du moment que le christianisme n'etait r»as 
la verite, le reste me parut indifferent, frivole, a peine digne 
d'interet. L'eeroulement de ma vie sur elle-meme m|e laissait 
un sentiment de vide comme celui qui suit un acces de fievre ou 
un amour brise." Souv., 330. 

"Si la science devait rester ce qu'elle est, il faudrait la subir 
en la maudissant ; car elle a, detruit, et elle n'a pas rebati ; elle 
a tire l'homme d'un doux sommeil, sans lui adoucir la realite.' y 
A. S., 93. 



346 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

We mlust not forget that when Eenan left the church, he was 
not merely discarding a creed, but renouncing a livelihood as 
well, and a career for which all his past life had aimed to pre- 
pare him. Lett Stem., 279. Such a step is not taken without 
a prolonged intellectual and spiritual struggle. It was the 
battle of conscience against self-interest, of spirit against the 
claims of matter, if we may so express it, subverting the very 
foundations of his spiritual self. Such a crisis must perforce 
leave its mlark in the mind and temperament of the victim. So 
with Renan. It was impossible for him to begin work, as it 
were de novo, in a field unrelated to these recent struggles. The 
most pressing need of the momlent, he seems to have felt, was to 
rebuild, in mjore stately form if possible, the shattered mansions 
of his faith. Destruction called for reconstruction, very nat- 
urally; and this led to an independent, historical study of the 
Christian religion, eventually resulting in the well-known vol- 
umes : Les Origines du Christiariisnie and Uhistoire du Peuple 
d'Israel, together with numerous articles and essays on related 
subjects. 

"Une seule occupation me parut digne de remplir ma vie: 
c'etait de poursuivre mes recherches critiques sur le christia- 
nisme par les moyens beaucoup plus larges que m'offrait la 
science laique." Souv., 343. 

"Le livre le plus important du dix-neuvieme siecle," he 
writes in 1848, "devrait avoir pour titre: Histoire critique 
des Origines du Christianisme. Oeuvre admirable que j'envie 
a. celui qui la realisera, et qui sera celle de mon age mur, si la 
mort et tant de f atalites exterieures . . . ne viennent m'en 
empecher." A. S., 279. Cf. ibid. 185: "Cette merveilleuse 
histoire qui, executee d'une maniere scientifique et definitive, 
revolutionnerait la pensee." 

At the time of his apostacy, therefore, in 1845, the plan of 
his life was already determined. Indeed, he says this himself: 

"L'idee qu'en abandonnant l'Eglise, je resterais fidele a. Jesus, 
s'empara de moi, et, si j'avais ete capable de croire aux appari- 
tions, j'aurais certainement vu Jesus m|e disant : "Abandonne- 
mioi pour etre mon disciple." Cette pensee me soutenait, m/en- 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 347 

hardissait. Je peux dire que, des lors, la Vie de Jesus etait 
ecrite dans mon esprit. La croyance a l'eminente personnalite 
de Jesus, qui est l'ame de ce livre, avait ete ma force dans ma 
lutte contre la theologie. Jesus a bien reellement toujours ete 
mon maitre." 27 Souv., B., 214. Of. A. &, 278-9. 

The fact is that, notwithstanding all his contradictions of de- 
tail, Renan's life and work as a whole is remarkable for its 
logical developmlent, not only in the sense of being an almost 
passive product of antecedent conditions, or environmental 
pressure ; but in the higher sense of adhering to the principles 
and maturing the plans of his early youth. Cf . Seailles, E. E,., 
41." 

There are few great men in whose lives the formative 
power of circumstances is more evident, or less interfered 
with by their own wills; and one of his most characteristic 
traits, without doubt, is the predominance of intellect and feel- 
ing over the will. As Mr. Babbitt says., the masculine religion 
of the will was sacrificed to the feminine religion of the heart. 
Cf. Mahrenholtz, E. K, 93. 

But when we contemplate the circumstances of his life, this 
is not in the least surprising. We have already noted in pass- 
ing that everything in his life, from earliest childhood on, 
favored a subordination of the will to feeling and intellect. 
We recall that he was brought up by women and priests. Cf . 
F. Det,, XXX; Souv., 153 ; VIII-IX, 14-15, 33-4, 114. Hia 
delicate health as a child debarred him from' participating in 
the self-asserting, will-developing, rough-and-tumble sports of 
the boys, who laughed at his delicacy and called him "made- 
moiselle." In his home there was no father, and his mother and 
sister, as well as the girl playmates of whom he was so fond, 
did much to encourage this "feminine religion of the heart." 
The very poverty and simplicity of his life at home, with no 
opportunity for manual labor, decided the nature of his tasks. 
For reflection and study he had an abundance of time, as well 
as abundant encouragement and good opportunities. His bril- 
liant miental endowments were apparent at once, and the dis- 
tinction gained in the class-room amply consoled him for the 



348 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

taunts of the boys in the play-grounds, thus encouraging still 
further the development of reason at the expense of the will, 
and of mind at the expense of his body. 

We should remember, too, his years of brooding solitude in 
Paris, where the feminine influences of mother, sister and play- 
mates were replaced by the rationalistic influences of Cartesian 
philosophy. A religion of reason replaced the religion of feel- 
ing; but there was nothing during his student years to encour- 
age the development of an active will, and much to discourage 
it And the same is true of his later life. 

His very respect for the truth, and especially his theory that in 
the quest for truth all personal bias should be suppressed, would 
tend, so far as this theory was carried out in his own practice, 
still further to develop his intellect at the cost of his will. Such 
an attitude must, favor compromise, and never can lead to 
blustering self-assertion. Eenan was at once too sincere and 
too clear-headed a man to be tempted to dogmatize on any one 
side of a debatable question. 

"Un esprit eclaire se dit a lui-meme: Si, depuis que la 
raison existe, tant de milliers de symboles ont eu la pretention 
de presenter la verite complete, et si cette pretention s'est tou- 
jours trouvee vaine, est-il bien probable que je sois plus heureux 
que tant d'autres et que la verite ait attendu ma venue ici-bas 
pour faire sa definitive revelation V C d'Angl., 198-9. 

"Si une societe, si une philosophic, si une religion etit pos- 
sede la verite absolue, cette societe, cette philosophic, cette re- 
ligion aura.it vaincu les autres et vivrait seule a l'heure qu'il est. 
Tons ceux qui, jusqu'ici, ont cru avoir raison se sont trompes,. 
nous le voyons clairement. Pouvons-nous, sans folle outrecui- 
dance, croire que l'avenir ne nous jugera pas comme nous 
jugeons le passe? Souv., 71. Cf. A. S., 446-7. 

This conviction, joined with a sincerity which in him was 
second nature, led him to show an unusual regard for opponents. 
Xo one ever saw more clearly, or recognized more candidly, the 
soul of truth in things erroneous, or of good in things evil. 

"Ici, je plaide un peu contre moi-meme; mais je ne suis pas 
un pretre ; je suis un penseur ; comme tel je dois tout voir. Un 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 349 

ouvrage bien eompltt ne doit pas avoir besoin qu'on le refute. 
L'envers de chaque pen see doit y etre indique, de maniere que 
le lecteur saisisse d'un seul coup d'oeil les deux faces opposees 
dont se compose toute verite." Dr. Ph., 256. 

One of the central features of all his philosophy was the belief 
that truth and error, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, wisdom 
and folly, and other such opposites, shade off into one another by 
gradations as imperceptible as the colors in a dove's neck. 
Souv., 70-1. 

"Ne rien aimer, ne rien hair absolument, devient alors une 
sagesse." Souv., 71. 

"L'impression des choses humaines n'est complete que si on 
fait une place a l'ironie a cote des larmes, a la pitie a cote de la 
colore, au sourire a cote du respect." Dr. Ph., V. Alsa cf. 
I-II. 

Such convictions, when not only preached but lived, as in 
Penan 's case they were, have of course no tendency to develop 
a strong, active will. One of his latest critics, Mr. Babbitt, is 
quite right when he says: 

"Everything tends to assume in the intelligence of Penan 
the form of an acute antimony — 'reason and sentiment, the 
classic and the romantic, the real and the ideal, science and 
morality. He is unable to fuse together and reconcile these 
contradictory terms in the light of a higher insight. Instead of 
choosing between opposite and equally plausible conclusions, he 
sets "the different lobes of his brain" to dialoguing about them. 
Such a state, if prolonged, would lead to a paralysis of the will." 
Souv., B., I.ntrod., XXVII. 

The judgment of another critic, still more unfavorable, is also 
true : 

"After all is said one cannot but feel that there is a touch of 
something unwholesome in Penan's writings, though, doubtless, 
nothing whatever of it in his life, which was as blamieless as it 
was kindly and gracious. There was too* little of fierceness and 
indignation against what was false and foul, too much tolerance 
for the partially untrue and the partially unclean. To put the 
matter shortly, no one who loves the manliness and sincerity of 



350 BULLETIN OE THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

the puritan spirit can fail to feel a certain disgust at, and con- 
tempt for, Renan's standpoint in regard to both morality and 
religion." Spectator, 79 : 897 ff. 

Bnt surely no less true are the words with which his bio- 
grapher concludes the story of his life: 

"Veracity, like charity, covers a multitude of sins . . . 
Do we not crave above all things from a gifted man, working in 
Renan's intellectual sphere;, that he shall tell us what he really 
and truly thinks and feels, whether the world likes it or not?" 
Espinasse, EL R., 235. 

And sincere he certainly was, throughout life. Whatever 
may be said of the truth of his teachings, his sincerity is beyond 
question. If he failed to see human relations and eternal real- 
ities in the right perspective, this was the fault of his instru- 
ment, not, of his purpose. On this point there is no disputing 
his own testimony: 

"Ce que j'ai ton jours eu, c'est 1'amour de la verite. Je veux 
qu'on mieitte sur ma, tombe (ah ! si elle pouvait etre au milieu du 
cloitre! mais le cloitre, c'est l'eglise, et l'eglise, bien a tort, ne 
veut pas de moi), je veux, dis-je qu'on mette sur ma tombe: 
Veritat&m dilexi. Oui, j'ai aime la verite . . . J'ai de- 
chire les liens les plus chers pour lui obeir. Je suis sur d'avoir 
bien fait . . . Oei temoignage, je le porterai haut et ferme 
sur ma tete au jugement dernier." Disc, 215-16. Of. F. 
Det., XXXIV; Souv., 305-6; Seailles, E. R., 22, 24, 315. 
Also the letter to his friend Cbgnat, Sep. 11, 1846. 

But perhaps this paper has been too unappreciative and, on 
the whole, too unsympathetic; and lest his truth-loving spirit 
should have cause to reproach his expositor with neglecting his 
greatest message to the world, sincerity and truthfulness, it 
seemS only fair at this point, in bidding our author a, long fare- 
well, to allow him a final word in defence! of his own position on 
the subjects discussed in this paper. 

"Dans cette grand e crise que l'avenement de l'esprit positif 
fait subir de nos jours aux croyances morales, j'ai defendu 
plutot qu'amoindri la. part de l'ideal. Je n'ai pas ete de ces 
esprits timides qui croient que la verite a besoin de penombre et 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF EENEST KENAN. 351 

que 1'infini craint le grand air. J'ai tout critique, et, quo! 
qu'on dise, j'ai tout maintenn. J'ai rendu plus de services au 
Men en ne dissimulant rien de la realite qu'en envelopp>ant ma 
pensee de oes voiles hypocrites qui ne tromtpent personne. 
]STotre critique a plus fait pour la conservation de la religion 
que toutes ]es apologies. Nous avons trouve a Dieu un riche 
ecrin de synonymes. Si nos raisons de croire aux reparations 
d'outre-tombe peuvent sermbler freles, eelles d' autrefois, etaient 
elles. beaucoup plus fortes ? Teste David cum Sibylla! . . . 
L'odre social, comme l'ordre theologique, provoque la question : 
Qui- sait si la verite n'est pas triste? L'edifice de la societe 
i&um'aine porte sur un grand vide. Nous avons ose le dire. 
Rien de plus dangereux que de patiner sur une couche de glace 
sans songer combien cette couche est mince. Je n'ai jamais pu 
croire que, dans aucun ordre de choses, il fiat mauvais d'y voir 
trop clair. Toute verite est bonne a savoir. Car toute verite 
clairement sue rend fort ou prudent, deux chose© egalement 
necessaires a ceux que leur devoir, une ambition imprudente ou 
leur mauvais sort appellent a se meler des affaires de cette- 
pauvre humanite." Dr. Ph., 262-4. Cf. Monod, Renam, 
36-46. 



352 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 



APPENDIX A: NOTES. 

Note 1. — It is interesting to compare the view of a professional 
modern psychologist. Prof. James, distinguishing between "refined" 
or "universal" supernaturalism, and "piecemeal" supernatural ism, in- 
clines to affirm the latter on the identical ground on which it is 
rejected by Renan. 

"For refined supernaturalism," he writes, "the world of the ideal 
has no efficient causality, and never bursts into the world of phe- 
nomena at particular points. . . . Universalistic supernatural- 
ism surrenders, it seems to me, too easily to naturalism. ... In 
this universalistic way of taking the world, the essence of practical 
religion seems to me to evaporate. ... In spite of its being so 
shocking to the reigning intellectual taste, I believe that a candid con- 
sideration of piece-meal supernaturalism and a complete discussion of 
all its metaphysical bearings will show it to be the hypothesis by 
which the largest number of legitimate requirements are met." Var. 
Rel. Exp., 521-3. 

Note 2. "La notion du surnaturel, avec ses impossibilites, n'ap- 
parait que le jour 6u nait la science experimental de la nature. 
L'homme etranger a toute idee de physique, qui croit qu'en priant il 
change la marche des nuages, arrete la maladie et la mort meme, ne 
trouve dans le miracle rien d'extraordinaire." V. J., 41. 

"La croyance au miracle est, en effet, la consequence d'un etat 
intellectual ou le monde est considere comme gouvern6 par la fan- 
taisie et non par des lois immuables. Sans doute, ce n'est pas ainsi 
que 1'envisagent les supernaturalistes modernes, lesquels, forces par 
la science, qu'ils n'osent froisser assez hardiment, d'admettre un ordre 
stable dans la nature, supposent seulement que Taction libre de Dieu 
peut parfois le changer, et concoivent ainsi le miracle comme une 
derogation a des lois etablies. Mais ce concept, je le repete, n'etait 
nullement celui des hommes primitifs. Le miracle n'6tait pas concu 
alors comme surnaturel. L'idee de surnaturel n'apparait que quand 
Tidee des lois de la nature s'est nettement formulee et s'impose meme 
a ceux qui veulent timidement concilier le merveilleux et l'experience. 
. Pour les hommes primitifs, au contraire, le miracle 6tait par- 
faitement naturel et surgissait a chaque pas, ou plut6t il n'y avait ni 



B RATTER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN". 353 

lois ni nature pour ces ames nai'ves, voyant partout action immediate 
d'agents libres. . . Ce n'est pas d'un raisonnement, mais de tout 
l'ensemble des sciences modernes que sort cet immense resultat: il n'y 
a pas de surnaturel." A. S., 45-6. 

Note 3. Renan's position on this question is more fully set forth 
in his article la Metaphysique et son avenir, I860, and again, three 
years later, in a letter to Mr. Berthelot: 

"Si Ton entend par metaphysique le droit et le pouyoir qu'a l'homme 
de s'elever audessus des faits, d'en voir les lois, la raison, l'harmonie, 
la poesie, la beaute . . . il y a une metaphysique. . . Mais 
si Ton veut dire qu'il existe une science premiere contenant les prin- 
cipes de toutes les autres, une science qui peut a elle seule, et par des 
combinaisons abstraites, nous amener a la verite sur Dieu, le monde, 
l'homme, je n? vois pas la necessite d'une telle categorie du savoir 
humain. . . II n'y a pas de verite qui n'ait son point de depart 
dans l'experience scientifique, qui ne sorte directement ou indirecte- 
ment d'un laboratoire ou d'une bibliotheque, car tout ce que nous 
savons, nous le savons par l'etude de la nature ou de l'histoire." Frag., 
282-4. Cf. ibid., 263, 265. C. d'Agl., 206. 

"J'ai nie autrefois l'existence de la metaphysique comme science 
a part et progressive; je ne la nie pas comme ensemble de notions 
immuables a la facon de la logique. Ces sciences n'apprennent rien, 
mais elles font bien analyser ce que Ton savait. En tout cas, elles 
sont totalement hors des faits. Les regies du syllogisme, les axiomes 
fondamentaux de la raison pure, seraient vrais comme les mathema- 
tiques, quand meme il n'y aurait personne pour les percevoir. 
Mathematiques pures, logique, metaphysique, autant de sciences de 
l'eternel, de l'immuable, nullement historiques, nullement experi- 
mentales, n'ayant aucun rapport avec l'existence et les faits." Frag., 
174-5. 

Note 4. "II n'est pas sur que la Terre ne manque pas sa 
destinee, comme cela est probablement arrive a des mondes innom- 
brables; il est meme possible que notre temps soit un jour considere 
comme le point culminant apres lequel l'humanite n'aura fait que 
dechoir; mais l'univers ne connait pas le decouragement; il com- 
mencera sans fin l'oeuvre avortee; chaque echec le laisse jeune, alerte, 
plein d'illusions. . . Courage, courage, nature! . . Obstine-toi; 
repare pour la millionieme fois la maille de filet qui se casse. . 
Vise, vise encore le but que tu manques depuis l'eternite. . . Tu 
as l'infini de l'espace et l'infini du temps pour ton experience. Quand 
10 



354 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

on a le droit de se tromper impunement, on est toujours stir de reus- 
sir." Sou v., XX-XXI. 

"The universe . . obtains its object by an infinite variety of 
germs. What Javeh desires always happens. Let us not be trou- 
bled; if we are among those who are going astray, who are running 
counter to the supreme will, that is of little consequence. Humanity 
is one of the countless ant-hills among which the experiment of 
reason is being carried on in the midst of space; if we miss our goal, 
others will reach it." P. Isr., 11:454-5; ibid. vol. V, 361. 

Note 5. The same view is taken in his fitudes d'histoire reiigieuse, 
p. 419.: 

"Dieu, Providence, immortalite, autant de bons vieux mots, un peu 
lourds peut-etre, que la philosophie interpretera dans des sens de 
plus en plus raffines, mais qu'elle ne remplacera jamais avec avantage. 
Sous une forme ou sous une autre, Dieu sera toujours le resume de 
nos besoins suprasensibles, la categorie de l'ideal (c'est a dire la 
forme sous laquelle nous concevons l'ideal." Cf. Frag., 250; A. S., 
479. 

Note 6. "Our normal waking consciousness, rational conscious- 
ness, as we call it," writes Prof. James in his latest book, "is 
but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from 
it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness 
entirely different. . . No account of the universe in its totality 
can be final, which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite 
disregarded. . . They may determine attitudes, though they can- 
not furnish formulas, and open a region, though they fail to give a 
map. At any rate they forbid a premature closing of our accounts 

with reality. . 

. If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level 

of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. 
. The truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, ar- 
ticulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings 
of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclu- 
sions." Var. Rel. Exp., 388, 73, 74. Prof. James explains that he is 
dealing for the moment with the is, not with the ought. All he con- 
tends for is that the sub-conscious and non-rational does, as a matter 
of fact, hold primacy over reason in the religious realm. Cf. ibid., pp. 
422-4, 427, 456. 

Note 7. "How do we know," asks Prof. James, "that conscious- 
ness is generated de novo in each particular brain? May not 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 355 

consciousness exist anterior to the brain, behind the scenes, co-eval 
with the world? 

The production of such a thing as consciousness in the brain is the 
absolute world-enigma, — something so paradoxical and abnormal as to 
be a stumbling block to Nature, and almost a self-contradiction. Hum. 
Im., 21. 

Even though our soul's life (as here below it is revealed to us) may 
be in literal strictness the function of a brain that perishes, yet it is 
not at all impossible, but on the contrary quite possible, that the life 
may still continue when the brain itself is dead." Ibid., 11-12. 

Note 8. Compare the famous declaration of Huxley: 
"If there is one thing plainer than another, it is that neither the 
pleasures nor the pains, of life in the merely animal world are distrib- 
uted according to desert; for it is admittedly impossible for the lower 
orders of sentient beings to deserve either the one or the other. If 
there is a generalization from the facts of human life, which has the 
assent of thoughtful men in every age and country, it is that the vio- 
lator of ethical rules constantly escapes the punishment which he de- 
serves; that the wicked flourishes like the green bay-tree, while the 
righteous begs his bread; that the sins of the fathers are visited upon 
the children; that, in the realm of nature, ignorance is punished just 
as severely as wilful wrong; and that thousands upon thousands of in- 
nocent beings suffer for the crime, or the unintentional trespass, of 
one." Evolution and Ethics, Lond., 1893, p. 12. 
So likewise felt Goethe: 

"Denn unfiihlend 
1st die Natur: 
Es leuchtet die Sonne 
Tiber bose und gute, 
Und dem Verbrecher 
Glanzen wie dem Besten 
Der Mond und die Sterne. 

Wind und Strome, 
Donner und Hagel 
Rauschen ihren Weg 
Und ergreifen, 
Voriibereilend, 
Einen und den andern. 

Auch so das Gliick 
Tappt unter die Menge, 
Fasst bald des Knaben 



356 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Lockige Unschuld, 
Bald auch den kahlen 
Schuldigen Scheitel. 

Nach ewigen, ehrnen, 
Grossen Gesetzen 
Miissen wir alle 
Unseres Daseins 
Kreise vollenden. . . " 

Note 9. "I have said nothing," writes Prof James of his Gifford 
Lectures, "about immortality or the belief therein, for to me it seems 
a secondary point. If our ideals are only cared for in 'eternity,' I do 
not see why we might not be willing to resign their care to other 
hands than ours. Yet I sympathize with the urgent impulse to be 
present ourselves, and in the conflict of impulses, both of them so 
vague yet both of them noble, I know not how to decide. It seems to 
me it is eminently a case for facts to testify." Var. Rel. Exp., 524. 

But in the case of many people, if not most, it is the death of a 
loved one, child, parent, or friend, that reinforces this "urgent im- 
pulse to be present ourselves," and it is very hard to see how such 
pecple can be willing to leave the hoped-for reunion "to other hands 
than their own." 

In complete contrast with these statements is the belief of Emer- 
son: 

"If you love and serve men, you cannot by any hiding or stratagem 
escape the remuneration. Secret retributions are always restoring 
the level, when disturbed, of the divine justice. It is impossible to 
tilt the beam. All the tyrants and proprietors and monopolists of the 
world in vain set their shoulders to heave the bar. Settles forever- 
more the ponderous equator to its line, and man and mote, and star 
and sun, must range to it, or be pulverized by the recoil." Lectures 
and Biogr. Sket, 1868, p. 186. 

Note 10. Compare the statement of Sidgwick, Methods, 438: 
"And, therefore, I should judge, from a strictly utilitarian point of 
view, that any attempt, such as Bentham made, to dispense with the 
morality of instinct and tradition, would be premature and ill-advised." 

Note 11. From a passage in the Souvenirs it appears that, as man 
is duped by Nature, so Nature in turn may be duped by man. The 
following story is put in the mouth of Renan's mother, but she is 
plainly expressing his own views: 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 357 

"Tout n'est au fond qu'une grande illusion, et ce qui le prouve, 
c'est que, dans beaucoup de cas, rien n'est plus facile que de duper la 
nature par des singeries qu'elle ne sait pas distinguer de la realite\ 
Je n'oublierai jamais la fille de Marzin. . . qui, folle par sup- 
pression du sentiment maternel, prenait une buche, l'emmaillottait de 
chiffons, lui mettait un semblant de bonnet cPenfant, puis passait les 
jours a dorloter dans ses bras ce poupon fictif, a le bercer, a le serrer 
contre son sein, a le couvrir de baisers. . . II y a des instincts pour 
qui l'apparence s'uffit et qu'on endort par des fictions. . . Que 
veux-tu! Ces pauvres folles prouvent par leurs egarements les saintes 
lois de la nature et leur inevitable fatality." Souv., 41-2. 

Note 11a. An interesting comparison at this point is again fur- 
nished by Prof. James. Commenting on the favorite utterance of 
Margaret Fuller: "I accept the universe," and Carlyle's sardonic re- 
ply; "Gad! she'd better!" he writes: 

"At bottom the whole concern of both morality and religion is with 
the manner of our acceptance of the universe. Do we accept it only 
in part and grudgingly, or heartily and altogether? . . . Morality 
pure and simple accepts the law of the whole which it finds reigning, 
so far as to acknowledge and obey it, but it may obey it with the 
heaviest and coldest heart, and never cease to feel it as a yoke. But 
for religion, iri its strong and well-developed manifestations, the serv- 
ice of the higher never is felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far 
behind, and a mood of welcome, which may fill any place on the scale 
between cheerful serenity and enthusiastic gladness, has taken its 
place. . . It makes a tremendous emotional and practical differ- 
ence to one whether one accept the universe In, the drab discolored 
way of stoic resignation to necessity, or with the passionate happi- 
ness of christian saints." Var. Rel. Exp., 41. 

Note 12. "The assertion that mortality is in any way depend- 
ent on certain philosophical problems," says Prof. Huxley, "produces 
the same effect on my mind as if one should say that a man's vision 
depends on his theory of sight, or that he has no business to be sure 
that ginger is hot in his mouth, unless he has formed definite views 
as to the nature of ginger." 

"If it is demonstrated that without this or that theological dogma 
the human race will lapse into bipedal cattle, more brutal than the 
beasts by reason of their greater cleverness, my next question is to 
ask for the proof of the dogma. If this proof is forthcoming, it is my 
conviction that no drowning sailor ever clutched a hencoop more 
tenaciously than mankind will hold by such dogma, whatever it may 



358 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

be. But if not, then I verily "be'iTeTe that the human race will go on 
its evil way; and my only consolation lies in the reflection that, how- 
ever bad our posterity may become, so long as they hold by the plain 
rule of not pretending to believe what they have no reason to believe, 
because it may be to their advantage so to pretend, they will not have 
reached the lowest depths of immorality." 

In behalf of the same view may be cited one of the greatest names 
in modern etuics, Prof. Sidgwick: 

"I am so far from feeling bound to believe for purposes of practice 
what I see no ground for holding as a speculative truth, that I can- 
not even conceive the state of mind which these words seem to de- 
scribe, except as a momentary, half-wilful irrationality, committed in 
a violent access of philosophic despair." Methods, 5th ed., 507. 

Note 13. This remained Kenan's attitude, more or less con- 
sistently, throughout life. Nature and nurture had combined to in- 
oculate his childhood with a temperamental Idealism which not even 
the rudest reverses of life were able entirely to efface. 

Nearly half a century later he writes of himself: 

"En fait, je n'ai d'amour que pour les caracteres d'un idealisme 
absolu, martyrs, heros, utopistes, amis de Pimpossible. De ceux-la 
seuls je m'occupe; ils sont, si j'ose le dire, ma speciality." Souv., 123. 

"Je n'abandonnai nullemeht mon gout pour l'deal; je l'ai plus vif 
que jamais, je l'aurai toujours. Le moindre acte de vertu, le moindre 
grain de talent, me paraissent infiniment superieurs a toutes les rich- 
esses, a tous les succes du monde." Souv., 122. 

Note 13a. "What right have we," asks Dr. Maudsley, "to be- 
lieve nature under any obligation to do her work by means of com- 
plete minds only? She may find an incomplete mind a more suitable 
instrument for a particular purpose. It is the work that is done, and 
the quality in the worker by which it was done, that is alone of mo- 
ment; and it may be no great matter from a cosmical standpoint, if in 
other qualities of character he was singularly defective, — if indeed 
he were hypocrite, adulterer, eccentric, or lunatic." Quoted, with ap- 
proval, by Prof. James, Var. Rel. Exp., 19. 

Note 14. "Happiness," says Prof. James, "like every other emo- 
tional state, has blindness and insensibility to opposing facts given 
it as its instinctive weapon for self-protection against disturb- 
ance. When happiness is actually in possession, the thought of evil 
can no more acquire the feeling of reality, than the thought of good 
can gain reality when melancholy rules. To the man actively happy. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OP ERNEST RENA1ST. 359 

from whatever cause, evil simply cannot then and there be believed 
in. Var. Rel. Exp., 88; also cf., 90. 

But this exactly is the problem, why happiness rather than melan- 
choly should continue in possession. 

Renan has attempted himself to explain his constant cheerfulness, 
but as usual his explanations do not agree very well with each other. 
He is specially fond of attributing his temperamental cheerfulness to 
his descent from a Celtic ancestry. Disc, 217. 

"Je suis double," he writes in the Souvenirs, "quelque fois une 
partie de moi rit quand l'autre pleure. C'est la l'explication de ma 
gaite. Comme il y a deux hommes en moi, il y en a toujours un qui 
a lieu d'etre content." p., 145. 

The explanation offered in the Souvenirs is more serious, and on 
the whole, correct: 

"Ma paix d 'esprit est parfaite. D'un autre cote, fai trouve" une 
bonte extreme dans la nature et dans la societe. . . Je n'ai ren- 
contre sur mon chemin que des hommes excellents. . . Une bonne 
humeur, difficilement alterable, resultat d'une bonne sante morale, 
resultat elle-meme d'une ame bien equilibree et d'un corps suppor- 
table malgre* ses defauts, m'a jusqu'ici maintenu dans une philosophie 
tranquille, soit qu'elie se traduise en optimisme reconnaissant, soit 
qu'elle aboutisse a une ironie gaie. Je n'ai jamais beaucoup souf- 
fert " p. 374. 

Note 15. It would not be hard to find in Renan's books many 
other passages in which the same doctrine is expressed or implied. 
Here, e. g., is another from the Souvenirs: 

"Et maintenant je ne demande plus au bon genie qui m'a tant de 
fois guide, conseillee, console, qu'une mort douce et subite, pour l'heure 
qui m'est fixee, proche ou lointaine. Les stoiciens soutenaient qu'on 
a pu mener la vie bienheureuse dans le ventre du taureau de Phalaris. 
C'est trop dire. La douleur abaisse, humilie, porte a blasphemer. 
La seule mort acceptable est la mort noble, qui est non un accident 
pathologique, mais une fin voulue et precieuse devant l'Eternel. La 
mort sur le champ de bataille est la plus belle de toutes, etc. Souv., 
376. 

Note 16. It is from this point of view that we must interpret 
Renan's frequent suspicions that morality and religion may be nothing 
more, after all, than cosmic illusions. In the course of evolution only 
such traits of mind and character have come down to our own times 
as were not incompatible with the requirements of successful life 



360 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

under set cosmic conditions. This is concisely and clearly expressed 
in the following passage: 

"Une humanite plus intelligente, oil tous verraient clair, ne serait 
pas viable; elle perirait dans son germe meme, et par consequent elle 
n'existe pas." Dial., 30. 

Wote 17. The same attitude appears to have been taken by Renan 
during the siege of Paris, in 1870. The Journal of the Goncourts 
records the following scene: 

"Berthelot continue ses revelations d6solantes, au bout desquelles 
je m'ecrie: 'Alors tout est fini, il ne nous reste plus qu'a el ever une 
generation pour la vengeance' " — "Non, non, crie Renan, qui s'est 
leve, la figure toute rouge, pas la vengeance, perisse la France, perisse 
la patrie, il y a au-dessus le Royaume du Devoir, de la Raison." — "Non, 
non, hurle toute la table, il n'y a rien au-dessus de la patrie . . ." 
Renan s'est leve et se promene autour de la table, la marche mal 
equilibree, ses petits bras battant l'air, citant a haute voix des frag- 
ments de l'Ecriture sainte, en disant que tout est la." E. de Goncourt, 
Journal, 2 serie, I vol., p. 28. But cf. Renan's letters to M. Strauss, 
written at this time; aiso Seailles, E. R., 265, note 1. 

Note 18. Renan's progress from radicalism to conservatism can 
be broadly traced in his attitude towards the French Revolution 
at different periods of his life. In the Avenir de la science he is still 
a fervent admirer of that great event, as appears from the following 
foot-note : 

"L'annee 1789 sera dans l'histoire de l'humanite une annee sainte. 
. Le lieu ou l'humanite s'est proclamee, le Jeu de Paume, sera 
un jour un temple; on y viendra comme a Jerusalem, quand l'eloigne- 
ment aura sanctifie et caracterise les faits particuliers en symboles 
des faits generaux. Le Golgotha ne devint sacre que deux ou trois 
siecles apres Jesus." A. S., note 6. 

The same attitude is taken in his letters during the period between 
his apostacy from the church in 1845 and the coup d'etat of 1851: In 
a letter from St. Malo, for example, Sept., 1847, to his friend Berthe- 
lot, he gravely argues: If the sublimities of the christian religion 
have prevailed over its narrowness and its primitive superstitions, 
why should the sublimity of the Revolution be unable to efface its 
horrors? The critic will see both sides, to be sure, as he sees them 
both in Christianity; but the religionist will see only the sublime, just 
as in Christianity. Corr., 32. 

"With this youthful enthusiasm we may contrast what he has to say 
on the same subject in 1858, in his article on M. Cousin: 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN". 361 

"Au fond, la Revolution frangaise, qu'on prend toujours comme un 
fait general de l'histoire du monde (Hegel lui-meme a commis cette 
erreur), est un fait tr§s particulier a la France, un fait gaulois, si 
j'ose le dire, la consequence de cette vanite qui fait que le gaulois 
supporte tout, excepte 1' inegalite des rangs sociaux, et de cette 
logique absolue qui le porte a reformer la society sur un type ab- 
strait, — again like himself in the A. S., — sans tenir compte de l'histoire 
et des droits consacres." Mor. Crit., 98-9. CT. Q. C, III-IV, 86, 380; 
also Ref. int., 248. 

From a passage in the Souvenirs it appears that his early enthus- 
iasm for the Revolution was caught from his mother, and that he was 
well aware of the inconsistency of his statements in regard to it: 

"J'ai pris d'elle un gout invincible de la Revolution, qui me l'a fait 
aimer malgre ma raison et malgre tout le mal que j'ai dit d'elle. Je 
n'efface rien de ce que j'ai dit; mais, depuis que je vois l'espece de 
rage avec laquelle des ecrivains etrangers cherchent a prouver que la 
Revolution frangaise n'a ete que honte, folie, et qu'elle constitue un 
fait sans importance dans l'histoire du monde, je commence a croire 
que c'est peut-etre ce que nous avons fait de mieux, puisqu'on en est 
si jaloux." Souv., 105. 

We may note, too, in passing, that Renan's early radicalism in mat- 
ters of social policy was simply the application to secular institutions 
of that same intellectual temper of ultra-rationalism which had re- 
cently forced him out of the church. Indeed, we should hardly expect 
a young man who had just set aside the supposedly sacred authorities 
and traditions of the church, to show much respect for authority and 
tradition in secular matters. 

He was certainly influenced, too, in these matters, during the. 
years immediately following his withdrawal from the church, by his 
intimate relations with the young Berthelot. It was in the autumn of 
1845 that they first made each other's acquaintance. Renan was 22 
years old, and Berthelot 18, and so completely did they stand at the 
same point of view, t~at friendsnip at once became a kind of intel- 
lectual partnership. 

"Notre ardeur d'apprendre etait egale; nos cultures avaient e'te' 
tres di verses. Nous mimes en commun tout ce que nous savions; 
. Berthelot m'appr'it ce qu'on n'enseignait pas au seminaire; de mon 
cote, je me mis en devoir de lui apprendre la theologie et l'hebreu. . . 
Notre honnetete et notre droiture s'embrasserent. . . Nos discus- 
sions etaient sans fin. . . Nous passions une partie des nuits a 
chercher, a travailler ensemble. . . La crise de 1848 nous emut 
profondement. . . Notre amitie consista en ce que nous nous ap- 
prenions mutuellement, en une sorte de commune fermentation qu'une 



362 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITT OF WISCONSIN. 

remarquable conformite d 'organisation intellectuelle produisait en 
nous devant les memes objets. Ce que nous avions vu a deux nous 
paraissait certain. . . II faut que les questions sociales et philoso- 
phiques soient bien difficiles, pour que nous ne les ayons pas resolues 
dans notre effort desespere." Souv., 334-7. 

The results of this co-operative intellectual fermentation are pre- 
served in Renan's Avenir de la science, that great Pourana, as he him- 
self calls it, from which most of his later inspirations were drawn. 
A. S., XI. Cf. Seailles, ui. R., 40-1. 

Renan's radicalism was destined to be short-lived, however. The 
events of 1848 had already shaken rudely his confidence in democracy, 
and the coup d'etat of 1851 destroyed it completely. A. S., IV. 

His mission to Italy, moreover, during 1849-50, besides developing 
new interests and awakening his artistic instinct, had taught him the 
valuable lesson that different peoples need different institutions, and 
that a government which is good for one country may be very bad for 
another. Within a year after writing the Avenir de la science he had 
so far changed his ground, he himself tells us, especially with refer- 
ence to socialism, that he wondered how he ever embraced the views 
so enthusiastically espoused in that work. It was for this reason 
among others that the book was not published till more than forty 
years later. A. S., IX. 

Note 19. This attitude seems at first glance to be contradicted 
by his unlimited admiration of all the forms of culture achieved 
by ancient Athens. Souv., 57-72. But Athenian democracy, as he ex- 
pressly admits in that famous rhapsody, was virtually an aristocracy, 
based on slavery. 

"II y a eu un peuple d'aristocrates, un public tout entier compose 
de connaisseurs, une democratie qui a saisi des nuances d'art tene- 
ment fines que nos rafSnes les apergoivent a peine. II y a eu un pub- 
lic pour comprendre ce qui fait la beaute des Propylees et la 
superiorite des sculptures du Parthenon." Souv., 61. 

Note 20. Renan's conception of civil liberty coincides exactly with 
that of Herbert Spencer: 

"La liberte, c'est le droit qu'a tout homme de croire et de faire ce 
que bon lui semble dans les limites ou le droit semblable des autres 
n'est point atteint." Mor. Crit., 159. 

Note 20a. "L'inegalite est legitime toutes les fois que I'inegalit6 
•est necessaire au bien de l'humanite. Une societe a droit a ce 
qui est necessaire a son existence, quelque apparente injustice qui en 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST EENAB". 363 

resulte pour l'individu. . . La possibility et les besoms de la so- 
ciete, les interets de la civilisation priment tout le reste. . . Je 
vais jusqu'a dire que, si jamais l'esclavage a pu etre necessaire a 
l'existence de la societe, l'esclavage a ete legitime; car alors les 
esclaves out ete esclaves de l'humanite, esclaves de l'oeuvre divine, 
ce qui ne repugne pas plus que l'existence de tant d'etres attaches 
fatalement au jcug d'une idee qui leur est superieure et qu'ils ne com- 
prennent pas. A. S., 378-9. Cf. ibid., notes 156 and 157: 

"On est parfois tenter de se demander si l'humanite n'a pas ete trop 
tot emancipee. . . Comment fera l'humanite, avec une liberte in- 
dividuelle aussi developpee que la notre, pour conquerir les deserts? 
. Les grandes choses ne se font pa sans sacrifice, et la religion, 
conseillere des sacrifices, n'est plus! Je me berce parfois de l'espoir 
que les machines et les progres de la science appliquee compenseront 
un jour ce que l'humanite aura perdu d'aptitude au sacrifice par le 
progres de la reflection." 

This doctrine was often reaffirmed by Renan in his later period, and 
is developed at length in his Dialogues and his Drames. 

The practice of vivisection, and the killing of animals for food, is 
justified by Renan on the same general ground as slavery: 

"Les animaux qui servent a la nourriture de 1'homme de genie ou 
de 1'homme de bien devraient etre contents, s'il savaient a quoi ils 
servent. Tout depend du but, et si un jour la vivisection sur une 
grande echelle etait necessaire pour decouvrir les grands secrets de 
la nature vivante, j'imagine les etres, dans l'extase du martyre volon- 
taire, venant s'y offrir couronnes de fleurs. Le meurtre inutile d'une 
mouche est un acte blamable; celui qui est sacrifie aux fins ideales n'a 
pas droit de se plamdre, et son sort, au regard de l'infini (zoo Se.&>), 
est digne d'envie." Dial., 129-30. Cf. A. S... IX, 387. 

But Renan himself has repeatedly asserted, both before and after 
writing this passage, that these transcendental ends are not known, and 
very probably cannot be known: 

"Rien ne nous indique quelle est la volonte de la nature, ni le but 
de l'univers." A. S., XVI. Cf. Frag., 318-9. 

Taking the two statements together, it would seem that he is him- 
self refuting the very proposition which his arguments are intended 
to establish. For if the sacrifice of individual lives and liberties is 
legitimate only when made for certain supposedly transcendental ends 
of Nature, it would seem that these ends must be known before the 
sacrifice can be legitimate. It must be admitted that Renan's ideal- 
ism, in the present instance again, is more beautiful than true. 



364 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Note 21. That this is not merely the doctrine of one of Renan's 
characters but truly his own, is shown by the following passages from 
his article on Amiel: 

"Les societes de temperance reposent sur d'excellentes intentions, 
mais sur un malentendu. Je ne connais qu'un argument en leur 
faveur. M. T. . . me disaft un jour que les maris de certains pays, 
quands ils n'ont pas ete temperants, battent leurs femmes. Voila qui 
est horrible, assurement; il faudrait tacher de corriger cela. Mais, au 
lieu de supprimer l'ivresse pour ceux qui en ont besoin, ne vaudrait-il 
pas mieux essayer de la rendre douce, aimable, accompagnee de sen- 
timents moraux? II y a tant d'hommes pour lesquels l'heure de 
l'ivresse est, apres l'heure de l'amour, le moment ou ils sont les meil- 
leurs." F. Det., 383-4. 

In the following passage he attempts to defend this attitude on phil- 
osophic grounds: 

"Eh bien! l'etat d'ame que M. Amiel appelle dedaigneusement 
"l'epicureisme de l'imagination" n'est peut-etre pas, pour cela, un 
mauvais parti. La gaietfi a cela de tres philosophique qu'elle semble 
dire a la nature que nous ne la prenons pas plus au serieux qu'elle ne 
nous prend nous-memes.; si le monde est une mauvaise farce, par 
la gaiete nous la rendons bonne. D'un autre cote, si une pensee 
indulgente et bienveillante preside a l'univers, nous entrons bien mieux 
par la resignation joyeuse dans les intentions de cette pensee supreme, 
que par la morne raideur du sectaire et l'eternelle jeremiade du croy- 
ant." F. Det., 396-7. 
And again: 

"Amiel se demande avec inquietude: Qu'est-ce qui sauve? Eh! 
mon Dieu! c'est ce qui donne a chacun son motif de vivre. Le moyen 
de salut n'est pas le meme pour tous. Pour l'un, c'est la vertu; pour 
l'autre, l'ardeur du vrai; pour un autre, l'amour de l'art; pour d'autres, 
la curiosite, l'ambition, les voyages, le luxe, les femmes, la richesse; 
au plus bas degre, la morphine et l'alcool. Les hommes vertueux 
trouvent leur recompense dans la vertu meme; ceux qui ne le sont pas 
ont le plaisir." F. Det, 382-3. 

In spite of the offensively frivolous tone of these passages, — and 
they might easily be multiplied, — there is a grain of truth in Renan's 
contention. This is more clearly and less objectionably put by Prof. 
James : 

"The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its 
power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually 
crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour. 
Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 365 

unites, and says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the Yes 
function in man. It brings its votary from the chill periphery of things 
to the radiant core. It makes him for the moment one with truth. 
Not through mere perversity do men run after it. To the poor and 
the unlettered it stands in the place of symphony concerts and of liter- 
ature; and it is part of the deeper mystery and tragedy of life that 
whiffs and gleams of something that we immediately recognize as 
excellent should be vouchsafed to so many of us only in the fleeting 
earlier phases of what in its totality is so degrading and poisoning. 
The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness, 
and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion of that 
larger whole." Var. Rel. Exp., 387. 

Note 22. "L'impossibilite ou il se voyait de plus en plus de faire 
des sottises l'autorisait a dire toute celles qui lui passaient par 
la tete; il se rendait cette justice qu'il n'avait fait aucun mal; il ne 
songeait pas qu'ecrire, c'est agir, et qu'on a sa part des fautes de tous 
ceux dont on affaiblit la conscience et la volonte." E. R. XII. Also 292. 

In reply one might quote from Renan: 

"Tout ce qui eleve l'homme et le ramene au soin de son ame l'ame- 
liore et l'epure; la qualite des doctrines importe assez peu. Les lec- 
teurs capables de trouver du gout a un ecrit, sont capables aussi d'en 
decouvrir le venin, s'il y en a." Mor. Crit., VII. Cf., Dial., 32-40; Eccl., 
88; P. Det, 426-7. Souv. 149-50. 

But such statements, even if they were quite true, would not remove 
the objection; and for once there can be no doubt that Renan is wrong 
and his critic right. 

Note 22a. Compare the statement of Amiel: 

"Juger notre epoque au point de vue de l'histoire universelle, 
l'histoire au point de vue de periodes geologiques, la geologie 
au point de vue de l'astronomie, c'est un affranchissement pour 
la pensee. Quand la duree d'une vie d'homme ou de peuple nous ap- 
parait aussi microscopique que celle d'un moucheron, et, inversement, 
la vie d'un ephemere aussi infinie que celle d'un corps celeste avec 
toute sa poussiere de nations, nous nous sentons bien petits et bien 
grands, et nous pouvons dominer de toute la hauteur des spheres notre 
propre existence et les petits tourbillons qui agitent notre petite Eu- 
rope." Journ., Jl. 20, 1848. 

Note 23. For the general question of heterogeneous personalities, 
the reader is referred to James, Var. Rel. Exp., 166-88. The divided 



366 BULLETIN OF THE TJNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

self and the process of its unification, and to the numerous references 
there given to other treatments of the same subject. 

Note 24. This same doctrine of objective reason as being "not 
merely the only legitimate source of belief, which perhaps it may be, 
but the only source of legitimate beliefs, which it assuredly is not," 
is clearly expressed also in his article UExamen de conscience phi- 
losophigue, 1888: 

"Le premier devoir de l'homme sincere est de ne pas influer sur ses 
propres opinions, de laisser la rgalite se reflfiter en lui comme en la 
chambre noire du photographe. . . Devant les modifications internes 
de notre retine intellectuelle, nous devons rester passifs. . . Nous 
n'avons pas le droit d'avoir un desir, quand la raison parle; nous 
devons ecouter, rien de plus; prets a nous laisser trainer pieds et 
poings lies ou les meilleurs arguments nous entrainent. La production, 
de la verite est un phenomene objectif, etranger au moi, qui se passe 
en nous sans nous, une sorte de precipite" chimique que nous devons 
nous contenter de regarder avec curiosity." F. D6t., 401-2. 

In accordance with this theory Renan believed that the progress of 
reason is inevitable and irresistible. No man can choose what he will 
or will not believe. 

"S'il y a quelque chose de fatal au monde, c'est la raison et la sci- 
ence. Les orthodoxes sont vraiment plaisants dans leurs coleres 
contre les libres penseurs, comme s'il avait dependu d'eux de se de- 
velopper autrement, comme si Ton etait maitre de croire ce que Ton 
veut." A. S., 93. Cf. F. Det, 402. In recent years this question as to 
the proper attitude of mind in the pursuit of truth, has been much dis- 
cussed, especially with reference to the role which the will and the 
intellect respectively play in what may be called the psychology of re- 
ligious belief. Hermann Lotze seems to have done more than any 
one else in the last century to inaugurate this reaction against the 
agnostic doctrine (see his Microcosmos, Eng. tr., 4th ed., 1890, vol. 2, 
pp. 571-8, 659, 678; also the introductory pages of his Outlines of 
Philosophy of Religion. A powerful impetus was given to the move- 
ment by Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief; but perhaps the most 
lucid discussion in brief compass is that of Prof. James, in his well- 
known essay The Will to Believe. 

Note 25. This view of his apostacy conflicts, it is true, with his 
own account in the Souvenirs; but his own version, written some 
thirty years after the event, seems distorted by historical perspective, 
or imperfect remembrance: 



BRAUEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 367 

He is certainly mistaken when he says, for example: 
"Ma foi a ete detruite par la critique historique, non par la scolas- 
tique, ni par la philosophie. L'histoire de la philosophie et l'espece de 
scepticisme dont j'etais atteint me retenaient dans le christianisme 
plutot qu'elles ne m'en chassaient. Je me repetais souvent ces vers 
que j'avais lus dans le vieux Brucker: 

Discussii fateor, sectas attentius omnes, 

Plurima quaesivi, per singula quaeque cucurri, 

Nee quidquam inveni melius quam credere Christo." Souv., 258... 

"Dans cette grande lutte engagee entre ma raison et mes croyances, 
j'evitai soigneusement de faire un seul raisonnement de philosophie 
abstraite. . . Mes raisons furent toutes de l'ordre philologique et 
critique; elles ne furent nullement de l'ordre mStaphysique, de l'ordre 
politique, de l'ordre moral." Souv. 297-8. Cf. ibid., 286; also Mor. Cr., 
174. 

These statements must be taken to represent the process as it ap- 
peared to his memory in tne retrospect, rather than its actual char- 
acter. A truer account is found in his let£ers of the time, which 
are contemporary records, and addressed, not like the Souvenirs to 
a promiscuous public as an Apologia pro vita sua, but to the only per- 
son in the world to whom he dared reveal the most intimate secrets of 
his heart, his sister Henriette. It is to this correspondence, where 
his plans and prospects, his disappointments and his difficulties are 
frankly discussed, that we must turn for the real causes of his sepa- 
ration from the church. 

And from these letters it is very clear that his apostasy was not 
by any means due, as he insists, exclusively to historical and textual 
criticism, but quite as much to his readings in philosophy and natural 
science. For long before he was capable of wielding the weapons of 
textual criticism, ana before he had even begun his studies in biblical 
philology, he was being incessantly torn by religious doubts of the 
very gravest nature. Cf. A. S,. 49. 

As early as March, 1842, before he had begun either Hebrew or 
German (Lett. Sem., 165, 229), he was already inoculated with the 
germs of an all-questioning scepticism. 

On March 23, 1842, he writes to his sister: 

"D'ailleurs, le propre de la philosophie est moins de donner des 
notions bien assurees, que de lever une foule de prejuges. On est tout 
etonne, quand on commence a s'y adonner, de voir que jusque-la, on 
a ete le jouet de mille erreurs, enracinees par l'opinion, la coutume,. 
1 education." Lett. 87; also 122. Cf. Lett. Sem., 164, 175. 



368 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Again on Sept. 15 of the same year, he writes: 

"On voit les choses dune maniere si differente; on reconnait tant 
de prejuges et d'erreurs, la ou Ton ne croyait voir que verity, qu'on 
serait tenter d'embrasser un scepticisme universel. C'est la la pre- 
miere impression de l'etude de la philosophie." Lett, 96; also 100. 

And that it was not merely his secular beliefs that had grown un- 
certain, but his religious creed as well, appears clearly from another 
passage in the same letter, where he discusses the choice of a vocation. 
Declaring that he was not intended for a secular calling, he continues: 

"Je ne dis pas ceci par le zele d'une devotion spirituelle: oh! non; 
ce n'est plus la mon defaut; la philosophie est merveilleusement propre 
a en corriger les exces, et une reaction trop violente est seule a 
craindre." Lett., 100. 

Even in the Souvenirs itself there are passages in which the influ- 
ence of philosophy is explicitly recognized as an important factor in 
the destruction of his faith; as for example the following: 

"La contradiction des travaux philosophiques ainsi entendu avec la 
foi chretienne ne m'apparaissait point encore avec le degre de clarte' 
qui bientot ne devait laisser a mon esprit aucun choix entre l'abandon 
du christianisme et l'inconsequence la plus inavouable." Souv., 247; 
also 251; Cf. St. Beuve, Nouv. Lund., Je. 2, 1862; N. Am. Rev., 48-63ff. 

But the most glaring discrepancy appears in his attempt to account 
for the persistent orthodoxy of one of his teachers, the erudite M. 
Lehir. The question could scarcely fail to present itself to his mind: 
If the study of biblical criticism proved so disastrous to the faith of the 
student, why was the teaching of it compatible with the faith of the 
professor? 

"La verite' de l'orthodoxie," he writes of M. Lehir, "ne fut jamais 
pour lui l'objet d'un doute. . . Tout a fait etranger a la philosophie 
naturelle et a l'esprit scientifique, dont la premiere condition est de 
n'avoir aucune foi prealable et de rejeter ce qui n'arrive pas, il resta 
dans cette equilibre ou une conviction moins ardente eut trgbuche'. 
Le surnaturelle ne lui causait aucune repugnance intellectuelle." Souv., 
274; Cf. A. S., 49. 

The explanation is probably correct; but does it not involve the 
open admission that foremost among the causes of his own defection 
were "la philosophie naturelle et l'esprit scientifique," and a "repug- 
nance intellectuelle" against supernaturalism? Cf. Lett. Sem., 5, 15, 
16, 41. 

The truth is, when Renan entered upon his theological studies at 
St Sulpice, in Sep. 1843, he was virtually a disbeliever already. From 
the very first the onus probandi was thrown on Christianity. That 



BRAUEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST KENAN. 369 

was important. There is all the difference in the world between be- 
lieving a creed until disproven, and disbelieving it until proven; and 
there can be no doubt whatever that the latter was Kenan's attitude 
towards the Christian creed at the beginning of his theological studies. 

It cannot be true then, that his faith was destroyed by textual criti- 
cism of the bible, for the excellent reason that none remained to be 
destroyed. All that was left for philology to do* was to ripen the seed 
that philosophy and science had sown. And that it promptly did. 
By destroying the prestige of a supposedly infallible scripture, phil- 
ology dethroned the last authority which still subdued his reason 
and restrained his will. But even here there were powerful allies. 
Renan ceased to acknowledge the authority of the scriptures not 
merely because of errors and contradictions in the text, but also, as 
he very significantly observes in one of his letters of the time, be- 
cause an inspired book would be a miracle. Souv, 293-5 ; Cf . Dial. 14-22. 

That was decisive. To imply a miracle was to assail his most 
cherished conviction, the reign of law, and to assert an impossible ab- 
surdity. Dial., 14-22. In his mind, the impossibility of miracle had 
come to be more than a mere doctrine; it had acquired all the 
fixity of a mental category. Nothing could have prevailed at this 
period against his worship of reason. Had he witnessed a genuine 
miracle with his own eyes he would certainly have declared it hallu- 
cination or imposture rather than admit that the causal nexus of na- 
ture had been broken through. 

Indeed, were any specific belief to be named as the cause of his 
leaving the church, it would be this belief in the universality of irre- 
fragable natural law. In point of fact, however, no one such specific 
belief can be named. He is much nearer the truth when he says: 

"Mes doutes ne vinrent pas d'un raisonnement, ils vinrent de dix 
mille raisonnements." Souv., 284-5; Mor. Cr., 174. 

His entire disposition and method had led to this crisis. It was 
not so much his disbelief in any particular dogma that made it impos- 
sible for him to abide by the creed; it was the rationalism and the 
unfinality of his whole intellectual temper. Cf. James, Var. Rel. Exp., 
pp. 73-74. 

Half a century later, looking back upon this intellectual hypertrophy 
of his earlier period, he refers to himself humorously as 

"Un jeune homine, atteint d'une forte encephalite, vivant unique- 
ment dans sa tete et croyant frenetiquement a la verite." A. S., VI. 

Note 26. Renan has made repeated confession of his own disap- 
pointment with his labors in history: 

11 



370 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Je crains fort que nos ecrits de precision de l'Academie des inscrip- 
tions et belles-lettres, destinees a donner quelque exactitude a l'his- 
toire, ne pourissent avant d'avoir ete lus. Cest par la chimie a un 
bout, par l'astronomie a un autre, c'est surtout par la physiologie 
generale que nous tenons vraiment le secret de l'etre, du monde, de 
Dieu, comme on voudra l'appeler. Le regret de ma vie est d'avoir 
choisi pour mes etudes un genre de recherches qui ne s'imposera 
jamais et restera toujours a l'etat d'interessantes considerations sur 
une realite a jamais disparue." Souv., 263. See also his letter to M. 
Berthelot, Aug., 1863, in the Frag., 153-4; also "Disc, 134-5; A. S., XIV. 

One of his latest expressions of opinion as to the probable future 
of historical science occurs in his preface to the Avenir de la science 
1890: 

"L.es sciences historiques et leurs auxiliaires, les sciences philo- 
logiques, ont fait dlmmenses conquetes depuis que je les embrassai 
avec tant d'amour il y a quarante ans. Mais on en voit le bout. 
Dans un siecle, l'humanite saura a peu pres ce qu'elle peut savoir sur 
son passe. . . Le processus de la civilisation est reconnu dans ses 
lois generates. L'inegalite des races est constatee. Les titres de 
chaque famille humaine a des mentions plus ou moins honorables dans 
l'histoire du progres sont a peu pres determines." A. S., XIV. 

For a critical estimate of Renan as an historian, see the discussion 
of M. Ch. Seignobos, Hist. lang. litt. fr., t. VIII, 259-267. Also the esti- 
mate of M. Faguet in the same volume. 

Note 27. This is a very interesting confession; but does it really 
conform to his own canon of objective reason? Des lors la Vie de 
Jesus etait ecrite dans mon esprit." That is to say, fifteen years before 
it was written the Vie de Jesus was complete in his mind. The state- 
ment is doubtless true, and accounts for the fact, patent to all readers, 
that the character of Renan's Jesus so much resembles Renan. But 
how are we to reconcile this confession with his doctrine that truth 
must be a product of objective reason, as impartial and impersonal as 
a chemical precipitate Cf. F. Det. 401-2; also Souv., 274: "L'esprit 
scientifique, dont la premiere condition est de n'avoir aucune foi 
prealable." 

Is it not palpably plain that in this matter again Renan's theory is 
one thing and his practice quite another? Or rather his theory itself 
is many things; for a doctrine fundamentally opposed to the "chemical 
precipitate" theory is affirmed no less often. 

"La foi et l'amour, en apparence sans lien avec l'intelligence, sont 
le vrai fondement de la certitude morale et l'unique moyen qu'a 



BKATJEK THE PHILOSOPHY OF EKN"EST RENAN". 371 

rhomme de comprendre quelque chose au probleme de son origine et 
de sa destinee." Mor. Crit. II. 

Is not this the most subjective conceivable conception of truth? 

But why dwell longer on these perpetual contradictions? Is Renan 
alone, after all, in falling thus short of his own ideals? Let the con- 
sistent man, if he knows himself, throw the first stone! In the present 
instance, Renan is the more pardonable as the ideal to be attained is 
probably a mere fiction. For the truth seems to be, as Mr. Balfour and 
others have tried to show, that the doctrine of an objective reason, 
universally applied, is itself an unrealized — and perhaps unrealizable — 
subjective ideal. 



372 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 



APPENDIX B : BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The number of books, pamphlets and magazine articles written 
about Renan is of course much too large to be catalogued here. Most 
of them, especially those provoked by the Vie de Jesus, are of a con- 
troversial nature, and give little or no help towards a comprehension 
of Renan and his work. Among the best are the following: 

I. BIOGRAPHICAL. 

Boissier, G: Funerailles de M. E. Renan, 1895. 

Cognat, J.: Renan, hier et aujourdhui, 1883. 

Darmesteter, Mary J.: La Vie d'Ernest Renan, 1898. 

Denais, J: Du Seminaire au Pantheon, Paris, 1893. 

Duff, Sir M. E. Grant: Ernest Renan. In Memoriam, 1893. 

Espinasse, F.: Life of Renan, 1895. 

Frenzel, K: Renan und Henriette. Cosmopolis, Dec, 1896. 

Loth, J. : Renan au College de Treguier. In Annales de Bretagne, vol- 
VIII (1892), pp. 124-9 (the Palmares of Treguier College for the 
years 1836-7). 

Mahrenholtz, R.: Ernest Renan. In Zeitschrift f. fr. Sprache u. Lit., 
Bd. XVI, 50-93. 

Paris, G.: Penseurs et Poetes, 1896. 

Platzhoff, Eduard: Ein Lebensbild von Ernest Renan, Dresd, 1900. 

Perraud, Mgr.: Souvenirs et impressions, 1893. 

Scherer, Melanges d'histoire religieuse, 2nd ed., 1865. 

Renan, Ernest: Lettres du Seminaire (1838-1846), Paris, 1902. Let- 
tres Intimes de Ernest et de Henriette Renan, 1896. Correspon- 
dance, E. Renan et M. Berthelot, 1898. Souvenirs d'enfance et de 
jeunesse, dixieme ed., 1884. Ma Soeur Henriette. 

II. CRITICAL WORKS. 

Allier, R.: La philosophic d'Ernest Renan, 1894. 
Bodner, S.: Mikrokosmos, vol. 2, pp. 88-190, Berlin, 1898. 
Bourget, P. : Essais de psych, contemp., 1883. 
Brandes, G. : Eminent Authors of the 19th Cent, 1887. 
Brunetiere, F.: Nouveaux essais litt. cont, 1895. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN. 373 

Darmesteter, James: Notice sur la vie et les oeuvres de M. Renan, 

1893. 
Denis, Ch.: La Critique irreligieuse de Renan, 1898. 
Desportes, H. et Bourmand, F.: E. Renan, sa vie et son oeuvre, 1893. 
Faguet, E.: Politiques et moralistes, 3e serie, 1900. 
France, A. : La Vie litteraire, vols. 1 and 2. 

Hutton, R. H.: Criticism on contemporory thought, vol. 2, 1894. 
Labanca, B.: La "Vita di Gesu" di Ernesto Renan in Italia, 1900. 
Ledrain, A. : Renan, sa vie et ses oeuvres, 1892. 
Lemaitre, Jules: Les Contemporains, vols. 1 and 4. 

Impressions de theatre, vol. 1. 
Monod, G.: Renan, Taine et Michelet, 1894. 
Paris, G.: Penseurs et Poetes, 1896. 

Pellissier, G.: Le Mouvement litteraire au XIXe siecle, 1894. 
Platzhoff, Ed.: E. Renan, seine Entwickelung und Weltanschauung, 

1900. 
Rod, E.: Les Idees morales du temps present, 1891. 
Sainte-Beuve, Nouveaux Lundis, vols. II (18"62), and VI (1863). 
Saintsbury, G.: Miscellaneous Essays, 1892. 
Scherer, Edm.: Etudes sur la litt. contemp., vols. IV, VII, VIII, IX, 

X. 
Seailles, G.: Ernest Renan, 1895. 
Verne, M.: Revue de Belgique, 1898. 
Vogii§, E. M. de: Heures d'histoire, 1893. 
Wyzewa: Nos Maitres, 1895. 



III. MAGAZINE ARTICLES. 

The very numerous magazine articles about Renan can be readily 
found from the following works : 

Poole's Index to Periodical Literature, 1802, to date. There is now a 
very convenient abridgment of this work covering the period from 
1815-1899 in a single volume. 

Cumulative Index to a Selected list of Periodicals (for current num- 
bers). 

Bibliographie der Deutschen Zeitschriften-LItteratur, mit Einschluss 
von Sammelwerken und Zeitungen, Leipz. 1897. This work begins 
with the year 1896. 

Repertoire Bibliographique des Principales Revues Franchises, Paris, 
1898. This begins with 1897. 



374 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Catalogo Metodico degli Scritti Contenuti neTle Pubblicazioni Perio- 
diche italiane e straniere. The first volume of this work was pub- 
lished at Rome in 1885, but the indexing begins, for the more im- 
portant periodicals, with their first volume. 

IV. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES. 

The best general bibliography of Renan in existence is that of Mr. 
John P. Anderson, of the British Museum, which was published as 
an Appendix to The Life of Ernest Renan, by Fr. Espinasse, Lond., 
1895. 

In this work are listed, in chronological order, the various editions 
of Renan's writings, down to 1895; and a very extensive catalogue is 
given of books on Renan, in the various languages of Europe, besides 
a large number of articles from English and French magazines. 

This bibliography is reprinted, with less detail and a few unimpor- 
tant omissions, by Hugo Paul Thieme, in his brochure: La Litterature 
Francaise du dix-neuvieme Siecle, Paris and Leipzig, 1897; and the 
following books, besides a number of magazine articles, are added 
to Mr. Anderson's list: 

Brunetiere, Nouveaux Essais, 1895. 

Darmesteter, J.: Selected Essays, 1895. 

Deschamps, G.: La Vie et les Livres, 1896. 

Felix, C. J.: M. Renan et sa Vie de Jesus, 18T53. 

Guettee, F. R.: Du Discours d'ouverture de M. Renan, 1862. 

Hello, Era.: M. Renan et la Vie de Jesus, 1863. 

Lanson, G.: Hist. d. 1. Litterature Franc, 1895. 

Naudet, F.: Notes sur la Litterature Moderne, I— II, 1885-8. 

Rod, Ed.: Les Idees Morales du Temps Present, 1891. 

Wyzewa: Nos Maitres, 1895. 

The following works should be added to the bibliographies of MM. 
Anderson and Thieme: 

1. Renan's own works: 
Les antiquites egyptiennes et les fouilles de M. Mariette, souvenirs de 

mon voyage en Egypte, Rev. d. d. Mond., 1865. 
Documents epigraphiques recueillis dans le nord de l'Arabie par M. C. 

Doughty, publies et expliques par E. Renan, 1884. 
Introduction to Book III of the "Hundred Greatest Men," by F. Max 

Mueller and E. Renan, Lond., 1885. 
Melanges d'histoire et de voyages, 1890. 
Lettres Intimes de Ernest Renan et Henriette Renan, 1842-5, second 

ed., 1896. 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST REN AN. 375 

Same translated into English by Lady Mary Loyd, N. Y., 1896. 

Oeuvres choisies (In Colin's series of Pages Choisies), 1897. 

Ernest Renan et Marcelin Berthelot, Correspondance, 1847-92. Pub- 
lished by M. Berthelot in 1898. 

Etudes sur la politique religieuse du regne de Philippe le Bel, 1899. 
(A reprint from the Hist. Litt. d. 1. Fr., vols. 26, 27 and 28.) 

PriSre sur l'Acropole. Compositions de H. Bellery-Desfontaines, 
gravees par Eugene Froment, 1899. For an estimate of this beau- 
tiful edition d'art of a chapter from Renan's Souvenirs d'Enfance, 
see the article by: 

Janin, CI.: Le livre, a propos d'une edition d'art de la Priere sur 
l'acropole, in the Gazette des Beaux Arts, third series, vol. 24, pp. 
253-264, Paris, 1900. 
Another portion of the Souvenirs, with very fine illustrations, was 

published in Paris in 1901, under the title: 

Le broyeur de lin. Avec preface des Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeu- 
nesse. Vingt-sept eaux-fortes originales de Ed. Rudaux. 

Lettres du Seminaire (1838-1848), Paris, 1902. 

An annotated edition of the Souvenirs, with an introductory article 
which is the best brief treatment in print of Renan and his work, 
by Irving Babbit, published by Heath and Company, 1902. 

A catalogue of Renan's library was published in Paris in 1895, mak- 
ing a book of 495 pages. 
2. Biographical and critical works: 

Aurevilly, J. Barbey de: Les Oeuvres et les Hommes au dixneuvi&me 
siecle, vol. 6, 1887. A very adverse criticism. 

Bersot, Ern.: M. Ernest Renan. In his Essais, 1864, vol. 2, pp. 
264-80; 509-24. Reviews of R's Mor. Crit. and of his V. J. 

Bodner, Sigm.: Mikrokosmos, vol. 2, 88-190, Berl., 1898. 

Boissier Gaston: Funerailles de M. E. Renan, Paris, 1895. 

Bonghi, Ruggiero: La "Tempesta" di W. Shakspeare e il "Calibano" 
di E. Renan. Reale Accademia di scienze morale e politiche, 
Atti, 1879, XV: 9. 

Bussy, Ch. de (i. e., Marchal, Chas.): Renan en famille, Paris, 1866. 

Cassel, Paul S.: Preussen und Deutschland. Eine Antwort an Ernest 
Renan. Berl., 1870. 

Church, R. W.: Occasional papers selected from the Guardian, the 
Times and the Sat. Rev., 1846-90, 2 vols., Lond., 1897. (Reviews 
of R's Les Apotres, Hibbert lecture, and the Souv.) 

Crelier, H. J.: M. Ernest Renan trahissant le Christ par un roman, 
etc., second ed. Paris, 1864. 

Cuoq, J. A.: Jugement errone de M. E. Renan sur les langues sau- 
vages. Montreal, 1864. 



376 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WISCONSIN. 

Denais, J.: Du Seminaire au Pantheon, Paris, 1893. 

Denis, Ch.: La Critique irreligieuse de Renan, Paris, 189s. 

Desportes H. et Bourmand F. : Ernest Renan. Preface par J. de 

Biez, Paris, 1893. 
Deutsch, Em.: Literary Remains, Lond., 1874. 
Eminent Persons. Biographies reprinted' from the Times, Lond., 

1892-7 (vol. 5). 
Espinasse, Fr.: The life of Ernest Renan, 1895. 
Faguet, Em.: Politiques et Moralistes du 19e siecle, 3e serie, 1900. 
Felix, N.: M. Renan et sa Vie de Jesus, Paris, 1863. 
Frenzel, Karl: Renan und Henriette, Cosmopolis, Dec., 1896. 
Furness, W. H.: Remarks on Renan's Life of Jesus. Phil., 1865. 
Gratry, A. J. A.: Les Sophistes et la Critique, Paris, 1864. 
Griswold, Hattie: Personal Sketches of Recent Authors, Chicago, 

1898. 
Harrisse, Henry: M. Ernest Renan. 

Hutchison, Wm. G.: Introd. to Renan's Poetry of the Celtic Races. 
Hutton, R. H.: Criticism on Contemporary Thought, Lond., 1894, 

vol. 2. 
Janet, P.: La philosophie et M. Renan, Paris, 1858. 
Labanca, B.: La "Vita di Gesu" 3i Ernesto Renan in Italia; studio 

storico-critico, Roma, 1900. 
Littre, M. P. Emile: La Science au point de vue philosophique, Paris, 

1873. (Review of R's Hist. Semitic Languages.) 
Loth, J.: Renan au College de Treguier. In Ann ales de Bretagne, 

vol. VIII, pp. 121, 124-9 (1892). 
Mahrenholtz, R.: A carefully written article on Renan's life and 

work, in Zeitschrift f. franz. Sprache u. Lit., XVI: pp. 50-93. 
Negri, G. : Segni dei tempi; profili e bozzetti letterari. (Ernesto 

Renan e l'incredulita moderna.) Milano, 1893. 
Paris, Gaston: Penseurs et Poetes, 2e ed., Paris, 1896. (Discours 

prononces au nom du College de France, aux funerailles d'Ernest 

Renan.) 
Pearson, C. H.: Reviews and Critical Essays, Lond., 1896. 
Pellissier, G.: Literary Remains in France in 19th Cent., N. Y., 1897. 
Perraud, Mgr.: A propos de la mort et des funerailles de M. Ernest 

Renan, Souvenirs et Impressions, Paris, 1893. 
Platzhoff, Eduard: E. Renan, seine Entwickelung und Weltanschauung. 

Inaugural-Dissertation der philosophischen Fakultat der Univer- 

sitat Bern zur Erlangung der Doktorwurde, Dresden und Leipzig, 

1900. 
Ernest Renan; ein Lebensbild, Dresden, etc., 1900. (Vol. 9 

in "Manner der Zeit.") 



BRAUER THE PHILOSOPHY OF EARNEST RE'NAK". 377 

Poitou, M. Eug.: Les philosophes francais contemporains et leurs 

systemes religieux, Paris, 1864. M. Renan et l'Allemagne. Let- 

tre ouverte d'un Allemand, "Wiesbaden, 1879. 
Ritter, Dr. H.: E. Renan iiber Naturwiss. u. Geschichte, 1865. 
Robinson, A. M. F. (Mde. Darmesteter) : La Vie de Ernest Renan, 

Paris, 1898. 
Secretan, Ch.: Essais de pbilos. et de litt., pp. 368-71, 1896. 
Simon, J.: Quatre Portraits, Paris, 1896. 

Smalley, Geo.: London Letters and Some Authors, vol. I, N. Y., 1891. 
Strong, Aug. H.: Christ in Creation, and Ethical Monism, Phil., 1899. 

(pp. 332^363.) 
Stuart, H.: Paris Days. 
Tollemache, L. A.: Essays, Mock-Essays and Character Sketches, 

1898. 
Vattier, G.: Galerie des Academiciens, 3e serie, Paris, 1863-6. 
Verne, Maurice: E. Renan. In Revue de Belgique, 1898. 
Vogue, E. M. de: Heures d'Histoire, Paris, 1893. 



378 ' BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. 



APPENDIX C: ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED, AND 
EDITIONS; QUOTED. 

(Unless otherwise stated, the author is Renan.) 

Amiel, Journ. — Fragments d'un Journal Tntime, 7th ed., Geneve, 1897. 

Ant. — L'Antechrist. 

Apost— Apostles, N. Y., 1866. 

Averr. — Averroes et lAverroisme, 4th ed., 1882. 

A. S. — LAvenir de la Science, 8th ed., 1894. 

Cant. — Le Cantique des Cantiques, 7th ed., 1891. 

C. d'Angl. — Conferences dAngleterre, 1880. 

Darmesteter, Agn. M. F. — The Life of Ernest Renan, 1898. 

Dial. — Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques, 4th ed., 1895. 

Disc. — Discours et Conferences, 3rd ed., 1887. 

Dr. Ph. — Drames philosophiques, 1888. 

Eccl. — L'Ecclesiaste, 3rd ed., 1890. 

E. R. — Ernest Renan. 

Espinasse, Fr. — Life of Ernest Renan, Lond., 1895. 
Frag., see Dial. 

F. Det. — Feuilles Detachees, 9th ed., 1892. 
Fort. Rev. — Fortnightly Review. 
Found. Bel. — Foundations of Belief. 

Hist. Rel. — Etudes d'histoire religieuse, 7th ed., 1864. 

James, Var. Rel. Exp. — Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902. 

Job — Le Livre de Job, 5th ed., 1894. 

Lang. Sem. — Histoire generale des langues semitiques, 1863. 

Lett. Sem.— Lettres du Seminaire (1838-46), 1902. 

(1842-5), 4th ed., 1896. 
Lett. Sem. — Lettres du Seminaire (1838-46-, 1902. 
M.-Aur. — Marc-Aurele 'et la fin du monde antique, 1882. 
Monod, Renan, Taine et Michelet, 1894. 
Mor. Crit. — Essais de morale et de critique, 4th ed., 1889. 
Nouv. Hist. Rel. — Nouvelles etudes d'histoire religieuse, 1884. 
Or. Lang. — De l'Origine du Langage, 3rd ed., 1859. 
P. Isr. — History of the People of Israel, Boston, 1894-5. 



BRATJER THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENJdS". 379 

Peup. Sem. — De la part des peuples semitiques dans l'histoire de la 

civilisation, 7th ed., 1875. 
Q. C. — Questions Contemporaines, 3rd ed., 1870. 
Ref. Int. — La Reforme intellectuelle et morale, 4th ed., 1884. 
Seailles — Ernest Renan, 2nd ed., 1895. 
Sidgwick, Henry — Methods of Ethics, 5th ed. 
Souv. — Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse. 
V. J.— La Vie de Jesus, 9th ed., 1863. 



.b My '08 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNEST RENAN 



BY 

HERMAN G. A. BRAUER, M. A. 



A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, 1902 



(Reprinted from the Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, 

Philology and Literature Series, 

Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 205-379) 



MADISON, WISCONSIN 
October, 1903 



